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LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE
MENTALLY ILLt
JAMES R. ELuiss*
The "rights revolution," sparked by the United States Supreme Court under the leadership of former Chief Justice Earl
Warren, has abated as the Court modifies and in some instances
emasculates the constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants. While the Supreme Court assumes a more "moderate" position regarding the rights of criminal defendants and takes a closer
look at due process decisions generally, the "rights revolution" has
had substantial spillover effect in the case of individuals confined
involuntarily in mental institutions.' The courts, especially federal
courts, have recognized the constitutional basis of procedural and
substantive safeguards for individuals subject to commitment in
state mental institutions. Judicially mandated procedural safeguards for committing persons and insuring their rights to proper
treatment once confined have necessitated widespread legislative
reform of state mental health statutes.
One of the rights now afforded individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment is representation by legal counsel. By one
t Copyright 1980 by James R. Elkins.
* A.B., University of Kentucky, 1967; J.D., University of Kentucky, 1971;
LL.M., Yale University, 1975; Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I The effort to secure additional legal rights for the mentally ill has received a
setback in recent decisions of the Supreme Court. The Court in Addington v. Texas,
99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979), refused to analogize involuntary confinement to criminal
incarceration for purposes of determining the state's burden of proof in interfering
with the liberty of the mentally ill. In Parham v. J. R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that constitutional due process for children whose parents seek
to confine them in mental institutions is satisfied by a psychiatric determination
that appropriate legal standards have been met. These decisions indicated that the
Court is unwilling to curb the power of institutional psychiatry through the creation
of additional procedural safeguards for the mentally ill. The Court may be signaling
that the spill-over of rights from the criminal justice system to the mental health
system has ended.
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count, forty-two of the states now provide for legal representation,2
and the presence of defense counsel or a guardian ad litem3 in civil
commitment proceedings is now routine. By statute, the majority
of states require that legal counsel be appointed for individuals
subject to involuntary commitment.' Where statutes fail t6 provide for counsel, counsel may still be required as a matter of constitutional right.' West Virginia, by statute, specifically provides that
2Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process:A Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1540 n.2 (1975).
The representation of counsel is not mandatory in some states. For example,
some states require the appointment of counsel only where the individual specifically requests the assistance of an attorney. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/2,
§ 8-22 (Supp. 1975); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 13(c) (1972 Replacement Vol.); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 83-1049 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1 - 13 (1978
Replacement Vol.); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
ANN.

§ 54.1

(West 1978); WASH. REv. CODa

§ 71.05.200 (1)(b) (1975).

A second group of states makes the appointment of counsel discretionary with
the court. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 433A.270 (1975); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 88(c)
(McKinney 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970).
A few states require the appointment of a guardian ad litem who may, but is
not required to be, an attorney. See, e.g., HAW REv. STAT. § 334-82 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
3 One state provides for the appointment of a guardian ad litem without reference to whether such individual should be a lawyer. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-213 (1972).
In the majority of states, state mental health codes specifically provide for
the appointment of counsel for indigents subject to civil commitment hearings. A
list of the states and relevant statutory provisions is contained in Brunetti, The
Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings, 29 Sw. L.J. 684, 689 n.21 (1975).
1 For a discussion of the constitutional basis for the right to counsel, see Brunetti, supra note 4, at 691-98. The author argues that the Sixth Amendment and
the general principles of due process furnish constitutional grounds for requiring the
presence of counsel and that the provisions of thosb states that do not require
appointment of counsel or make such appointment discretionary with the courts
are constitutionally deficient.
The federal courts that have considered the issue have upheld the indigent
mental patient's right to counsel. See, e.g., In Re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D.
Pa. 1971). While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
issue, its rulings in other areas suggest that the Court will endorse the trend of
decisions in the lower federal courts. See Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel
for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, and a Proposal, 45
Miss. L.J. 43, 44-45 (1974). See generally Note, Civil Commitments: Should There
Be A ConstitutionalRight to Counsel, 2 CAP. U.L. REv. 126 (1973); Note, The Right
to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings,40 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1967).
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counsel be appointed to represent the mentally ill in a commitment hearing' and makes mandatory counsel's presence at the
hearing.7 While the right to counsel in civil commitment hearings
is now secured by statutory provision buttressed by judicial
suggestion that counsel is constitutionally required, there remains
a question concerning the appropriate role of an attorney in representing the mentally ill. s This article will explore the function of
6 The West Virginia statute provides that "[i]n the event that the individual
has not retained counsel, the court or mental hygiene commissioner at least seven
days prior to hearing shall appoint a competent attorney ....
." W. VA. CODE §
27-5-4(g) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
7 The West Virginia statute makes appointment of counsel mandatory and
makes no reference to a client's waiver of counsel. The language of the statute
suggests, however, that both the individual who is subject to the hearing and the
attorney "shall" be present. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(h)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The
statute does not envision waiver of counsel. Some 25 other states have statutory
provisions which do not mention waiver of counsel. See Brunetti, supra note 4, at
700. For a discussion of the waiver issue, see Brunetti, supra note 4, at 701-06. See
generally Corder, Haizlip, & Spears, Legal Issues in the Treatment of Adolescent
PsychiatricInpatients, 27 Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHiAT. 712 (1976); Note, The
Right to Counsel at Civil Competency Proceedings, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 389-92
(1967); Comment, Mental Health - Applicable Standardsin Waiver of Right to
Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 607 (1976).
ASee generally R. RoCK, M. JACOBSON, R. JANOPAUL, HosPrrALiZATION AND DisCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 157-60 (1968); Andalman & Chambers, Effective
Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, and A
Proposal,45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and
Professional Responsibility, 33 ALB. L. REv. 92 (1968); Brakel, The Role of the
Lawyer in the Mental Health Field, 2 A.B.F. RESARCH J. 467 (1977); Broderick,
Justice in the Books or Justice in Action - An InstitutionalApproach to Involuntary Hospitalization for Mental Illness, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 547, 620-32 (1971);
Brunetti, The Right to Counsel, Waiver Thereof, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings,29 Sw. L.J. 684 (1975); Cohen, The Function
of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424 (1966);
Cyr, The Role and Functionsof the Attorney in the Civil Commitment Process:The
District of Columbia Approach, 6 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 107 (1978); Dix, The Role of
the Lawyer in Proceedings Under the Texas Mental Health Code, 39 TEX. B.J. 982
(Nov. 1976); Ennis, Civil Liberties and MentalIllness, 7 CraM. L. BULL. 101 (1971);
Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned to Hate the
Adversary System, 6 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 71 (1978); Gassel, Levy-Warren & Weiss,
Representing the Helpless: Toward an Ethical Guide for the PerplexedAttorney, 5
W. ST. U.L. REV. 173 (1978); Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally
Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REv. 553 (1979); Hiday, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment: Changes, Effects, and Determinants,5 J. Psychiat. & L. 551 (1977);
Kirtpatrick, Oregon'sNew Mental Commitment Statute: The Expanded Responsibilities of Courts and Counsel, 53 OR. L. REv. 245 (1974); Kumasaka & Gupta,
Lawyers and Psychiatrists in the Court: Issues on Civil Commitment, 32 MD. L.
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the attorney assigned or engaged to represent a client in a civil
commitment hearing. The author will present specific suggestions
for a more adequate and effective representation of the mental
patient/client. Finally, the article will explore other alternatives to
the present system of representation of the mentally ill in West
Virginia.
Exposing the inadequacies in the legal representation of the
mentally ill has been left in large part to legal commentators. The
civil commitment process historically has been of little concern
either to the public or to the practicing bar The low visibility of
REV. 6 (1972); Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974); Mutnick & Lazar, A Practical
Guide to Involuntary Commitment Proceedings, 11 WILLAMErE L.J. 315 (1975);
Patch, The Mentally Disabled and His Lawyer, 2 J. PSYCHIAT. &L. 33 (1974); Perlin
& Siggers, The Role of the Lawyer in Mental Health Advocacy, 4 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIAT. -& L. 204 (1976); Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on
Admissions to a State Mental Hospital: A Confrontation of Professions, 10 J.
HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 66 (1969); Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Admin.
istrationof PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein Arizona, 13 Aniz. L. REV.
1, 51-60 (1971); How to Represent Clients at Mental Commitment Hearings, 23
LEGAL AID BRIEF CASES 19 (1964); Practice Manual, The Attorney's Role at the
Commitment Hearings:Guidelines and PracticalConsiderations,2 MENTAL DISABiLITY L. Rpm. 427 (Jan.-Feb. 1978); Note, Compulsory Counsel for California's
New Mental HealthLaw, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 851 (1970); Note, The Role of Council
in the Civil Commitment Process:A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540
(1975); Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lawyer and the Court in Securing
Psychiatric Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil Commitment
Procedures, 6 Hous. L. REv. 519, 531-32 (1969).
1 The civil commitment process has, however, received substantial attention
in the legal literature, resulting in an almost state-by-state analysis. See, e.g.:
ALABAMA: Cole, The Nadir of Due Process: An Analysis of Involuntary Civil
Commitment ProcedureIn Alabama, 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 8 (1972). ARIZONA:
Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Administration of PsychiatricJustice:
Theory and Pratticein Arizona, 13 Aiuz. L. REV. 1 (1971). ARKANSAS: Gazman,
Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Defendant in Arkansas, 24 ARK. L. REV. 19
(1970); Comment, Arkansas Involuntary Civil Commitment: In The Rear Guard of
the Due Process Revolution, 32 ARK. L. REv. 294 (1978). CALIFORNIA: E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN PoLITIcs: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN

CALIFORNIA (1972); Abramson, The Criminalizationof Mentally DisorderedBehavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIAT. 101 (1972); Harrington, Involuntary Commitment of Mentally Disordered
Persons Under the Lanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 8 LINcoLN L. REv. 55 (1973);
Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder:The Applicationof California's Lanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 11 L. & Soc'y REv. 629 (1972); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California:The Lanterman-Petris-ShortAct, 7 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 93 (1974); Note, "Who Says I'm Crazy?" - A Proposalfor Mandatory
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161

Judicial Review of Emergency Detention in California, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 695
(1978); (For a bibliography of articles on civil commitment in California, see A.
BROOKS, LAW, PsYCHATRY AND THE MENAL HEATH SYSTEM 602-03 (1974)). COLO-

RADO: Brofman, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the Denver Probate
Court, 46 DEN. L.J. 496 (1969); Elliott, Proceduresfor Involuntary Commitment on
the Basis of Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. CoLo. L. REV. 231 (1970); Steingarten,
Report from Colorado:The New Commitment Law, 4 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 105 (1976).
CONNECTICUT: Comment, The Mentally Ill in Connecticut-A Survey, 6 CONN.
L. REV. 303 (1973-74). DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Peele, Chodoff & Taub,
Involuntary Hospitalization and Treatability: Observations from the District of
ColumbiaExperience, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 744 (1974). FLORIDA: Deasy & Steele,
Analysis of a State Hospital PopulationSubject to Release Under FloridaLaw, 27
Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIAT. 42 (1976); Flaschner, Florida'sNew Mental Health
Law, 46 FLA. B.J. 344 (1972); Note, Involuntary Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill
Under Florida'sBaker Act: ProceduralDue Process and The Role of the Attorney,
26 U. FLA. L. REV. 508 (1974). HAWAII: Wexler, Comments and QuestionsAbout
Mental Health in Hawaii, 13 HAW. B.J. 3 (Winter, 1978). ILLINOIS: Schlensky,
Constitutional Problems with Mental Commitment in Illinois, 62 ILL. B.J. 552
(1974); Comment, Mental Health - Clarifying Statutory and Constitutional
Guidelinesfor Involuntary Civil Commitment ProcedureUnder the Illinois Mental
Health Code, 6 Loy. Cm. L.J. 208 (1975). IOWA: Bezanson, Involuntary Treatment
of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation, 61 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1975);
Contemporary Studies Project: Facts and FallaciesAbout Iowa Civil Commitment,
55 IOWA L. REV. 895 (1970); Note, Due ProcessDeficiencies in Iowa's Civil Commitment Procedure,64 IOWA L. REv. 65 (1978). KENTUCKY: Note, Civil Commitment
of the Mentally.Ill in Kentucky, 62 Ky. L.J. 769 (1974). LOUISIANA: Comment,
Civil Commitment Procedurein Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REv. 149 (1970); Comment,
The Louisiana Mental Health Law of 1977: An Analysis and a Critique, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 542 (1978). MASSACHUSE'ITS: Flaschner, The New MassachusettsMental
Health Code - A "Magna Carta" or a Magna Maze?, 56 MAsS. L.Q. 49 (1971);
Joorst & McGarry, MassachusettsMental Health Code:Promise and Performance,
60 A.B.A.J. 95 (1975); McGarry, Massachusetts'New Mental Health Act: Process
& Performance,MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 179 (F.

Ayd ed. 1974); Walker, Mental Health Law Reform in Massachusetts, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 986 (1973). MICHIGAN: Morris & Luby, Civil Commitment in a Surburban
County: An Investigation by Law Students, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 518 (1973); Note,
Michigan's Revised Mental Health Code, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 620 (1976); Note,
Language of Involuntary Mental Hospitalizations:A Study in Sound and Fury, 4
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 195 (1970); Comment, Problems of Chapters4, 5, & 8 of the New
Michigan Mental Health Code, 1975 Der. C.L. REV. 229. MISSOURI: Note,
Missouri's New Mental Health Act: The Problems With Progress, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 209; Comment, Legal Fiction,Misguided Paternalism,and Unfounded Prediction: Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment in Missouri, 20 St. Louis
U.L.J. 120 (1975). MONTANA: Note, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
38 MONT. L. REV. 307 (1977). NEBRASKA: Hagel, Defending the Mentally Ill: A
Discussion of Nebraska's Involuntary Commitment Proceedings,57 NEB. L. REV. 1
(1978); Levie, The New Mental Health Commitment Act: How Does It Work?, 62
NEB. MED. J. 196 (June, 1977); Peters, et'al, Administrative Civil Commitment:
The Ins and Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 266 (1975); Peters,
et al, Administrative Civil Commitment: The NebraskaExperience and Legislative
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Reform Under the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act of 1976, 10
CREIGHTON L. REV. 243 (1976); Comment, Civil Commitment: The Nebraska Substantive Standard, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265 (1974). NEW MEXICO: Note,
ConstitutionalProblems of.Civil Commitment Procedures in New Mexico, 6
N.M.L. REV. 113 (1976). NEW YORK: J. ZUSMAN & W. CARNAHAN, MENTAL
HEALTH: NEW YORK LAW AND PRACTICE (2 Vols.) (1975); Dawidoff, Commitment of
the Mentally Ill in New York: Some Comments and Suggestions, 3 J. PSYCHnAT. &

L. 79 (1975); Faust, New Mental Hygiene Law of New York: A Recodification, 19
N.Y.L.F. 83 (1973). NORTH CAROLINA: Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11 LAW & Soc'y REV. 651 (1977);
Note, North Carolina'sNew Mental Health Laws: More Due Process, 52 N.C. L.
Rev. 589 (1974). NORTH DAKOTA: Lockney, ConstitutionalProblems With Civil
Coimitment of the Mentally Ill in North Dakota, 52 N.D.L. REV. 83 (1975). OHIO:
Dewey, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: An Inquiry into the Deprivationof Civil
Liberties Under Ohio Laws and Procedures, 1 CAP. U.L. REv. 1 (1972); Comment,
The New Ohio Mental Health Act, 11 AKRON L. REV. 104 (1977); Comment,
Reforming the Mental Health Law of Ohio, 7 AKRON L. REv. 475 (1974). OKLAHOMA: McDougal, Mental Health Laws in Oklahoma: Who Needs Commitment?,
13 TULSA L.J. 258 (1977). OREGON: Kirkpatrick, Oregon's New Mental Health
Commitment Statute: The Expanded Responsibilitiesof Courts and Counsel, 53
OR. L. REV. 245 (1974); Mutnick & Lazar, A PracticalGuide to Involuntary Commitment Proceedings, 11 WiLAMsTT L.J. 315 (1975); Comment, Involuntary Civil
Commitment in Oregon, 9 WILLAMETrTE L.J. 63 (1973). PENNSYLVANIA: Belsky,
Pennsylvania's New Mental Health Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 482 (1977); Meisel,
PennsylvaniaCivil Commitment Procedures:A PracticalGuide, 77(3) PA. MED. 47
(1974); Note, Pennsylvania'sMental Health ProceduresAct, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 669
(1978); Note, Gates of Cerberus:Involuntary Civil Commitment in Philadelphia,
49 TEMP. L.Q. 323 (1976); Note, Standardsfor Involuntary Civil bommitment in
Pennsylvania,38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 535 (1977); Note, Revising Pennsylvania'sInvoluntary Civil Commitment Statute, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 180 (1975); Comment,
Pennsylvania's Commitment: The Mental Health ProceduresAct, 50 TEMP. L.Q.
1035 (1977); Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment
in Pennsylvania, 15 VILL. L. REV. 951 (1970). SOUTH DAKOTA: Note, Involuntary
Civil Commitment in South Dakota: A Step Closer to ConstitutionalLegitimacy,
19 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1974); Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Nondangerous Mentally Ill: Substantive Limitations, 18 S.D.L. REV. 407 (1973). TENNESSEE: Brenner, Commitment Procedures:1975 Amendments, 68 J. TENN. MED. A.
630 (1975); Note, Civil Commitment in Tennessee - What Process is Due?, 8 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 135 (1977); Comment, Constitutional- Right to Liberty - Involuntary Confinement of Mental Patients, 43 TENN. L. REv. 366 (1976). TEXAS: Note,
Texas Involuntary Commitment Laws - Unconstitutional?,25 BAYLOR L. REV. 273
(1973); Note, Involuntary Commitment in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 474 (1977);
Comment, Civil Commitment in Texas - An Illusion of Due Process, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 486 (1976). VIRGINIA: Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment in Virginia: A
ConstitutionalPerspective, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 646 (1973). WASHINGTON:
Note, Striking a Balance Between Liberty and Health: The Washington Mental
Health Act, 11 GONZAGA L. REV. 720 (1976); Comment, Progress in Involuntary
Commitment, 49 WASH. L. REv. 617 (1974). WISCONSIN: Dix, Hospitalizationof
the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for Re-Examination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1
(1967); Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v.
Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 503.
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the civil commitment process can be attributed to both social
and legal factors, including the tendency to ignore complex social
problems. For years, the mentally ill were warehoused in geographically remote state mental institutions, in part, to isolate and distance ourselves from social "undesirables." The tendency to hide
the problem of the mentally ill is also reflected in the legal process.
Civil commitment proceedings and records are not open to public
scrutiny."° Of even greater significance is the fact that civil commitment hearings are held without juries."
In order to provide a factual framework in which to analyze
the role of the lawyer, the Appendix contains transcripts of three
civil commitment hearings. The hearings reported in the Appendix
and those observed by other legal commentators demonstrate that
assigned counsel frequently serve as a "legitimizing force" in the
commitment process. Attorneys often do little more than insure
that the legal proceedings satisfy statutory and constitutional requirements. Few attorneys understand the nature of mental illness, the social, political, and psychological issues which are raised
by "labeling" an individual mentally ill.2 It is with these issues in
mind that this article suggests a more active role for the lawyer in
1*The West Virginia Code provides that "[t]he circuit court or mental hygiene commissioner shall hear evidence from all interested parties in, chamber
." W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(i)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The statute also provides that:
[t]he written application, certificate, affidavit and any warrants issued
pursuant thereto, including any papers and documents related thereto
filed with any circuit court or mental hygiene commissioner for the involuntary hospitalization of any individual shall not be open to inspection
by any person other than the individual, except upon authorization of the
individual or his legal representative or by order of the circuit court and

such records shall not be published except upon the authorization of the
individual or his legal representative.
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(c)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
,1 The West Virginia Mentally Ill Persons Act makes no reference to the right
to have a jury make the determination that an individual should be involuntarily

committed to a mental institution and, consequently, civil commitment hearings
in West Virginia are heard by either a circuit judge or a mental hygiene commis-

sioner. See text accompanying notes 60-64, infra. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has recently ruled that state and federal due process requirements do
not mandate jury trials in civil commitment proceedings. Markey v. Wachtel,
No. 144-79 (filed Dec. 11, 1979),

-

S.E.2d -

(W. Va. 1979).

,2 For an introduction to the "labeling theory" of mental illness, see LABELuNG
MADNESS

(T. Scheff ed. 1975).
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the civil commitment hearing and a more vigorous defense for the
mentally ill client.
The decision to confine the mentally ill against their will is not
an isolated act solely dependent upon the family and a consenting
psychiatrist. The determination to confine a person for the protection of society or from harm that the person might cause himself
or herself should be considered in a broader social, political, historical,' 3 and legal context. While a complete socio-political-historical
perspective is beyond the scope of this article, 3" a brief sketch
" See N. DAiN, CONCEPTS OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1789-1865 (1964);
A. DEUTScH, THE MENTALLY ILL INAMERICA (2d ed. 1949); M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS
AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN AN AGE OF REASON (1973); G. GROB,
MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERIcA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973); G. ROSEN, MADNESS
INSOCIETY (1968); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971); V. SKULTANS,
MADNESS AND MORALS: IDEAS OF INSANITY IN THE NINErEENTH CENTURY (1975); THE
AGE OF MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY HOSPITAUZATION (T. Szasz ed. 1973);

Dershowitz, The Origins of Preventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law Part II, The American Experience, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 781 (1974).
'1-' The work of Dr. Thomas Szasz has been perhaps the most influential (especially in the legal community) in bringing about a critical scrutiny of institutional
psychiatry and the social and legally approved practice of confining the mentally
ill against their will.
Szasz's overall impact on involuntary institutionalization is unclear. His work

parallels a decade of fundamental change in the era of massive state institutions.
The decade was characterized by activism committed to "the sanctity of the individual, the absolute priority of the needs of minorities and the poor, and a distrust
of institutional ways of dealing with social issues." Miller, The "Right to Treatment": Can the Courts Rehabilitate and Cure?, 46 PUB. INTEREST 96 (1977).
Dr. Szasz's charge to the legal profession during this period of extensive institutionalization was to "cease all further collaboration with agencies or institutions
entrusted with the drafting or enforcement of mental health law. . . ." Szasz, A
Psychiatrist Views Mental Health Legislation, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 224, 225 (1970).

The anomaly in Szasz's position is that he also viewed the usual efforts at mental
health law reform as useless and harmful. Id. at 224. This position was based on
the view that involuntary mental hospitalization is a form of slavery and should
be abolished. Szasz finds no situations and no circumstances which would justify
involuntary confinement. Id. at 234. "It is an unqualified moral evil." Id. at 236.
Szasz's views have been spelled out in numerous law review articles, books, and
in. psychiatric literature. In the legal literature, see Szasz, The Dangerof Coercive
Psychiatry, 61 A.B.A.J. 1246 (1975); Szasz, The Sane Slave: Social Control and
Legal Psychiatry, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 337 (1972); Szasz, Hospital Refusal to
Release Mental Patient, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 220 (1960); Szasz, The Control of
Conduct: Authority vs. Autonomy, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 617 (1975); Szasz, The Right
to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734 (1969); Szasz, Medicine & Madness, 3 J. PSYCHIAT. &
L. 215 (1975); Szasz, The Child As Involuntary MentalPatient:The Threat of Child
Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy and Self-Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
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of the history of institutionalization of the mentally ill will provide
the attorney with a point of departure for further study.
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE EARLY YEARS

Mental illness was not viewed as a critical social problem in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. David Rothman, in
his book, The Discovery of the Asylum, argues that insanity, during the colonial period, was treated no differently from other forms

of disability and social deviance. The mentally ill were simply
viewed as needy persons who were dependent upon the community
for care" and there was little or no systematic effort to isolate the
mentally ill from the community. 5 Much of the colonial legislation
1005 (1977); Szasz, From Contract to Status Via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW,

537 (1973); Szasz, Involuntary Psychiatry, 45 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1976).
Dr. Szasz's views are expounded in their most comprehensive form in his
various books. E.g., THE THEOLOGY OF MEDICINE (1977); PsYcmATRIc JUsTICE (1965);
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961). It

should come as little surprise that the views of Dr. Szasz have generated considerable debate, especially within the psychiatric profession. The real anomaly is that
Dr. Szasz is a practicing psychoanalyst, a fact that many of his critics would like
to overlook. He has become the bete noir of the psychiatric profession. The body
of literature in response to Szasz is substantial and no attempt will be made here
to list it all. The following is a representative sampling. Begelman, A Taste of
Honey: Dr. Guttmacher on Dr. Szasz, 18 PSYCH. REP. 531 (April, 1966); Grenander, Thomas Szasz and the Right to Choose, 2 Civ. Lm. REv. 130 (Spring, 1975);
Guttmacher, Critique of Views of Thomas Szasz on Legal Psychiatry, 10 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 238 (1964); Kubie, The Myths of Thomas Szasz, 38 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 497 (1974); Robitscher, Controversial Crusades, 4 MED. Op. & REy.
188 (1968); Robitscher, The Impact of New Legal Standardson Psychiatry or
Who are David Bazelon and Thomas Szasz and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things About Us? or Authoritarianism Versus Nihilism in Legal Psychiatry,
3 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 151 (1975); Schoenfeld, An Analysis of the Views of Thomas
Szasz, 4 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 245 (1976); Schur, PsychiatristUnder Attack: The
Rebellious Szasz, 217 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 72 (June, 1966); Slovenko, Civil Commitment in Perspective, 20 J. Pus. L. 3 (1971); Stone, Hanging the Psychiatrists,
62 A.B.A.J. 773 (1976); Stone, Law, Property & Liberty: A Polemic That Fails, 42
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 627 (1972); Stone, Psychiatry Kills: A Critical Evaluation
of Dr. Thomas Szasz, J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 23 (1973); Goldberg, Book Review, 50
A.B.A.J. 1073 (1964); Morris, Book Review, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1164 (1971).
H D. ROTHMAN, THE DIsCovERY OF THE ASYLUM 4, 130 (1971). "The insane re-

ceived public attention and sympathy as one group among the poor whose incapacitating ailment made them permanently dependent upon relatives or upon the community. But the biological or social agents of mental disease and the precise nature
of the affliction prompted little reflection." Id. at 109.
11The failure to segregate the mentally ill from the community at large is not
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applicable to the mentally ill dealt primarily with those who interfered with or could not or would not contribute to the survival task
of society. "Since illness and dependency were intimately related,
the care of the mentally ill usually came under the jurisdiction of
the local community as a result of the poor laws."' 8 The colonial
laws applicable to the insane dealt with their property rather than
any notion of treatment. 7 For example, Massachusetts Province
adopted a legal code in 1641 which made reference to "distracted"
persons and idiots and provided for a "General Court" to validate
the transfer of property from the control of such persons.' 8 One
writer, Gerald Grob, reports that:
By 1676 the General Court noting the rise in the number of
'distracted persons' and the problems stemming from their behavior, ordered town selectmen to care for such persons so that
'they doe not Damnify others.' Selectmen were also empowered
to manage the estates of such individuals and to pay all expenses incurred from the property owned by them."
By the end of the eighteenth century another law authorized
commitment to a house of correction of any person '[l]unatic
and so furiously mad as to render it dangerous to the peace or
safety of the good people, for such lunatic person to go at
large.'n
The essential purpose of these early laws was to authorize
community care for the assets and physical persons of those unable
to care for themselves. "Provision was made for guardianship, for
the support of the indigent insane, and, somewhat later, for the
confinement of those regarded as a threat to the well-being of the

community."'"
It is significant that "[v]irtually none of the legislation enacted by colonial legislatures referred to the medical treatment of
surprising since "there is no reason for believing that the condition of the insane
was appreciably worse than that of other dependent groups within colonial society."
G. GROB, MENTAL INSTITuTONs IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLCY TO 1875, at 12 (1973).
"Id. at 8.
'7 Justice Neely finds the historical roots of parenspatriae,the doctrine which
underlies state intervention to care and treat the mentally ill, in efforts at protecting the property of the mentally ill. Hawks v. Lararo, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
Is GROB, supra note 15, at 8.
It Id.
"Id. at 9.
21Id. at 10.
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the insane; it emphasized mainly the social and economic side of
mental illness."" The care of the mentally ill prior to the nineteenth century did not reflect widespread public concern with the
problems growing out of insanity. The community became involved only when an individual seemed to threaten public safety
or had no means of support.
By the Jacksonian era (1830's), the view of insanity had
changed. While the colonists "had assumed that its cause, like
that of other diseases, rested with God's will . . . ," social
activists, psychiatrists,' general practitioners, and asylum administrators 2l insisted that insanity was curable and the asylum was
the means by which the cure could be effected. 2 During the 1830's,
1840's, and 1850's, the institutionalization of the insane became a
standard practice as the states began to construct asylums. 2 By
1860, twenty-eight of the thirty-three then existing states had built
public institutions for the mentally ill.2? As David Rothman puts
' 29
it, "[a] cult of asylum swept the country.
Insanity in this period was no longer viewed as God's will but
a result of social chaos and disorder. "The style of life in the new
republic seemed willfully designed to produce mental illness.
Everywhere they looked, they found chaos and disorder, a lack
of fixity and stability. The community's inherited traditions and
procedures were dissolving, leaving incredible stresses and
2 Id.
2
21

ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 109.

"Although psychiatrists preferred to conceive of the mental hospital as a

strictly medical institution, their analysis of the nature and etiology of mental
illness and their modes of care and treatment were not far removed from the values
of American society." GROB, supra note 15, at 133.
2 Asylum administrators or "medical superintendents," as David Rothman
refers to them, tended "to come from the ranks of socially concerned physicians."
GROB, supra note 15, at 134. On the professionalization of mental hospital superintendents and the ideology of this professional group, see id. at 134-50.
26 ROTHimN, supra note 14, at 131.
2 Id. at 130.
SId.
26 Id. It should be noted here that, as in colonial times, the issue of the care
and treatment of the insane was usually raised within the framework of welfare and
dependency. The establishment of mental hospitals, therefore, was but one phase
of the larger thrust toward the creation of public structures for dependent groups."
GROB, supra note 15, at 85. See, Symposium: Mentally Retarded People and the
Law, 31 STAN. L. Rav. 541 (1979).
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strains." 3 From this view of society, the psychiatrist "linked mental illness to social organization." 3' Logically, the first .step.in the
cure of insanity which results from social disorganization is to
remove the "distracted individual" from society. The removal was
accomplished by literally segregating both the insane individual
and the institution from the community? What better way to
restore a disordered mind than to isolate the individual from the
source of the illness and society - in an institution with a country
location and a "tranquil, natural, and rural" scene.n
To expedite this process:
Medical superintendents were also eager to have commitment laws as simple and as uncomplicated as possible. Most
superintendents preferred to allow relatives to bring the patients directly to the institution and arrange for commitment on
the spot; only a few believed that prior judicial examination or
jury decisions were necessary. The managers of the Utica asylum, for example, objected strenuously to legal formalities in its
incorporation act that made the certification of insanity under
oath by two 'respectable physicians' a prerequisite for admission.Y
David Rothman describes the rationale for this attitude as
follows:
Confinement,

[the medical superintendents] believed

...

was not a punishment but a cure, and hence there was little
cause to begin a legal proceeding before the insane entered an
asylum as there was to require it for persons going to any other
type of hospital. Furthermore, they found no need to rely upon
legal processes when they themselves could easily differentiate
between sanity and insanity and every cumbersome requirement might discourage someone from sending a patient to the
asylum, a risk which medical superintendents wanted to minimize. Finally, judicial routines too often consumed valuable
time, and the longer the delay in admissions, the less the likelihood of a cure . .

.

.These objections were generally persu-

asive. Managers were comparatively free to confie the mentally ill at their own discretion.3
0 ROTHMAN, supra note 14, at 114.
'
'

3

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

125.
137-38.
138.
143.
144.
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The ideals reflected in the "cult of the asylum" were soon
undermined. Superintendents, in many cases, were unable to control the admission and discharge of patients36 and the institutions
"found that a significant part of their capacity was being devoted
to providing custodial care for chronic patients whose chances for
recovery seemed at best remote.

' 37

The legal system contributed

to the problem. "Commitment and discharge laws forced asylums
to accept the types of disorder that the community considered
particularly troublesome. Alcoholics, the criminally insane, epileptics, and the mentally retarded poured into hospitals and became
chronic patients. Superintendents were forbidden to discharge
such court-referred cases if they might still menace the community."3 With little planning and no hope of "curing" their
wards, mental institutions took on increasing numbers and built
larger physical plants to accommodate them. Superintendents
failed "to communicate their plight to the courts and to stem the
flow of cases"39 or to carry out therapeutic objectives." The presence of larger hospitals tended "to accelerate the thrust toward
greater reliance on institutional care of the mentally ill, which in
turn increased the demand for more facilities. The result was a
constant cycle of growth that resulted in larger and larger institutions . . "4'
The mental health system of the mid-nineteenth century,
characterized by large isolated institutions, filled with chronic patients from families unable to cope with the "crazy," disruptive
behavior of one of its members, was a function not only of social
factors but also of legal commitment procedures which made it

1,Id.

at 186-96; R. CAPLAN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY AMERICA

65-69 (1969).

11GROB, supra note 15, at 187.
U CAPLAN, supra note 36, at 68. GROB, supra note 15, at 193.
3' CAPLAN, supra note 36, at 68.
10GROB, supra note 15, at 191, 202-04, 219, 306-07, 340.
1' Id. at 191.
The reasons for this situation were not difficult to understand. The existence of an alternative to family care of confinement in an almshouse or

jail, a growing social acceptance of institutionalization, the increase in
population and the migration to the United States of impoverished
groups who used hospitals with a far greater frequency than native groups
all combined to increase sharply the pressure on the hospital to accept
more patients.
Id. at 192.
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easy for the system to function. 2 "[T]herapeutic concerns were
sjowly being pushed into the background. Over a period of time
psychiatry began to lose the charismatic aura of its early years and
became endowed with some of the qualities often associated with
occupations - order, regularity, efficiency, rationalmanagerial
ity." 43
During the 1850's there was evidence of growing public concern over the failure of mental institutions to solve the problem of
insanity. The hospitals themselves came under attack.4 As early
as the 1850's, the complaints of illegal commitments resulted in a
campaign to secure laws to limit the authority of hospital superintendents and to guard patient rights. "Throughout the 1860's and
alleged abuses of the rights of the insane
1870's the furor over the
45
continued unabated.
In 1867, Illinois passed a "Personal Liberty Law" and other
states followed with similar legislation requiring a jury trial before
a patient could be admitted to an asylum.48 In 1872, Iowa passed
a law requiring a jury trial and provided that patients have
"complete freedom to write to whomever they desired and which
forbade the superintendent or staff to open and to censor mail.'",
The period of 1860-1900 saw the appearance of new mental
hospitals,"8 the growth of existing ones, and a growing controversy
over commitment itself. West Virginia opened its first asylum,
West Virginia Hospital for the Insane, in 1864. In less than ten
years, the new hospital grew from an average patient population
of forty in 1865, to 350 in 1875.
The majority of states, did not have explicit commitment laws
2 "The number and type of patients, the time spent in the hospital, and the
quality of care were all dependent to a significant degree upon the framework
established by law." Id. at 194.
Id. at 205.
" Id. at 263-69.
s The furor resulted in a number of court cases by patients and their relatives
against asylums. CAPLAN, supra note 36, at 190-91.
46Id. at 191.
4 GROB, supra note i5, at 267. Similar legislation was passed in Massachusetts

in 1874. CAPLAN, supra note 36, at 233-34.
48 "Between 1870 and 1880 nearly thirty new institutions were opened . ...
For the remainder of the nineteenth century, the movement to expand public facilities continued unabated; not until the twentieth century was there a clear diminution in the opening of new hospitals." GROB, supra note 15, at 303.
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for the mentally ill "because the insane had traditionally been
secreted away by families, or had been confined in prisons and
poorhouses under other legal provisions. In time, however, this
vagueness became dangerous, both to those who might easily be
unjustly deprived of their freedom and to asylums receiving patients in good faith, but later accused of malpractice." 4 "By the
late 1870's and 1880's, criticism of asylums had become organized
and powerful. Reform societies included many professionals and
intellectuals, philanthropic businessmen, lawyers, clergymen, and
medical practitioners . .

.,,"

The legal control over confinement varied from state to state.
Some of the early commitment laws (prior to 1875) allowed commitment on the basis of certification by two physicians. In Massachusetts, the law required, in addition, "an affidavit of some authoritative person of good character, usually the trustee of an asylum." 5' In 1890, New York enacted a commitment law which required a judicial order and "a certificate of lunacy signed by two
qualified examiners in lunacy."5 The patient could appeal from
the order and demand a jury trial. One commentator, in reviewing
this period, finds that "[iln restrospect, the commitment law
movement, and particularly the emphasis given jury trials, seems
to have been a hysterical reaction to a more serious but unresolved
set of problems: the shortage of mental health treatment facilities
and the lack of sophistication in technique, accompanied by public
horror of mental illness."53
A

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF WEST VIRGINIA

CIVIL

COMMITMENT

PROCEDURES

Voluntary Admissions
In West Virginia there are two types of patients covered by the

Mentally Ill Persons statute - voluntary and involuntary patients. The West Virginia Code authorizes mental health facilities
to admit "for diagnosis, care and treatment" those patients who
apply for hospitalization.54 Today, the number of voluntary pa" CAPLAN, supra note 36, at 194.

0 Id. at 199. See generally id. at 199-211.
5'Id. at 194.
2 Id. at 242.
'o

R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL

17 (1968).

, W. VA. CODE § 27-4-1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979); W. VA. CODE § 27-4-1(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
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tients substantially exceeds those who are committed involuntarily. There is no requirement for any type of judicial hearing prior
to a voluntary admission and, consequently, legal control on the
admission of such individuals has been historically non-existent.
The voluntary admission of children to state mental institutions without judicial supervision was recently challenged in a case decided by the United States
Supreme Court. In Parham v. J.R., 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2503 (1979), the Court found
that children have "a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment .

. . ."

This liberty interest is protected by the due

process standards of the Constitution. However, in deciding what process is due,
the second level of inquiry, the Court is unwilling to mandate a full-dress judicial
review of the parental and institutional decision to commit the child. Rather, the
Court will, in this case, require only an inquiry by a "neutral factfinder." Id. at
2506. The Court goes on to suggest that the review by the staff psychiatrist which
determines whether commitment is appropriate is sufficient to protect the constitutional liberty interest of the child. Id. at 2506-07. See also Secretary of Public
Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S.Ct. 2523 (1979) (decided with Parham,
upholding the Pennsylvania statute governing voluntary commitment of mentally
ill juveniles).
For a review of the issues in the commitment of children, see generally Beyer
& Wilson, The Reluctant Volunteer: A Child's Right to Resist Commitment, in
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 133-48 (G. Koocher ed.
1976); Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental
Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1974); Meisel & Roth, The Child's Right to
Object to Hospitalization:Some Empirical Data, 4 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 377 (1976);
Panneton, Children, Commitment & Consent: A Constitutional Crisis, 10 FAM.
L.Q. 295 (1976); Rolfe & MacClintock, The Due Process Rights of Minors Voluntarily Admitted to Mental Institutions, 4 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 333 (1976); Szasz, The
Child as Involuntary Mental Patient:The Threat of Child Therapy to the Child's
Dignity, Privacy, and Self Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1005 (1977); Note, Voluntary Admission of Children to Mental Hospitals:A Conflict of Interest Between
Parent and Child, 36 MD. L. REv. 153 (1976); Note, Minor's Right to Due Process:
Does it Extend to Commitment to Mental Institutions?,52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 136
(1976); Note, Due Process Limitations on ParentalRights to Commit Children to
Mental Institutions,48 U. COLO. L. Ray. 235 (1977); Note, On the Voluntary Admission of Minors, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 189 (1974); series of articles on Kremens v.
Bartley, in 27 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHiAT. 705 (1976).
The legal rights of children in the mental health system is part of a broader
problem-of legal rights and children generally. See generally Bersoff, Developing
Legal Theories in Child Advocacy, 29 CLIN. PSYCH. 20 (1976); Beyer, Changes in the
Parent-Child Legal Relationship: What They Mean to the Clinician and
Researcher, 7 J. AUTISM & CHILDHOOD SCHIZOPHRENIA 84 (1977); Curtis, The Checkered Careerof Parens Patriae:The State as Parent or Tyrant, 25 DE PAUL L. REv.
895 (1976); Garvey, Child, Parent,State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay
on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S.CAL. L. REV. 769 (1978); Levy, et al,
Symposium: Children's Rights - Psychiatry and the Law, 3 J. PSYcHIAT. & L. 475
(1975); Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487 (1973); Comments, The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 669 (1978).
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The 1978 amendments to the Mentally Ill Persons provisions of the
West Virginia Code, however, substantially changed the legal status of the voluntary patient in West Virginia.
The 1978 amendments impose new requirements on mental
health facilities and mental health professionals who evaluate individuals for purposes of voluntary admission to mental health
institutions. The most significant feature of the newly enacted
procedures for voluntary patients is the requirement that all voluntary patients be given a written statement containing a warning
that their voluntary status can be changed and the patient confined involuntarily for an indefinite period of time. The statute
specifically requires that the written statement be in "bold print"
and disclose that:
(1) voluntary admission does not mean voluntary release;
(2) voluntary admission may result in a decision of the mental
health facility to subject the patient to a legal proceeding which
could result in a legally sanctioned confinement in the mental
health facility for an indefinite period of time;
(3) regardless of the ultimate outcome of the legal decision to
commit the individual for an indefinite period, the individual
may be held in the mental institution for up to 30 days to
facilitate the legal proceedings; and
(4) the patient is entitled to request release at any time. 51
The 1978 amendments further extended voluntary patients'
legal rights by requiring that they be given written notice of their
rights while a patient in the mental health facility." By statute,
this requirement includes the "right to treatment" and civil rights
outlined in section 27-5-9 of the old statute. The new amendment
makes clear, however, that the written statement of patient rights
is not to be limited to the rights presently outlined in section 275-9. Consequently, the new amendment requires mental health
facilities to ascertain and give written notice to the voluntary patient of any and all rights which are now afforded the patient by
virtue of the administrative regulations of the Department of
Health and the constitution as interpreted by state and federal
courts. The amendment also provides that the name of the mental
health personnel who makes the oral and written disclosure to the
patient be made a part of the patient's records along with a copy
§ 27-4-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
W. VA. CODE § 27-4-4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
W. VA. CODE
'
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of the written and signed patient rights statement.
The 1978 amendments require written consent for "any course
of treatment"57 provided voluntary in-patients. The new provision
further states that: "Such consent shall be revocable at any time
and shall not be valid for a period exceeding six months." 8 This
provision means quite simply that the patient may withdraw his
or her consent at any time before or during the course of therapy
and, secondly, that consent for treatment is valid only for a period
of six months. Consequently, during the course of on-going therapy, the mental health professionals will be required to confirm the
patient's desire to continue the course of treatment after each six
month period.
The provisions should also be interpreted to mean that written
consent is required for each course of treatment. If the mental
health facility proceeds with a course of chemotherapy with consent of the patient and then decides to place the patient in a group
for psychotherapy, the patient's written consent for the new therapeutic procedures must be obtained.
To implement the new provisions, each mental health facility
is required to designate a staff person as a "voluntary patient
coordinator."" The voluntary patient coordinator is responsible for
notifying individuals currently in mental health facilities and persons subsequently admitted as voluntary patients of their rights
under the new amendments.
Involuntary Admissions
There are essentially three criterion for the involuntary confinement of individuals in West Virginia mental institutions. First,
the individual must be shown to be mentally ill, mentally retarded, or an alcohol or narcotics addict. Second, the individual
must be likely to cause serious harm to himself or others because
of the condition. Finally, there must be no less restrictive alternative than to confine the person in the state mental institution.
In most cases, the initial decision as to whether these criteria
are met is made by psychiatrists. The statute simply requires that
'"

W. VA. CODE § 27-4-4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).

"Id.
" W. VA.

CODE

§ 27-4-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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one physician or a psychologist"0 certify that the individual has
been examined, that he or she is mentally ill (or mentally retarded
or addicted) and, as a result, is likely to cause serious harm to self
or others.6 '
The statute provides that the individual must be given a probable cause hearing and have a full trial type hearing completed
within thirty days." The hearing requirement means that the final
determination of whether an individual is mentally ill and dangerous lies with the court. In West Virginia the circuit court has

jurisdiction over civil commitment hearings but is directed by statute to appoint lawyers, designated as mental hygiene commissioners, to serve as judges in all civil commitment proceedings. 3 The
statute requires the mental hygiene commissioners to make findings which are set forth in a written report to the circuit court. The
mental hygiene commissioner [MHC] is specifically charged with
safeguarding the interests of the patient as well as the state. 4
The probable cause hearing was first mandated by the 1978
amendments to the statute. In the 1978 amendments, the hearing
1*On the use of psychologist in civil commitment proceedings, see Miller,
Lower, & Bleechmore, The ClinicalPsychologistas an Expert Witness on Questions
of Mental Illness and Competency, 4 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 115 (1978).
", W. VA. CODE § 27-5-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
12 Id. § 27-5-2(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (probable cause hearing).
11Id. § 27-5-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). In West Virginia involuntary civil commitments are generally heard by a Mental Hygiene Commissioner (MHC) appointed by the circuit court of each county. The MHC holds office at the pleasure
of the circuit court and "may be removed at any time by the court." W. VA. CODE
§ 27-5-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute requires that the Mental Hygiene
Commissioner "be a person of good moral character, and of standing in his profession" and that he take the oath required of special commissioners. W. VA. CODE §
27-5-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
The MHC is empowered to issue summons and subpoenas, take sworn testimony, and make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. W. VA. CODE
§ 27-5-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The MHC is statutorily charged with safeguarding
"at all times the rights and interests of the individual as well as the interests of
the State." Id.
The findings and legal conclusions of the MHC are reported to, but not binding
on, the circuit-court, and a final order of commitment is entered by the court. Id.
Although the findings and conclusions of the MHC are not binding on the circuit
court, the statute makes no provision for appeal of the findings of the MHC to the
circuit court. Rather, the statute provides for judicial review of only the order of
commitment entered by the circuit court which is directed to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
"' W. VA. CODE § 27-5-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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was to be held within seventy-two hours of admission to the mental
health facility." The statute was again amended in 1979 to remove
the seventy-two hour requirement. The present statute sets no
specific time within which the probable cause hearing must be
held.
The statute sets forth certain rights that the patient has at the
preliminary or probable cause hearing. These rights are: the right
to be present at the hearing; the right to present evidence; the right
to examine testimony offered (this should include the right to
cross-examine witnesses for the applicant and to present arguments in opposition to the inference to be drawn from such evidence); the right to remain silent at the hearing;"8 and the right to
," W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979).
66 In West Virginia, the individual who is subject to commitment cannot be
compelled to testify at either the probable cause hearing, W. VA. CODE § 27-52(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979), or the final hearing. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(g)(4) (Cum.
Supp. 1979). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has ruled, however, that
the privilege is not applicable to the psychiatric interviews conducted prior to the
hearings. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974). Other courts have found
the Fifth Amendment applicable to the psychatric interview. See, e.g., Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1100 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The chief critic of the Lessard
decision extending the Fifth Amendment to psychiatric interviews has been Dr.
Alan Stone, the current president of the American Psychiatric Association.
Dr. Stone's concern for the implications of the Lessard opinion which requires
warnings of the effects of incriminating statements to a psychiatrist are well
founded, at least from the standpoint of the institutional psychiatrist. Patients who
invoke the privilege, remain silent, and refuse to cooperate with the psychiatrist
may preclude the possibility of a psychiatric diagnosis. See A. BRooKs, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 808 (1974). If the patient does not "tell"
on himself or herself, how can the psychiatrist determine the patient's condition?
Pragmatic concerns and preserving the involuntary commitment system are also
revealed in the Hawks decision: "To recognize the same rights against selfincrimination which would be required in a criminal proceeding would make almost
any commitment impossible, and would make the procedures so burdensome that
medical conclusions obtained through examination . . . would be inadmissible."
202 S.E.2d at 126. Using parens patriae grounds, the court justified sacrificing
the privilege against incrimination, finding it "unreasonable to hold that the
State can never act in the best interest of an individual. There is justification
for deviation in the case of emergency procedures where an individual's life may
be in jeopardy." Id. The court's rationale for not extending the privilege against
self-incrimination would apply in a limited number of cases. While a deviation
from strict due process might be a basis for disallowing the privilege in some
cases, such instances would be few compared to the vast number of involuntary
civil commitments. It is simply not the case that all involuntarily civilly committed patients are suicidal or maniacal and bent on total destruction of them-
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have the preliminary hearing conducted by rules of evidence. 7 The
anomaly in this section of the statute is that no reference is made
to the patient's right to counsel. The 1978 amendments specifically
provided that the patient was to be appointed counsel twelve hours
prior to the hearing. It is unclear whether the legislature intended
to remove the patient's right to counsel in the 1979 amendments
and whether an effort to deny counsel at the probable cause hearing would be constitutional." Regardless of whether the constitution mandates a right to counsel, it can be argued that no change
was actually intended. First, while there is no specific provision for
appointment of counsel, the statute does contain reference to counsel. The statute states that: "If requested by the individual or his
counsel, the hearing may be postponed for a period not to exceed
forty-eight hours." 9 More significant than this oblique reference to
counsel is the fact that the other rights afforded the patient require
the presence of counsel. It would be meaningless to afford a patient
the right to present testimony, cross-examine witnesses and have
the hearing governed by the rules of evidence unless a lawyer was
present to insure that the rights were exercised.
The Rights of Mental Patients
The courts" and state legislatures are now moving to recognize
greater patient rights" by imposing limitations on the discretion

selves or others. Thus, to reach the few truly dangerous mentally ill, the court
refuses to extend a basic constitutional right to a substantially larger class. On the
legal and psychiatric issues raised by the application of the Fifth Amendment to
civil commitment hearings, see Aronson, Should the Privilege Against SelfIncriminationApply to Compelled PsychiatricExaminations?, 26 STAN. L. Rlv. 55
(1973); Fielding, Compulsory Psychiatric Examinationin Civil Commitment and
Self-Incrimination, 9 GONz. L. REv. 117 (1973); Note, Application of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Civil Commitment
Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L.J. 729.
'7 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
" See note 2, supra.
" W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(b)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
70 Courts are now generally viewed as the writing edge of social reform, and this
is certainly true in the mental health field. One observer states that "[judicial
activism has taken over the field of psychiatric reform." Robitscher, Implementing
the Rights of the Mentally Disabled: Judicial,Legislative and PsychiatricAction,
in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGiiL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 142, 151 (F. Ayd ed.
1974).
1' For a summary of patient's rights, see B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS
OF MENTAL PATIENTS

(1973). But see note 1, supra.
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of mental health professionals. The necessity of greater procedural
safeguards has been urged to prevent deprivations of liberty by
involuntary confinement based on subjective psychiatric and medical decisionmaking. The prevailing trend in the states is to require
not only a finding of mental illness but also the likelihood that
the mentally ill person will be harmful to self or others if he or she
is not institutionalized.72 The trend in the current legal reform of
state mental health codes is primarily towards requiring more
objective indices of harm as a precondition to involuntary confinement. This trend is evidence of a partial rejection of the medical
model under which treatment is involuntarily imposed for the good
of the patient based on the patient's inability to make rational
decisions. The statutory requirement that individuals be harmful
as well as mentally ill has reduced the number of individuals subject to involuntary hospitalization on the basis that they need care
and treatment. West Virginia has followed this trend."
By one count, 44 states utilize the dangerousness criteria for civil commitment. Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalizationand PsychiatricTestiony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REV.
11, 22 (1976).
The Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), expressly
declined to decide whether dangerousness is a specific requirement for confinement.
One of the federal courts has noted that while the Supreme Court "did not directly
address itself to the degree of dangerousness that is constitutionally required before
a person may be involuntarily deprived of liberty,. . .its approval of a requirement
that the potential for doing harm be 'great enough to justify such a massive
curtailment of liberty' implies a balancing test in which the state must bear the
burden of proving that there is an extreme likelihood that if the person is not
confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others." Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). But see Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F.
Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), affl'd, 411 U.S. 911; Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348,
350, 278 N.E.2d 615, 617 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
71 For a comparison of involuntary civil commitment statutes now outdated by
statutory changes in the states, see S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW (Rev. ed. 1971); B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
72

(1973); R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HosPrrALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF
THE MENTALLY ILL (1968); Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: PsychiatricReliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400, 412-15
(1973). See also: Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974); W. Va. Code
§§ 27-5-2(a)(2), -3(a), -4(c)(2), -4(d)(1), -4(j)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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DEFINING

THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY WHO
MENTALLY ILL

REPRESENTS THE

At the outset, the attorney is presented with a client who has
been labeled by important individuals in the community as
"mentally ill" or "sick" and in need of treatment. While the process of labeling the client begins with family, friends, or possibly
the police, the label must be confirmed by a psychiatrist or psychologist." The involvement of medical and mental health professionals raises a number of questions. What role will the medical
and psychiatric professional play in deciding the fate of the client?
How does the defense attorney define the role of such professionals
in deciding his client's fate? More importantly, to what extent
is the defense lawyer prepared by training and personality to
challenge the pronouncements of medical and psychiatric
professionals? In essence, how does the attorney view his or her role
in the context of other involved professionals?7 5

The attorney's role in representing mental patients can be
analyzed from a sociological perspective. The sociologist views
"role" as the social expectations of an individual who occupies a
certain position and status. One of the most salient characteristics
of "role" is that it is external to the individual and reflects a public
view of what the individual should do in his position.
The expectations of defense counsel representing a person alleged to be mentally ill and dangerous are now limited because
civil commitment hearings are closed to the public,76 are of little
interest to the legal profession, and are not subject to critical scru" The labeling process is a complex one. One commentator has pointed out

that the patient's path to the hospital is "determined by a large number of behavioral, familiar, social, and situational variables rather than simply by the patient's
symptoms, diagnosis, or degree of distress." Flynn & Henisz, Criteriafor Psychiat-

ric Hospitalization: Experience with a Checklist for Chart Review, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 847, 847 (1975). The authors admit, however, that ultimately the decision
to hospitalize is based "on the clinical judgment of referring professionals and the
admitting hospital clinicians." rd.
11The author of a study of the New York Mental Health Information Service
found that: "[l]awyers are generally more factually oriented and concerned about
unnecessary deprivation of individual liberty, while social workers tend to view
their role as that of 'helping' the patient." Gupta, New York's Mental Health
Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RUTGERs L. REV. 405, 442

(1971).
"1

See note 10 and accompanying text, supra.
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tiny by patients and their relatives. The only potentially critical
observers are the circuit judge, the mental hygiene commissioner,
and the opposing counsel. 7 Typically, the mental hygiene commissioner will have no greater expertise than defense counsel and is,
therefore, an unlikely candidate to clearly define defense counsel's
role.7" Efforts at a more precise role definition have been presented
11Opposing counsel is a prosecuting attorney who appears on behalf of the
applicants for involuntary commitment. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-1(c) (Cum. Supp.
1979). See also W. VA. CODE § 27-5-1a (Cum. Supp. 1979).
In West Virginia, the civil commitment hearing is in the format of a traditional adversary hearing with defense counsel opposing a prosecuting attorney
before a MHC who is, in effect, a substitute for the circuit judge.
Dr. Alan Stone has criticized civil commitment proceedings where patients are
represented by counsel and there is no prosecuting attorney. Stone feels that in
the absence of a prosecuting attorney, psychiatrists are placed in the prosecutorial
role. Stone, Recent Mental Health Litigation: A CriticalPerspective, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 273, 274-75 (1977). The problem with the psychiatrist as prosecutor,
Stone finds, is that it is destructive of professional identity. Stone is not clear about
how this destructive impact can be avoided where there is a "real" prosecutor and
the psychiatrist testifies "against" the patient. Perhaps, the absence of the prosecutor simply reveals the true role of the prosecutor in the involuntary civil commitment process. See T. SZASz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICE 230 (1963):
We must begin by candidly acknowledging the role of the hospital psychiatrist vis-a-vis his patient. Such a psychiatrist, especially if he works in
a state hospital, is not the patient's agent. The law, the mental patient,
and the public must cease to look on hospital psychiatrists - and perhaps even current psychiatry as a profession - as the patient's helpers
and friends. To be sure, sometimes they try to be. But more often they
are the patient's adversaries . . . .

The relationship between hospital psychiatrist and mental patient is
one of oppression disguised as benefaction. The institutional psychiatrist,
though not necessarily the patient's enemy, is neither his friend nor his
therapist.
"' In a study of the systems for providing counsel to indigent mental health
patients in Chicago, New York, Cleveland, and Memphis, the authors concluded
that "judge and counsel seem to have developed a working relationship in which
each appeared to act on a shared conception of the attorney's proper role. Judges
did not either exhort counsel to be more active or chastise them for being too
aggressive." Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, and a Proposal,45 MIss. L.J. 43, 74 (1974).
The authors point out that the judge may shape the attorney's role through an
implicit assumption by the attorney that zealousness is undesirable. Id. at 74-75.
See also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSISTION 233 (1975).
In a 1977 survey of West Virginia Mental Hygiene Commissioners [hereinafter
MHCs1 Jerry Dambro, a law student at West Virginia University College of Law,
found that over 50% of the Commissioners believed they had either special training
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in the legal literature," but the impact of such academic attempts
at preventing deficiencies in role performance is unclear.
In the absence of a clearly defined role, the attorney is often
satisfied to "stand by" as the client/patient is civilly committed. "
This minimal effort is justified on a number of grounds. First, the
attorney may view his or her role as limited to insuring that the
patient's statutory and constitutional rights are not violated during the legal process of commitment. The attorney following this
view serves simply to insure that required procedures have been
followed.8 With such a view, appointment of counsel has "become
a mere procedural ritual which helps to sanctify the judgment of
8 2
commitment without injecting any substantial protection.
or other special qualifications for the position. Only one of the MHCs responding
had taken a law course directly related to mental health. Of the 22 MHCs responding to the survey, several indicated they had undergraduate majors in psychology,
four had been active in local mental health associations, and eight others felt they
had special qualifications based on previous appointments as guardian ad litem and
board membership of a local mental health center. One had a member of the family
who was mentally ill.
Twenty percent of the respondents thought special training would be "very
helpful"; 60% felt it would be "somewhat helpful"; the remaining 20% felt it was
"not necessary." Significantly, 90% indicated that they would attend a workshop
or seminar on civil commitment.
71 See note 8, supra.
10This observation is based on the author's attendance of involuntary civil
commitment hearings in West Virginia. See also Cohen, The Functionof the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REv. 424 (1966); Wexler
& Scoville, Special Project - The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory
and Practicein Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 51-60 (1971); Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Under Flordia'sBaker Act: ProceduralDue Process
and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 508, 526 (1974).
S, In general, the procedural view of the lawyer's role can be traced to the
"legalism" which pervades the legal profession. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
Certainly, one function of the attorney is to advise the client of procedural
aspects of the involuntary commitment hearing. "The attorney should explain how
the proceedings will be conducted, the types of questions that will be asked, and
describe in detail the setting of the hearing." Nutnick, A PracticalGuide to Involuntary Commitment Proceedings, 11 WMLAMErrE L.J. 315, 320-21 (1975).
82 Brunetti, supra note 4, at 707. The role of the lawyer is essentially system
maintenance. Playing the role of lawyer by being "present," insuring procedural
safeguards (the "legal niceties") while ignoring or remaining oblivious to the simple
fact that human beings are being warehoused for social deviance, "is a massive
failure and a festering evil." Shaffer, Introduction,13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 369 (1973).
' ndalman and Chambers have suggested that the presence of lawyers and their
perfunctory performance serves in many jurisdictions only to "add a falsely reassur-
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In the sections which follow, various aspects of legal representation in the civil commitment process are explored, and alternatives to the attorney's ritual presence and limited effectiveness in
protecting the client against involuntary hospitalization are suggested.
Interviewing the Mental Patient/Client
Interviewing the mental patient/client is a difficult task for
the attorney. The client who is disoriented, suffering from thought
disorders, hallucinating or delusional is sometimes unable to communicate with the attorney. In such cases, the attorney representing an uncommunicative client (or one whose illness substantially
impairs communication) simply cannot rely upon the patient as a
source of information.8 3 While problems in communication are
often part of mental illness, such difficulties may be a result of
prior institutionalization or because a patient has problems with
English.84
The patient's inability to communicate does not relieve the
attorney of the responsibility of zealously representing the client.
The attorney should, if possible, attempt to interview the patient/client on more than one occasion. The ability of the client to
communicate may vary over time, in which case multiple interviews will increase the chances of finding the client lucid and communicative. Moreover, if this is not done, the attorney may obtain
a distorted view of the patient's condition. 5 A second interview can
also be used to avoid the idiosyncratic effects of medication on the
ing patina of respectability to the proceedings." Andalman & Chambers, supra note
8, at 72.
13 But see D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INsTITUTIONAL CAREER (1966). The
author argues that mental patients are more capable of rational decisions than is
commonly thought.
'
See, e.g., Case 2 in Appendix.
' The need for multiple interviews is equally applicable to psychiatrists who
attempt to use the interview as the basis of a diagnosis of mental illness. The
reliability of the psychiatric diagnosis is integrally related to the thoroughness of
the psychiatric interviews which lead to the diagnosis. If the psychiatrist testifies
that only one interview was conducted, the attorney may seek to discredit such
testimony by showing that the patient's condition has changed or that the patient
actually suffers from a different condition than that described by the psychiatrist.
See Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, Clinical Criteriafor PsychiatricDiagnosis and
DSM-III, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1187 (1975).
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patient."6 Regardless of whether a second interview is possible, the
attorney should determine from the client and the patient files
whether medication has been prescribed and if so, its dosage, purpose, and effects on the patient. Finally, the patient's history of
medical drug use and his or her ability and willingness to selfadminister prescribed drug medication is of importance.
The patient/client interview should be supplemented with a
thorough review of the patient's medical and psychiatric records. 7
If the client was previously or is currently hospitalized, interviews
with the hospital staff, the physicians who admitted the patient,
and those who have conducted subsequent examinations are also
essential.88 Obviously, this review should include an investigation
into any previous hospitalization for mental illness.
The main purpose of the interviews and review of patient files
is to obtain a realistic view of the patient as a person and the
circumstances which have occasioned the civil commitment proceedings. 9 Who is the patient? What are his or her strengths and
u Client medication, especially tranquilizers, can have a profound influence
not only on the attorney-client interview but the commitment hearing itself. See
Wexler & Scoville, Special Project - The Administration of PsychiatricJustice:
Theory and Practicein Arizona, 13 Amz. L. REv. 1, 66-69 (1971).
The goal . . . to achieve for each patient is to strike a balance by
administering drugs, if required, to remove psychotic, disabling and disruptive symptoms without impairing the patient's right to converse with
his attorney and to carry out his defense effectively. The patient's attorney should play an active part in helping to strike the appropriate balance.
Id. at 68.
" Medical records should be examined for observations and recommendations of physicians and statements made by the client. Where the
client's statements appear helpful, as where they indicate a willingness
to secure voluntary treatment, or where the physician's observations
point to exculpatory behavior, the attorney may wish to highlight such
statements and observations . . . . Counsel may, however, want to attempt to exclude medical records where they are damaging to the client's
prospects for maintaining his or her freedom.
Mutnick & Lazar, supra note 8, at 328 n.71. On analyzing a psychiatric report see
Rubin, The PsychiatricReport, in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 69 (R. Allen,
et al., eds. 1968).
" "The attorney has a responsibility to consult with the examining physician
concerning the medical history of the patient, the diagnosis, the proposed [or past]
treatment and the prognosis." Wexler & Scoville, Special Projects-The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practice, 13 Aiuz. L. REv. 1, 56 (1971).
"1 "The attorney should work towards an understanding of the events that led
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weaknesses in laymen's terms? What particular feature of the patient's behavior seems to be offensive or anxiety provoking? Does
the patient have any "insight" into these features of his or her
personality and behavior?"0 By focusing the attention of the hospital staff, social workers, and psychiatrists on such questions, the
attorney may find the significant features of the client's.mental
problem. 9
In the course of the client interview, the attorney should obtain the patient's view of the factors which led to the petition for
commitment or the hospital's attempts to continue the confinement. The lawyer has an obligation to investigate any story which
the psychiatrist claims is delusional.2 Prior to the hearing, the
attorney should insure, to the extent possible, that the client has
"an understanding of why the hearing is being held to determine
his or her mental health, what the consequences of the hearing may
be, and what facts caused the person to be taken into custody or a
93
notice of mental illness to be filed."
These factors are of special importance if the client has not
been committed previously. The statutory criteria for commitment
up to and contributed to the filing of the petition. Only in this way can he attempt
to develop possible alternatives to hospitalization." Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 11, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 452 (1966).
0' The client's "insight" is significant as it is one element that the psychiatrist
uses to determine the degree of mental disorder. For example, "[e]xaminers' reports often contain the statement 'lacks insight into illness,' based on the client's
refusal to recognize in himself or herself what the examiner speculates is a mental
disorder." Mutnick & Lazar, supra note 8, at 324. On the use of "insight" as a factor
influencing the psychiatric diagnosis, see Dix, Acute PsychiatricHospitalizationof
the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 485,
529.
" It is important for the attorney to recognize that the official medical psychiatric view of the client is based on a diagnosis. The client/patient's behavior is then
seen within the framework of the diagnosis. Behavior which does not support the
diagnosed mental illness is selectively screened out.
,2 See, e.g., Case 3 in Appendix. The patient's explanation for his hospitalization problems involved an attempt by others to run him out of the garbage collection business, which was labeled as delusional. In fact, the psychiatrist labeled this
concern with the garbage business "an isolated delusional system." The defense
lawyer assigned to represent the patient failed to investigate the patient's story or
to question the psychiatrist as to its potential factual basis. In this case the story
would have been difficult to confirm as the patient had been involuntarily confined
for 14 years at the time of the hearing.
11 Mutnick & Lazar, supra note 8, at 323.
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require that the patient constitute a danger to self or others if not
committed." The attorney should discuss with the client the allegation that he or she is dangerous. This discussion can be used to
determine the facts and circumstances which will be used to support the psychiatrist's view that the client's behavior is likely to
cause serious harm. The attorney will want to consider the context
in which the violent or suicidal behavior occurred and particularly
whether the allegations of dangerousness were based on behavior
which occurred during the effort to hospitalize the patient or during the hospitalization prior to the hearing. The attorney's efforts
in this area follow the traditional role of the criminal lawyer in fact
determination and thorough preparation. An understanding of the
events leading to the petition to commit should afford the basis for
a more comprehensive and adequate legal defense.
Questioning PsychiatricJudgments
Overcoming the Myth of Psychiatric Expertise
The defense lawyer faces a formidable challenge in overcoming the judicial weight given to medical testimony. Unquestioned
deference by the judicial decisionmaker to the psychiatrist must
be overcome through a defense which encourages the decisionmaker to focus on the limitations 5 and contradictions in the expert's testimony. In short, the defense of a patient will falter unless
the defense lawyer can convince the judge that the psychiatrist's
or medical expert's judgment is open to challenge. The judge
should be warned that:
Before a psychiatrist's conclusory judgment can be considered
an admissible expert judgment - much less worthy of
special attention - the psychiatrist must employ techniques
and apply knowledge that have been shown to produce substantially more reliable and valid results than could the techniques
and knowledge available to laymen. It has been assumed that
something in the education, training, experience and techniques of psychiatrists makes their judgments more reliable and
See note 72, supra.
For a succinct overview of the limits of psychiatric expertise in civil commitment cases, see Morse, Law and Mental Health Professionals: The Limits of
Expertise, 9 PROF. PSYCH. 389 (1978). For an expanded version, see Morse, Crazy
Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L.
REv. 527 (1978).
"

'5

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

29

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

more valid than those judgments would be in the absence of
such education, training, experience and techniques. That assumption may be incorrect."
In effect, the judge must be asked to reevaluate the presumption
of psychiatric expertise. 7
Of more immediate concern than judicial deference to psychiatric judgments is the deference of defense counsel. Defense attorneys often take the position that the psychiatrist and hospital staff
are acting in the best interest of the client and that the attorney's
role is to insure only that the statutory criteria for commitment are
satisfied and proper procedures have been followed." Deference to
medical and psychiatric judgments may also be attributed to the
attorney's fear that she or he is unprepared to question the judgment of the doctor or psychiatrist. Mental health professionals
often communicate their judgment in a technical language which
is difficult for lawyers to penetrate. As a consequence, many do not
try. Psychiatric testimony is often presented in conclusory form by
way of the technical labels applicable to the mentally ill. For example, the psychiatrist may testify that the patient is a paranoid
schizophrenic. If questioned, the psychiatrist will testify that the
basis for the diagnosis was the patient's hallucinations, paranoid
delusions, and distortions in thinking. Thus, even as the psychiatrist moves from conclusory labels (paranoid schizophrenia) to rationale for the diagnosis, the attorney is still confronted with unfamiliar language (e.g., hallucinations, paranoid delusions). The
1 Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom,62 CALm. L. REv. 693, 699 (1974). See also Dix, The Death
Penalty, "Dangerousness," PsychiatricTestimony, and ProfessionalEthics, 5 AM.
J. Cium. L. 151, 170-71 (1977).
"1 See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where

the court made "it very clear that neither the court nor the jury is bound by the ad
hoc definitions or conclusions as to what experts state is a [mental] disease or

[mental] defect." Id. at 851. Accord, Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
11A lawyer can take the approach that the hospital knows best, that his
client really doesn't know what he wants, and that the whole case can
and should be handled as perfunctorily as possible; such position is one
which is inimical to true legal representation and is very likely violative

of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Perlin & Siggers, The Role of the Lawyer in Mental Health Advocacy, 4 BuLL. AM.
AcAD. PsYcHiaT. & L. 204, 208 (1976); see Blinick, Mental Disability,Legal Ethics
and ProfessionalResponsibility, 33 ALB. L. REa. 92 (1968).
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lawyer's deference to medical and psychiatric opinion may be attributed in part to the obstacles in understanding the language. All
too often the lawyer is mesmerized by the magic language of psychiatry.
The most persistent argument advanced by attorneys to justify their limited role in defending mental patients is the lack of
training and preparation necessary to play an active role. 9 Alan
Stone suggests that the concepts of mental illness, mental competency, patient dangerousness, and treatment are "formidably metaphysical."' Such concepts are equally metaphysical to the psychiatrist, although the psychiatrist has both theory and clinical
experience to help explain these metaphysical concepts. Every attorney who expects to represent those who may be mentally ill has
an obligation to attain enough knowledge to formulate a coherent
theory of mental health and mental illness which can be used as
the basis for a viable legal defense against involuntary commitment. This obligation is an ethical duty mandated by the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter cited as CPR].
Disciplinary Rule 6-101 mandates that a lawyer shall not: "(1)
Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle . . . (2) Handle a legal matter without
preparation adequate in the circumstances." It should be obvious
that a lawyer who knows nothing about mental illness and the
problems associated with psychiatric judgments cannot be competent to represent the mentally ill. The CPR recognizes that a lawyer may not have the specialized knowledge needed to represent a
particular client. However, a lawyer without specialized expertise
may represent a client who he or she would otherwise not be competent to represent "if in good faith he expects to become qualified
"1 The need for special training in the mental health field is clear. The West
Virginia College of Law now offers a course in Law and Mental Health and there is
a growing awareness of the difficulties in representing mental health patients. Alan
Stone, a psychiatrist who holds appointment on the Harvard Law School faculty,
has recently noted that mental health statutes are typically:
open-ended, the legislative intent vague, and the case law, until quite
recently, so limited, routinized, and unilluminating .... And the classic legal considerations are supplanted by notions of mental illness, competency, dangerousness, and treatability which are themselves formidably metaphysical and as to which the average attorney is unschooled.

A.

STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW:
100Id.

A

SYsTEM IN TRANSISTION
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through study and investigation. . . ."I" In the absence of study
and thorough preparation, the attorney cannot adequately represent an individual in an involuntary civil commitment hearing.
Basis for Challenging the Myth of Expertise

Psychiatric Testimony Consists of Statements
About Human Behavior.
The factors which influence and determine specific human
actions and the human personality are diverse and multifaceted.
These factors can be understood only when presented as elements

of a model or theory of human behavior. The anomaly is that there
is as yet no single, commonly accepted scientific theory of human
0I ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION 6-3.

In the author's view, the minimal preparation for representing any mental
patient in an involuntary civil commitment requires a close reading of J. ZIsKIN,
COPING WrrH PSYCHIATRmC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1970), and/or Ennis

& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974). Both works present sufficient information
and data to formulate a defense in a specific case and consequently should be

viewed as required reading. The attorney who wants a more general review of the
mental health system, yet one which focuses on the legal aspects of involuntary
civil commitment, should read A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN
TRANSITION (1975). A copy of Dr. Stone's book can be obtained free from the Na-

tional Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency,
5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, Maryland 20852. When writing NIMH for the Stone
book one should also request a free copy of DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM INLAW
AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. Frederick ed. 1978). Dangerousness is one of the statutory
elements necessary for commitment and presents substantial legal, ethical, and
psychiatric issues which are at present unresolved in the various disciplines which
have addressed the subject.
The attorney who desires a more theoretical orientation to the legal issues of
involuntary civil commitment may want to review Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals,
and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527 (1978).
Professor Morse has informed the author that he is at work on a book on law and
mental health for West's Nutshell Series. If the book contains the insights of the
article, it will become a standard reference work for lawyers representing the mentally ill.
Attorneys can become sensitized to the problems of mental illness by reading
personal accounts of involuntary hospitalization such as K. DONALDSON, INSANITY
INSIDE OUT (1976), or personal accounts of mental illness such as MARK VONNEOUT,
THE EDEN ExPREss (1975) and P. KNAUTH, A SEASON IN HELL (1975), which details
the author's effort to combat depression. Finally, there are numerous fictional and
historical works which contain excellent descriptions of mental illness. See, e.g., M.
BRAND, SAVAGE SLEEP (1968); K. KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CucKoo's NEST (1962);

A.

STONE & S. STONE, THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY THROUGH LITERATURE
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behavior. Psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health workers
subscribe to different theories of human motivation and mental
health which are often unarticulated. In many instances, the mental health professional will eschew "grand" theories of human behavior. Such professionals are more likely to express concern only
with the treatment aspects of the "mentally ill." Even here, one
must have a theory or model to explain mental illness and its
treatment.' 2 A theory of "mental illness" subsumes within it a
theory of mental health or human behavior. Even within the field
of psychiatry, different schools have "a different view of what mental illness is, how it is caused, and how it should be treated."', 3 Of
interest are those professionals who argue that they follow no
model or theory. Arguably, all have a theory or model, whether it
is recognized and articulated, or unarticulated and unconscious.
This discussion of theories has a direct application for the
mental health lawyer. It is of utmost importance to determine the
expert witness's theory or theories of mental illness. The articulation of such theories provides the attorney with a number of options including exploration of the witness's understanding of the
theory underlying his or her diagnosis and its effectiveness as a
guiding model, the specific limitations and exceptions to the guiding theory or theories, and finally, competing, contradictory, or
04
alternative theories.
'
"In order to make deductions and inferences about the mind and the affective aspect of behavior - both in its normal and pathological functions - the
observer must have a theoretical framework in which to order, explain, and interpret his observations of the mental derivatives." Diamond &Louisell, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Rumuinations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 1335, 1341 (1965). The theoretical framework is elevated to the level of neces-

sity primarily because the mental processes in question can, for the most part, be
neither observed, described or measured. Id.
" Ennis & Litwack, supra note 96, at 721. "Today American psychiatry is a
complex amalgamation of Freudian, Neo-Freudian, socio-cultural, and biological
concepts and theories." Diamond & Louisell, supra note 102, at 1335.
I" "In the field of psychiatric opinion, divergent assumptions and conceptual
orientations often constitute the sole reason for the widely conflicting conclusions
reached by different alienists [psychiatrists] testifying in the same trial." Pollack,
Psychiatric Consultationfor the Court, in EFFECTIV UTmIZATION OF PSYCHIATmC
EVIDENCE 71 (1970) (reprinted from MENDEL & SOLOMON, THE PSYCHIATRIC
CONSULTATION (1968)). See J. ZISKIN, COPING WrrH PsYcmATRmC AND PSYCHOLOGICA
TESTMONY 118-45 (2d ed. 1970).
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Psychiatric Evidence is Subjective
The psychiatrist's and mental health professional's view of the
patient and the data and behavior which they find significant are
influenced by academic background, training, experience, adherence to a particular theory, and finally, their identification with,
or skepticism of, institutional psychiatry. A psychiatrist, in particular, will be affected by whether his or her clinical training was in
a setting which was disposition-oriented or in a university or psychoanalytic training institute which was therapy-oriented. Association with a legal or social agency also influences attitudes toward patients. The psychiatrist in full-time private practice may
be much more willing to accept individual vagaries in the patient
than the institutional psychiatrist and in contrast to the latter, the
private practioner may focus more upon the patient's psychological strengths than on his weaknesses and liabilities.
Psychiatric Evidence is Opinion Testimony
The weight to be accorded psychological evidence in the form
of opinion testimony depends essentially upon two factors: the
qualifications of the expert and the basis on which the opinion was
formulated. In order to properly assess the opinion, it is most important that the mental health lawyer explore in detail the background data which forms the basis upon which the ultimate opinion was formulated.' 5 The lawyer may attempt to show the unreliability of any psychiatric opinion based on its source. The diagnoses and predictions that psychiatrists make in court can be
based on a variety of information from diverse sources. In some
cases, the opinion is the result of extensive interviews with the
patient and direct observations of his behavior. In other cases, the
105The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized the principle
that full disclosure may be necessary to adequately support the psychiatric judgment. In State v. Myers, 222 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1976) the Court held that the trial
court erred in not permitting information elicited during a psychiatric interview to
be fully disclosed to the jury. The court found the information given to the psychia-

trist by the patient to be crucial to diagnosis and may therefore be fully disclosed
to the jury as an explanation for the diagnosis. Id. at 303-04. The court found it
prejudicial "to preclude a doctor from making reference to information which comes
to him in the form of records or documents prepared in the normal course of either
his examination or treatment of the patient." Id. at 304. The court, in a footnote,
makes it clear that it is not ruling on the admissibility of the records as such or the
situation where the expert bases an opinion on the opinion of others. Id. at 304 n.1.
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opinion will be based partly or primarily on the reports of others.
The foremost question for the attorney is whether the psychological opinion is based solely on a personal examination of the
patient or whether other sources were utilized. The expert witness
may have observed the patient over a long period of time and/or
may have established a therapeutic relationship. In such cases, the
mental health professional may effectively utilize frequent personal examinations and the long-standing relationship to support
the opinions presented to the court.
Although expert opinion testimony founded on knowledge
gained from personal observation is probably the most acceptable
basis for an expert opinion, it should not be considered as lying
beyond successful cross-examination. For example, can the expert
describe the patient's appearance, mannerisms, speech content,
and other patterns which support the opinion of "mental illness"
or "dangerousness?" What was the time period over which the
examination was conducted? When and where was the examination conducted? How many times was the patient interviewed?
How long was each interview? 6 Did the examination take place
solely for the purpose of allowing the mental health professional to
testify at trial? Did the patient consent to the examination and
cooperate with the examiner, or was the patient uncooperative?
More frequently, however, the opinion will be based on both
personal examination and secondary sources. Secondary medical
sources are diverse in nature. They include the patient's medical,
psychiatric, and criminal records as well as information in the
possession of hospital staff, legal counsel, friends, and neighbors.
Information from some or all of these sources may be the basis of
an expert opinion which will result in involuntary hospitalization.
Defense counsel, aware of this fundamental aspect of opinion
testimony, should make full inquiry into the basis for the expert's
opinion. Obviously, the goal here is to probe the accuracy of the
facts, the basis for the diagnosis, and the prediction of a likelihood
Mc'
One commentator has noted that in criminal cases where an insanity defense is raised the length of the psychiatric interview has been used as a basis for
attack on the admissibility of the testimony. Note, Involuntary Hospitalizationof
the Mentally Ill Under Florida'sBaker Act: ProceduralDue Process and the Role
of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 508, 527 n.186 (1974) (citing United States v.
Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 378 (4th Cir. 1971); Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560, 56364 (N.D. Tex. 1964), affl'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965)).
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of future harm. The cross-examination can begin by simply asking:
Doctor, is there any data in the patient's records and
from your personal examination from which one could
conclude that the patient is not mentally ill and/or
dangerous? Doctor, did the patient exhibit any normal or
healthy behavior during your examination? Could you
describe that behavior?
Not inconceivably, the psychiatrist might report only those portions of the prospective patient's comments and actions which
would support an inference that the individual was disturbed,
even though ninety-nine percent of what he or she said and did
would be entirely consistent with what we regard as normal
behavior. Nor is it uncommon for psychiatrists to omit qualifying remarks, thereby making the prospective patient's statements seem more irrational than they are. 107
Finally, the doctor can be asked to simply describe what the
patient is "like," that is, what are the obvious*assets and liabilities
of the patient? "Can you describe the patient in human terms
without the psychiatric labels?" The point is simply that psychiatrists render subjective observations in the course of their examinations and this should be brought to the court's attention.
Questioning the Psychiatriston the Ultimate Legal Issues: Is the
Patient Mentally Ill and Dangerous to Self or Others?
There are essentially two criteria for involuntary civil commitment established by statute in West Virginia and throughout the
United States. The crux of the involuntary commitment hearing
lies in the resolution of two questions: (1) Is the individual mentally ill?' (2) Is he or she likely to cause harm to self or others?

,o' Ennis & Litwack, supra note 96, at 745.

The examiner is selective in what he will notice in the clinical situation and what he will remember from the clinical situation. This is ex-

tremely important when one bears in mind that all one gets in the psychi-

atrist's report or in his testimony in the courtroom are those data which
he has selectively noted and selectively remembered. The raw data in its
entirety is seldom, if ever, available.
ZISKIN, supra note 104, at 118.
"I While this article is concerned solely with involuntary civil commitment for
mental illness, West Virginia also provides for commitment of the mentally re-
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Affirmative answers to these questions by the testifying psychiatrist provide the basis for involuntary confinement in a state mental hospital. The failure of defense counsel to question the psychiatric testimony on these matters is tantamount to acquiescence in
the state's decision to commit the individual.
Diagnosis of Mental Illness
There is considerable debate in the United States as to what
constitutes mental illness and how it should be defined.' °9 The
uncertainty underlying concepts of mental illness limits the certainty and objectivity which can be accorded any psychiatric diagnosis."' Notwithstanding the debate in the psychiatric literature
concerning diagnoses of schizophrenia, manic depression, and
mental retardation, these diagnoses are generally left unchallenged
by defense counsel in civil commitment hearings.
An example of how inadequate lawyers are in questioning psychiatric diagnosis is illustrated in a civil commitment hearing observed by the author."' The first psychiatrist testified that the
tarded and addicted. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(a)(1) (1979 Cum. Supp.). The
statute specifically includes the alcoholic and the narcotic addict. W. VA. CODE
§ 27-1-11 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
On the commitment of narcotics addicts see Abromosky & McCarthy, Civil
Commitment of Non-Criminal Narcotic Addicts: Parens Patriae;A Valid Exercise
of a State's Police Power; Or An UnconscionableDisregardof IndividualLiberty?,
38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 477 (1977). See generally N. KrrrRm, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANc E AND ENFORCED THERAPY 210-60 (1973). On the commitment of alcoholics see generally, KrrrRm,supra, at 262-96.
,0,
On the definitional problems inherent in the concept of mental illness see
Blinick, Mental Disability,Legal Ethics, and ProfessionalResponsibility, 33 ALB.
L. REv. 92, 92-96 (1968); Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?,83 YALE
L.J. 1237, 1237 n.1 (1974).
110
On the problem of diagnosis, see Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment:
Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 808, 809-12 (1975). See generally Diagnosis and the Difference It Makes,
Proceedings of the Scientific Conference in Honor of the Fiftieth Anniversary of
the MenningerFoundation, 40 BuLL. MENNINGER CuNIc 411-602 (1976). A psychiatric diagnosis is not an end in itself. It is only a means to serve the goal of treatment. "In the last resort all diagnostic concepts stand or fall by the strength of the
prognostic and therapeutic implications they embody." R. KYNDALL, THE ROLE OF
DIAGNOSIS IN PSYCHIATRY 40 (1975). For a review of the ways psychiatrists err in
diagnosing mental illness, see Morrison & Flanagan, Diagnostic Errors in
Psychiatry, 19 CoMPREHENsIvE PSYCHIAT. 109 (1978).
"I See explanatory footnotes to Appendix.
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patient was admitted to Weston State Hospital in 1942. The examination for the civil commitment hearing took place on August 15,
1977. The psychiatrist testified that in 1942 the patient was diagnosed as a manic depressive, depressed type,"' but that there was
doubt in the psychiatrist's mind as to the accuracy of the diagnosis. The correct diagnosis, the psychiatrist argued, should have
been schizophrenia. The testimony elicited by the prosecutor was
as follows:
Prosecutor: What is schizophrenia?
Psychiatrist: If you ask ten psychiatrists, you'll get eleven different answers. I won't try to define it, but you could say that
it is characterized by withdrawal from reality, dissociation of
thoughts, irrationality, and hallucinations.
Prosecutor: What is the patient's current diagnosis?
Psychiatrist: Schizophrenia.
After further testimony on the issue of dangerousness, the
defense counsel conducted the following cross examination:
Defense Counsel: From your examination, what can you say
about his ability to keep up his own appearance?
Psychiatrist: He needs some help. He needs to be pushed a
little.
At this point, defense counsel requested the MHC to take
notice of reports which indicated that the patient could take care
of himself.
Manic depressive reaction has been defined as:
[a] group of affective psychotic reactions characterized by a predominant mood of elation or depression, accompanied by related disturbances
of thought and activity. The behaviorial changes that occur range from
relatively mild to extremely severe and uncontrolled reactions, but in
most cases they appear to be exaggerations of normal tendencies rather
than bizarre distortions.
2 R. GOLDENSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HuMAN BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY,
AND MENTAL HEALT 727 (1970). In the depressive phase, the features range from
"inertia, loss of interest and enthusiasm, and physical complaints without organic
basis," dejection and thoughts of suicide to an acute depression where there is an
impairment of thought and speech. Id. at 727. In this advanced phase:
[riesponse to question is slow and hesitant, physical activity is almost
at a standstill, and contacts with other people are rarely initiated. The
patient is a picture of dejection: his body is stooped, his forehead furrowed, his face troubled, his gaze fixed downward.
112
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Defense Counsel: Did he cooperate with you?
Psychiatrist: I had to ask him questions several times.
MHC: Are you testifying that the diagnosis was wrong in 1942
or today?
Psychiatrist: The original diagnosis was made on the basis of
a suicide attempt and that, in my opinion, is not enough.
MHC: Is the patient mentally ill today?
Psychiatrist: With medication, the schizophrenia is under
control.
MHC: Is he oriented?
Psychiatrist: He is not oriented as to time and place. We're
getting into the organic stages.
MHC: From a visual observation, would not an alternative be
a nursing home?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
MHC: Will he wander off or hurt himself?
Psychiatrist: I don't think he would wander off.
In reviewing this transcript of an actual civil commitment
hearing reconstructed from the author's notes, the ineffectiveness
of defense counsel in questioning the psychiatric diagnosis is apparent. Even after the psychiatrist testified that an earlier diagnosis of manic depressive psychosis was doubtful, the defense lawyer
did not attempt to explore the basis for either the diagnosis at the
time of admission or at the time of the hearing. Rather, the attorney asked about the patient's "ability to keep up his own appearance" and whether he cooperated with the psychiatrist. It is unclear why the defense attorney pursued such a line of questioning.
The MHC in this case did, however, show concern over the diagnosis and whether the patient was, at the time of the hearing, mentally ill."'
This example is' reflective of a general failure of attorneys
representing the mentally ill to adequately probe psychiatric judgments about mental illness. There is generally no attempt by West
Virginia lawyers to determine how particular psychiatric labels are
selected or why the label applies to the particular individual in
question. The diagnosis is simply left unquestioned.
The West Virginia statute governing mentally ill persons attempts to define the elusive concept of mental illness but with less

,,3The MHC in this case was carrying out the statutory duty of safeguarding
the rights and interests of the patient as well as the state. See W. VA. CODE § 27-51(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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than total success. The statute defines mental illness as "a manifestation in a person of significantly impaired capacity to maintain
acceptable levels of functioning in the areas of intellect, emotion
and physical well-being."'' The definition presents more questions
than it provides answers. What are the common "manifestations"
of intellectual and emotional impairment? When is intellectual
and emotional impairment "significant?" What is an "acceptable
level of functioning in the areas of intellect and emotion?" Why
does the definition of mental illness include reference to "physical
well-being?" It is apparent that the statute fails to define mental
illness for purposes of determining what specific behavior, conduct, or mental state will subject the person to confinement. The
statute simply does not provide a sufficient guide for the public or
for the courts to determine when and in what circumstances the
state will use its power to involuntarily commit an individual."'
Under such circumstances, the courts are under great pressure to
accede to psychiatric judgments on mental illness. It should be
obvious that defense counsel has a duty to represent the client by
focusing the court's attention on the special danger presented by
psychiatric judgments which are unguided by statutory standards."'
Defense counsel faces a difficult but not insurmountable burden in questioning a psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness. If
§ 27-1-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
1, The failure of the West Virginia Mental Health Code to provide a definition
of mental illness which would permit objective application is reflected in the civil
commitment statutes of the other states. See Note, Developments in the Law Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1202 (1974). The note
points out that: "Even those states which have attempted more detailed definitions
of mental illness have not clearly or precisely identified the type and degree of
mental disorder which makes compulsory hospitalization appropriate." Id. at 120203. On the conceptual and pragmatic problems in defining mental illness, see
Mechanic, Some Factors in Identifying and Defining Mental Illness, in MENTAL
ILNESS AND SOCIAL PROcEssEs 23-32 (T. Scheff ed. 1967); T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY (1966); and the works of Thomas Szasz, THE
"' W. VA. CODE

MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); LAW, LIBERTY AND PSvCHATro (1963); THE MYTM
OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
"I Two recent opinions of the Supreme Court suggest that the Court may not

be willing to support the civil libertarian effort to further "legalize" the civil commitment process. (By "legalize" this author refers to the development of legal
procedural mechanisms to reduce the influence of psychiatrists in civil commitment hearings.) See Parham v. J. R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979); Addington v. Texas,

99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
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defense counsel has a working knowledge of the psychiatric literature and the criticism of involuntary hospitalization based on expansive definitions of mental illness similar to that found in the
West Virginia statute, the psychiatrist can simply be asked:
"Doctor, how would you define mental illness?" The answer to this
simple, straightforward question should provide a good source of
background data for use in further cross-examination or for argument to the court that the individual is not, in fact, mentally ill.
First, the psychiatrist's definition of mental illness may be substantially different from that provided in the statute. If that is the
case, it can be argued that the psychiatrist has found the patient
mentally ill based on his or her personal conception of mental
illness as opposed to the definition established by statute. ' Given
the broad statutory definition, this argument will seldom be effective, but will serve to highlight the defense counsel's intention to
scrutinize the psychiatric judgement.
A more promising attack on the psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness is to show the questionable reliability and validity of
psychiatric diagnoses in general. This attack can begin with an
attempt to show that a diagnosis of mental illness is substantially
different from a diagnosis of physical illness by a medical doctor.,"
To consider a psychiatric diagnosis to be as scientifically valid as
a medical diagnosis is, at present, unjustified. Bruce Ennis, a civil
liberties lawyer active in mental health litigation, and Dr. Thomas
Litwack, a psychologist, conducted a comprehensive survey of the
professional literature on psychiatric diagnoses and judgments and
found that psychiatrists themselves question the reliability and
validity of psychiatric judgments." 9 The work of Ennis and Lit"' S. SCHWARTZ & D. STERN, A TRuL MANUAL FOR Cvii Com TiNrr VI-16
(1976).
"I The foremost exponent of the argument that psychiatric diagnosis is inexorably different from medical diagnosis is Thomas Szasz. Dr. Szasz, a psychiatrist,
argues that psychiatrists have failed to establish a successful classificatory scheme
for mental illness. T. SzAsz, LAw, LmERTY, AND PsYcmATRY 24 (1963). Szasz finds
that "the significance of a psychiatric label depends more on the social situation
in which it occurs than on the nature of the object labeled." Id. at 35. For a
philosophical comparison of the medical and psychiatric approaches to health problem diagnosis, see Mischel, The Concept of Mental Health and Disease:An Analysis of the Controversy Between Behavioraland Psychodynamic Approaches, 2.J.
MED. & Pae. 197 (1977). See generally, J. ZisKn , supra note 101.
"I Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. Rav. 693 (1974). Reliability and validity are
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wack suggests that a psychiatrist should be questioned along the

following lines:
Doctor, you have testified that the patient is mentally ill
based on your diagnosis of schizophrenia. Is schizo-'
phrenia an established diagnostic category?
Doctor, isn't it true that a psychiatric diagnosis using a
criteria such as schizophrenia or manic depressive is not
reliable?' 0
Doctor, doesn't the research literature on psychiatric diagnosis show that psychiatrists are often unable to agree
with each other in their diagnoses?
Doctor, have you conducted any studies to determine the
validity of your own predictions, that is, how accurate
your judgments are t 2'
If not, have you relied upon the studies of others?
If so, which ones?
One of the most frequently used diagnoses in institutional
psychiatry is schizophrenia. 12 Its frequent usage suggests that determs of art without clearly different meanings. Reliability means "the probability
or frequency of agreement" as to a diagnosis. Would two psychiatrists reach the
same conclusion as to the diagnosis? Id. at 697. Validity refers to the accuracy of a
judgment or diagnosis. Id. The question of validity asks whether the psychiatric
diagnosis or judgment has been verified over time. For example, did the patient,
found by the psychiatrist likely to be dangerous to others, actually cause harm to
others?
I The studies which show unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis are summarized in ZISKIN, supra note 101, at ch. 8 and Ennis & Litwack, supra note 119, at
701-08. Dr. Alan Stone, after citing some of the studies reviewed by Ziskin and
Ennis and Litwack notes that "reliability could be improved for purposes of civil
commitment if psychiatrists would confine themselves to the broad diagnostic categories and in addition diagnose only severe conditions." A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH
AND LAw: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 66 (1975).
"I1See J. ZISKIN, COPING wrTH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 3747, 181-214 (2d ed. 1970).
After a comprehensive review of the psychiatric literature, Ennis and Litwack
found few studies of the validity of psychiatricdiagnosisand the few studies which
do exist suggest that diagnostic validity is low. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 119,
at 708-09. On the even more important question of dangerousness, the authors could
find no empirical studies which establish the validity of psychiatric predictions of
dangerousness'to self and others. Id. at 711-16. Accord, Albers, Pasewark & Meyer,
Involuntary Hospitalizationand PsychiatricTestimony: The Fallibilityof the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U. L. REv. 11 (1976) .
122 See ZISKIN, supra note 101, at 112. Schizophrenia "constitutes the largest
group of severe behavior disorders in our culture. Its victims occupy about 25% of
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fense attorneys should be especially knowledgeable as to this particular form of mental illness.12 A leading critic of psychiatric
expertise, Jay Ziskin, indicates that there is no generally accepted
definition of schizophrenia. 24 To add to the conceptual confusion,
there are social, genetic, and biochemical theories which compete
as causal theories for schizophrenia.'2 The observable symptoms
used to describe schizophrenia are also found in other forms of
mental illness (and in individuals not thought to be mentally ill),
making an objective criteria for diagnosis difficult, if not impossible. A psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia can be crossexamined as follows:
Doctor, is there a generally accepted or acceptable defini12
tion of schizophrenia?
Is there agreement among the medical profession as to
what constitutes the so-called condition of schizophrenia?
all the hospital beds in the United States." G. ULrmr & W. GOODRICH,A SYNOPSIS
OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHIATRY 73 (3d ed. 1965).
In the legal literature, see generally, Goldzband, Schizophrenia in the Adversary Arena, 12 CALIF. W. L. REV. 247 (1976); DuBose, Of the ParensPatriae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the
PatientJustify Involuntary Treatment, 60 MINN.L. REv. 1149 (1976). The psychiatric literature on schizophrenia is vast, numbering several thousand articles. For a
readable account of schizophrenia see S. ARIETI, INTERPRETATION OF ScmzoPmIA
(Rev. ed. 1974).
In For a review of the current thinking on schizophrenia see ANNUAL REVIEW
OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIA SYNDROME (R.Cancro ed. 1978); BEYOND THE DOUBLE BIND
(M. Berger ed. 1979); SCHIZOPHRENIA: TOWARDS A NEW SYNTHESIS (J. Wing ed. 1978);
THE NATURE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA (L. Wynne, R. Cromwell & S. Matthysse eds. 1978).

"I See generally, ZISKIN, supra note 101, at 112-16 (1977 Pocket Supplement
at 66-71).
' See note 123, supra.
226 Schizophrenia is defined in the American Psychiatric Association's
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (1968) (known as DSM

11) as follows:
Schizophrenia
This large category includes a group of disorders manifested by characteristic disturbances of thinking, mood and behavior. Disturbances in thinking are marked by alterations of concept formation which may lead to
misinterpretations of reality and sometimes to delusions and hallucinations, which frequently appear psychologically self-protective. Corollary
mood changes include ambivalence, constricted and inappropriate emotional responsiveness and loss of emphathy with others. Behavior may be
withdrawn, regressive and bizarre.
Id. at 33.
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Is it true that there is in fact no commonly accepted
definition of schizophrenia nor agreement as to the appropriate criteria for labeling someone as schizophrenic?'"
In fact, is there not a continuing controversy over what
constitutes schizophrenia?
Doctor, with regard to your diagnosis of schizophrenia,
what is the likelihood that another psychiatrist would
reach a similar diagnosis?
Doctor, was your diagnosis of schizophrenia made only
because the patient's behavior could not be given one of
the other labels of psychosis, e.g., manic depression?'28
The most effective means of rebutting psychiatric testimony
of mental illness or a particular diagnosis is to present rebuttal
testimony by a psychiatrist or psychologist. In West Virginia, individuals have a statutory right to examination and testimony from
an independent expert of his or her choice.' 2 An indigent is entitled
to use an independent expert with costs to be borne by the state.'30
' See ZisKiN, supra note 101. Here the lawyer seeks to challenge the reliability
of the diagnosis. Id. at 181-87; Ennis & Litwack, supra note 119; Albers, Pasewark
& Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility
of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 11 (1976). In each of
these sources, the authors review the psychiatric literature and conclude that psychiatric diagnoses are of doubtful validity. Thus, "Itihe testifying expert should
be led to admit that the chances of another expert, similarly qualified, agreeing
with his findings are barely better than 50-50. . . ." ZisKIN, supra note 101, at 186.
On the fallacies in the diagnosis of schizophrenia which make reliability and validity doubtful, see Kubie, Multiple Fallaciesin the Concept of Schizophrenia, 153 J.
NERvous & MENTAL DisEASES 331 (1971).
"2 If the answer is yes, it would make schizophrenia a waste basket diagnosis
to be applied when nothing else fits. If the answer is no, then the psychiatrist should
be questioned to determine the specific factors which led to the diagnosis. E.g., the
psychiatrist may contend that the patient reported hallucinations which are commonly linked to schizophrenia. In this case, the psychiatrist can be questioned as
to whether the presence of hallucinations is a reliable and valid indicator of schizophrenia. A number of studies now conclude that hallucinations occur in so-called
normal people. See ZISKIN, supra note 101 (1977 Pocket Supplement at 46-48)
(citing Goldstein, Case Report: HallucinatoryExperience: A PersonalAccount, 85
J. ABN. PSYCH. 423 (1976) and Holden, Altered States of Consciousness: Mind
Researchers Meet to Discuss Explorationand Mapping of "InnerSpace," 179 Scl.
982 (1973)).
'29 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'1 Id. See also, Farrell, Right of an Indigent Civil Commitment Defendant to
PsychiatricAssistance of His Own Choice at State Expense, 11 IDAHO L. REv. 141
(1975).
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Psychiatric Testimony as to Dangerousness

Defense counsel may frequently find it difficult to discredit a
psychiatric diagnosis of mental illness. The attempt will find the
attorney opposing the psychiatrist at the point of least vulnerability and on an issue which will insure a strong defense of
professional opinion. A more productive area for defense crossexamination will be the psychiatric testimony as to dangerousness.
Even the most reticent, ill-equipped defense counsel should be
able to force the expert to recognize the uncertainty and subjectivity in predictions of dangerousness. 3'
Dangerousness to Others
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has noted with
approval the dangerousness criterion 32 but has not provided meaningful guidance as to what constitutes harmful or dangerous action
towards others.I3 A minimal effort at guidance is found in the West
'3 Whenever a psychiatrist or psychologist testifies that a person is likely to
be harmful to self or others, he or she is making a prediction about the probability
of future occurrences of certain types of behavior. Given the number of factors
which interact to influence behavior, the ability to predict any particular behavior
is limited. For a useful review of the theoretical issues in pedicting future behavior,
see Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: PredictingBehavior With Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
'" "Society is entitled to protect itself against predatory acts on the part of
anti-social people, regardless of the cause of their anti-social actions. Therefore, if
the State can prove that an individual is likely to injure others if left at'liberty, it
may hospitalize him." Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974).
In The subjectivity of the harm criteria lies initially with the potentially broad
range of meaning which can be given to harm and dangerousness. Thus, dangerousness could be interpreted to mean:
crimes involving a serious risk of physical or psychical harm to another.
Murder, arson and rape are the obvious examples. Even in criminal law,
however, the notion of dangerousness can be much broader. If one believes that acts that have adverse effects on social interests are dangerous,
and if one accepts as a generality that the criminal law is devoted to such
acts, any crime can be considered dangerous. For example, speeding in a
motor vehicle, although traditionally regarded as a minor crime, bears
great risk of life and property, and thus may be viewed as a dangerous
act. Dangerousness can bear an even more extensive definition as well.
An act may be considered dangerous if it is offensive or disquieting to
others. Thus, the man who walks the street repeating, in a loud monotone, "fuck, fuck, fuck," is going to wound many sensibilities even if he
does not violate the criminal law. Other examples would be the man,
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Virginia statute. The code requires that one be "likely to cause
serious harm" and that the "substantial tendency to physically
harm other persons" be "manifested by homicidal or other violent
behavior which places others in reasonable fear of serious physical
harm." 3 '
Presently, proof of a propensity' "to cause serious harm" is
satisfied by the testimonial "predictions" of psychiatric professionals. In some instances, the prediction is based solely on the
theory that individuals in certain diagnosed categories of mental
illness are dangerous. For example, once a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia is made, the individual is predictably dangerous
since paranoid schizophrenics are dangerous. The attorney should
oppose psychiatric predictions of dangerousness which appear to
be based on the diagnostic label which a psychiatrist has attached.
For example, a conclusion that the patient is dangerous because
he or she is a paranoid schizophrenic ignores the fact that such
individuals "may be dangerous in only certain types of situations
found in most cities, striding about town lecturing at the top of his lungs,
or the similar character in San Francisco who spends his time shadow
boxing in public. If such people are dangerous, it is not because they
threaten physical harm but because we are made uncomfortable when we
see aberrancies. And, of course, if dangerousness is so defined, it is at
least as broad a concept as mental illness. The cases are unfortunately
silent about what meaning the concept of danger bears in the commitment process.
Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 75, 82 (1968).
' W. VA. Con § 27-1-12(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The West Virginia efforts to
define dangerousness to others can be compared with the new Pennsylvania Mental
Health Procedures Act which requires a showing that the mentally ill pose a clear
and present danger of harm to others. PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 50, § 7301 (1979-80 Cum.
Supp. Purdon). A clear and present danger is shown in Pennsylvania only when,
"... within the last thirty days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict
serious bodily harm on another and there is a reasonable probability that such
conduct will be repeated." Id. § 7301(b)(1) (1979-80 Cum. Supp. Purdon). See also
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (real and present threat
of substantial harm required).
'" It is not sufficient that the state establish a possibility that defendant
might commit some dangerous acts at some time in the indefinite future.
The risk of danger, a product of the likelihood of such conduct and the
degree of harm which may ensue, must be substantial within the reasonably foreseeable future. On the other hand, certainty of prediction is not
required and cannot reasonably be expected.
State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 261, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975).
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or in connection with relationships with certain individuals. An
evaluation of dangerousness in such cases must take into account
the likelihood that the defendant will be exposed to such situations
or come into contact with such individuals.' 36
Arguably, the requirement that the individual be shown to
have a "substantial tendency" toward violence requires that the
judgment as to potential harm be based, not on membership in a
classified group of the mentally ill who can be given a distinctive
psychiatric label, but on the actual likelihood of harm by the specific patient.'37 Moreover, any tendency toward harm to others
must be "substantial." The "substantial tendency" requirement,
while open to interpretation, must be viewed as a requirement that
the patient demonstrate a likelihood of violence by a recent overt
act, threat, or attempt.'38 The West Virginia statute was amended
,l, State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 261, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975). See also, State v.
Johnson, 493 P.2d 1386 (Or. App. 1972) (where the defendant was potentially dangerous to her children but was unlikely to have access to them); Dix, supra note
96, at 196.
'1' See People v. San one, 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974), where a
medical opinion of dangerousness towards others was premised on the testimony
of a psychiatrist that persons he had known who had delusions similar to the
patient's had injured or attempted to injure others. The court found the psychiatrist testimony "clear and convincing evidence" of dangerousness to others even
though the psychiatrist could not state the degree of probability of dangerousness.
But see, People v. Bradley, 22 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 318 N.E.2d 267 (1974), adhering
to the standard established in Sansone but holding that the psychiatric testimony
of dangerousness was less than "clear and convincing." Dr. Alan Stone, Professor
of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard, has suggested that "psychiatry lacks the capacity to identify dangerous patients with sufficient reliability to meet a court's
evidentiary test of either beyond a reasonable doubt (about 90 percent certainty)
or clear and convincing proof (about 75 percent certainty)." Stone, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT.

829 (1975).

The "clear and convincing" evidence of dangerousness in Sansone is doubtful.
The psychiatrist produced no data other than a personal conclusion that the defendant was more likely to commit a crime than any normal person. It is indeed
doubtful whether there is any data available to support the proposition that delusional mental patients are more likely to be dangerous than a cross-section of the
general community: More generally, it is improbable "that the likelihood of crime
within a group of individuals with any particular psychosis would be greater than
that to be expected in a normal community cross-section." Livermore, Malmquist
& Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 83
(1968).
'U W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See also, Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378, 390-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974). Compare People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App.
3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974), where the court rejected the proposition that a
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in 1978 to require that psychiatric testimony concerning dangerousness be based on detailed, recent "overt acts" which "clearly
demonstrate such likelihood." '39 Although this section of the statute has been repeAled, all applications for civil commitment must
state the overt acts which support the belief that the individual is
dangerous.'35 .' Psychiatrists in their predictions of dangerousness
should still be required to state the overt behavior which supports
their testimony at the civil commitment hearing.
One of the authors of a frequently cited study on dangerousness concludes that a "meticulous description" of actual behavior
is the core of a prediction of dangerousness.' Due to the imprecise
meaning of what constitutes an "overt act" demonstrating dangerousness, ,4'the attorney should inquire as to the exact nature of the
prediction of dangerousness must be based upon overt acts or threats. The absence
of evidence of prior harmful conduct, the court ruled, does not per se violate due
process. The court allowed the prediction of dangerousness on the basis of medical
testiony that the person was reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct.
The court, however, would limit such predictions to qualified psychiatrists who can
conduct their predictions by appropriate experience and study.
'9 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(c) (repealed 1979).
,39.tSee also W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(d)(i) (Cum.Supp. 1979), which requires
that an application to initiate civil commitment proceedings state "in detail the
recent overt acts" which support the belief that the individual is dangerous.
A sound argument can be made for the proposition that an overt act requirement is constitutionally required and a number of courts have accepted the argument. See, Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp.
509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The contrary position was taken
in United States v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
It has recently been suggested that psychiatrists adopt ethical standards to
limit testimony concerning dangerousness. One of the proposed standards would
require that: "(n]o expert opinion should be expressed unless the subject has
actually engaged in dangerous behavior and an analysis of that behavior should be
a major factor in the conclusion of the expert." Dix, supra note 96, at 195. (Emphasis added).
Where determinations of dangerousness are premised on overt acts, the role of
the psychiatrist is arguably of less significance. See Ochberg & Brown, Mental
Health and the Law: Partnersin Advancing Human Rights, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 491,
506 (1974) citing H. Steadman, The Determination of Dangerousness in New York
(unpublished paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association).
"I Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of
Dangerousness, 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371, 384 (1972).
"I As one commentator has noted, overt act is "a term of art" which has been
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overt act and how the conclusion of dangerousness is related to the
specific act of the individual.
The attorney should be cautious not to assume that assaultive
or violent behavior always supports an inference that the individual is dangerous to others. Situational factors may explain a patient's agressive or violent behavior, especially where the assaultive behavior is an attempt on the part of the individual to obstruct
confinement. The following questions are suggestive:
Doctor, is it possible that the patient was assaultive only
because there was an effort to confine the patient against
her will?
Doctor, is it possible that the aggressive behavior which
you observed (reported) was a result of the institutional
environment?
Even the presence of past dangerous acts, often viewed as the
best indicator of dangerousness, is not conclusive proof.
"Determination of dangerousness involves prediction of defendant's future conduct rather than mere characterization of his past
conduct.""'4 The dangerous behavior must be related to and a readopted from criminal conspiracy law and lacks precise meaning in the context
here. NOTE, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a ConstitutionalRequirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562,562 n.2 (1977).
The difficulty is exacerbated by the absence of case law detailing what overt acts
can be viewed as permitting a judgment of dangerousness. Id. at 576.
" State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 262, 344 A.2d 289, 303 (1975). Even a prior
criminal act is not a per se showing of dangerousness. The court in Krol noted that:
The fact that defendant is presently suffering from some degree of mental
illness and that at some point in the past mental illness caused him to
commit a criminal act, while certainly sufficient to give probable cause
to inquire into whether he is dangerous, does not, in and of itself, warrant
the inference that he presently poses a significant threat of harm, either
to himself or to others.
68 N.J. at 242, 344 A.2d at 295. The criminal act in Krol was the stabbing death of
the defendant's wife. The psychiatric testimony was that the defendant was an
acute schizophrenic and killed his wife because of a delusion that she was conspiring with his employer to murder him. See also, In re Stephenson, 36 Ill. App. 3d
746, 749, 344 N.E.2d 679, 682 (1976). The court in Krol does point out, however,
that empirical studies suggest that criminal conduct is an important factor in
prediction of future dangerous conduct. 68 N.J. at 261, 344 A.2d at 302 n.12 (citing
Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371, 384 (1972) and Rubin, Predictionof Dangerousnessin
the Mentally Ill Criminal, 287 ARCH. GEN. PSYCIHAT. 297 (1972)). The Supreme

Court has clearly established that proof of a criminal act is not a constitutionally
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sult of the present mental illness. All members of society, regardless of mental health, are at times dangerous to others. Consequently, the threat of dangerousness must be directly associated
with a current mental illness."'
A growing body of psychiatric and legal literature is addressed
to the issue of whether psychiatrists can reliably predict the likelihood of future dangerousness."' Bernard Diamond, an eminent
acceptable basis for involuntary commitment." See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966). See also Walker v. Jenkins, 203 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1974).
"
See W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-2(a)(2), -4(c)(2), -4(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
,' Am. PSYCHIAT. ASSOC., CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-30
(1975) (discussed in News & Notes, 26 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT. 249 (1975));
AM. PSYCHIAT. Assoc.: CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, TASK FORCE
REPORT 8, (1974); H. STEADMAN & J. COCoZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE:
EXCESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE (1974); CLINICAL EVALUTION OF THE DANGER-

OUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (J. Rappeport ed. 1969); DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A
PROBLEM INLAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (C. Frederick ed. 1978); Levine, The Concept
of Dangerousness:Criticism and Compromise, in PSYCHOLOGY INTHE LEGAL PROCESS
147-61 (B. Sales ed. 1977); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failureof PsychiatricPredic-

tions of Dangerousness:Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084
(1976); Cocozza & Steadman, Some Refinements in the Measurement and Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1012 (1974); Dershowitz,
Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 29 (1968)
(reprintedin 2(9) PSYCH. TODAY 43 (1969)); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness:
Some Fictions About Predictions, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 24 (1970); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Dix, "Civil"
Commitments of the Mentally Ill and the Need for Data on the Prediction of
Dangerousness,19 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 318 (1976); Ennis & Litwack, supra note
96; Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Observations on
the Decision to Release PersonsAcquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225,
235-36 (1960); Hunt & Wiley, Operation Baxstrom After One Year, 124 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 974 (1968); Katz & Goldstein, Dangerousnessand Mental Health, 131 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISORDERS 404 (1960); Kozal, Boucher & Garofolo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 371 (1972); Laves,

The Prediction of "Dangerousness" As A Criterionfor Involuntary Civil Commitment: ConstitutionalConsiderations, 3 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 291 (1975); Levinson &
Zan York, The Attribution of "Dangerousness" in Mental Health Evaluations, 15
J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 328 (1974); Meyerson, Panel Report: When is Dangerous, Dangerous?, 1 J. PSYCHIAT. & L. 427 (1973); Monoham & Beis, Controlling

Dangerous People, 433 ANNALS 142 (1976); Monoham & Cummings, Predictionof
Dangerousness as a Function of It's Perceived Consequences, 2 J. CalM. JUST. 239
(1974); Page & Yates, Civil Commitment and the Danger Mandate, 18 CANADIAN
PSYCIHAT. Assoc. J. 267 (Aug. 1973); Peszke, Is DangerousnessAn Issue for Physi-

cians in Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 825 (1975); Roth, et al.,
Dangerousness, Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 408,
509 (1977); Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarcerationof Dangerous
Criminals: Perspective and Problems, 56 VA. L. REV. 602, 618-21 (1970); Shah,
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forensic psychiatrist, stated flatly in 1974 that he knew of "no
reports in the scientific literature which are supported by valid
clinical experience and statistical evidence that describe psychological or physical signs or symptoms which can be readily used to
discriminate between the potentially dangerous and the harmless
individual."' 45 A reading of the recent literature on dangerousness
suggests that Diamond's assertion is still valid. At present, psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are unreliable, of doubtful validity, and fraught with imprecision; they consistently overpredict
the likelihood of harm-producing behavior.'
Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Policy
Considerations, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 501 (1975); Steadman & Cocozza,
Stimulus/Response: We Can't Predict Who is Dangerous,8 PSYCH. TODAY 32 (1975);
Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determination
of Dangerousnessin Law and Psychology, 1 J. PSYcHIAT. & L. 409 (1973); Stone,
132 AMER. J. PSYCHIAT. 829 (1975); Tanay, Law and the Mentally Ill, 22 WAYNE L.
REV. 781, 785-88 (1976); Waelder, Psychic Determinationand the Possibility of
Predictions, 32 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 15 (1963); von Hirsh, Prediction of Criminal
Conduct and lreventative Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. RV.
717 (1972); Note, Developments-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV.
L. REV. 1190, 1240-45 (1974).
For a bibliography of statistical studies which show that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are unreliable, see Rubin, Predictionof Dangerousnessin
Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 397 (1972).
For judicial opinions recognizing problems with psychiatric predictions of dangerousness and citing studies showing doubtful validity and reliability, see Dixon
v. Commonwealth, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (where the court heard testimony concerning the Baxstrom patients). See also, Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444, 453 n.25, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 242, 249
n.2, 344 A.2d 289, 295, 301 n.2 (1975); State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449
(1974).
I' Diamond, The PsychiatricPredictionof Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 444 (1974). See also, Rappeport, Lassen & Hay, A Review of the Literatureof
the Dangerousnessof the Mentally Ill, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 72, 79 (J. Rappeport ed. 1967).
U8 This problem of overprediction is the most serious consequence of
psychiatric inexactitude. It is estimated that even with the most careful
and painstaking testing approach to this problem (an approach rarely
taken in the matter of civil commitments) the results will yield a minimum of 60% to 70% false positives-that is, those who are predicted to
be dangerous but who in fact are not. Without elaborate testing, it may
run well above 90%.
Note, Standardsfor Involuntary Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania, 38 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 535, 546 (1977). See T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL 105-27 (1966); Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower in Civil Commitment: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,
2 PSYCH. TODAY 43, 47 (1969).
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Serious consideration should be given to questioning any psychiatric prediction of dangerousness.'47 The first approach is to
show that psychiatrists in general have no training or experience
in making such predictions and that this general rule holds for the
testifying psychiatrist as well.
Dr. Jones, did you receive any training in the diagnosis
of mental illness?
Dr. Jones, have you had similar training in the prediction
of dangerousness?
Doctor, are you familiar with the psychiatric literature on
dangerousness?
Doctor, have you read the literature on dangerousness
which does not appear in psychiatric journals?
Doctor, are you aware that much of the literature relevant to psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is not
typically found in psychiatric journals?'
"I Dr. Alan Stone suggests that defense counsel can easily discredit the testimony of psychiatrists who testify as to the dangerousness of a patient in order to
support commitment. Stone argues that:
the psychiatric community, insofar as they are proponents of therapeutic
hospitalization and see themselves as doing good with limited resources,
are particularly apt simply to 'cave in' when faced by hostile counsel.
It is just too damaging to the altruistic self-image of the psychiatrist
to be cast as the coercive agent of the State and jailor of the helpless.
Obviously his predictions of dangerousness cannot be validated, and if
reforms of the commitment statutes move as they have been toward
dangerousness as the central criterion, then the psychiatric witness will
easily be discredited.
A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 234-35 (1975).
Dr. Stone concludes that dangerousness is "an unworkable standard" and
"creates an impossible evidentiary problem, confines the untreatable, destroys
important social resources, and may well be unconstitutional [as a form of civil
preventive detention]." Stone, Comment, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 829, 829-30 (1975).
Dr. Stone questions whether psychiatrists should not recognize their limitations in
the prediction of dangerousness and "refuse to participate in this bizarre creation
of legal process?" Id. at 830. He would move toward a result-oriented medical model
with an emphasis on the right to treatment.
On the preventive detention aspects of confining the mentally ill who are
dangerous see Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1973).
"' Articles are often found in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE JOURNAL OF CIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN, BULLETIN OF THE
ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW, THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW,

AMERICAN

and SOCIAL

PROBLEMS.
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The questions to the psychiatrist can be framed by inquiring
about specific sources. For example:
Doctor, are you familiar with the report of the American
Psychiatric Association Task Force on "Clinical Aspects
of the Violent Individual?"'' Doctor, don't you believe
that a reasonably informed expert on dangerousness
should be aware of the work of the American Psychiatric
Association which reports and analyzes the existing research on the clinical issues concerning psychiatric evaluation and prediction of individual dangerousness? 5 '
In challenging a prediction of dangerousness, the following
questions may be useful:
Doctor, could you describe what aspects of the defendant's behavior lead you to conclude she is dangerous?
Is your conclusion based on behavior which you have not
personally observed? If not, what is the source of your
information about the described behavior?
Doctor, can you predict that the patient is dangerous
based on a diagnosis which does not include observations
of actual physical violence or threats of violence?
Doctor, isn't it true that many patients diagnosed as
mentally ill are not dangerous?
Doctor, are there specific psychological, physical, or
social criteria which permit a prediction of dangerousness? 5'
APA TASK FORCE REPORT No. 8 (1974), supra, note 144.
See Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness,"Psychiatric Testimony, and
Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CraM. L. 151, 175 (1977). The Task Force Report
specifically provides that "clinicians should avoid 'conclusory' judgments" on the
predictions of dangerousness. APA TASK FORCE REPORT No. 8 (1974) at 33.
If the psychiatrist is not familiar with the TASK FORCE REPORT which is now
more than five years in print, he can be asked whether he is familiar with more
recent literature. For example, the psychiatrist could be asked whether he has read
1

'

or reviewed DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A

PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH (C.

Frederick ed. 1978) (a recently collected series of articles compiled by the National
Institute of Mental Health). If the psychiatrist replies that he has not, then he can
be asked how he maintains current expertise in his field if he does not read the
publications of the National Institute of Mental Health and the American Psychiatric Association.
151Diamond reports that he is unable to find anything in the psychiatric and
scientific literature establishing psychological or physical criteria that permits ac-
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Doctor, would it be fair to say that determinations of
dangerousness are ultimately based on legal, social, and
ethical perspectives as well as a psychological
prediction?'Doctor, is dangerousness a psychiatric concept or or is it
merely a matter of making common sense inferences
from what a person has done in the past?
In summary, defense counsel should seek to determine the
qualifications of the mental health professional to testify on dangerousness; whether the psychiatrist can demonstrate a working
knowledge of the literature concerning clinical prediction of future
behavior; and the extent to which the psychiatrist has resolved the
difficulties in making reliable and valid predictions of dangerousness.
Although it can be acknowledged that psychiatry and the psychological sciences now allow some understanding of the individual motivations and social determinants of past and present behavior, the present state of psychological knowledge still does not
permit successful prophecy as to what a person will do in the
future. The future behavior of any particular individual is a funccurate prediction of dangerousness. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of
Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 444 (1974).
One obvious influence on a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is the patient's present disruptive and disorderly behavior. See Levinson & Zan York, The
Attribution of "Dangerousness"in Mental Health Evaluations,15 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAVIOR 328 (1974). See also Forst, The PsychiatricEvaluation of Dangerousness
in Two Trial Court Jurisdictions,5 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIAT. & L. 98 (1977). Other
studies confirm that past behavior is the best statistical predictor of behavior,
inadequate as it may be. Rosenblatt & Mayer, The Recidivism of Mental Patients:
A Review of Past Studies, 44 AM. J. ORrHOPSYCHIAT. 697 (1974); Rubin, Prediction

of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27

ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT.

397 (1972).

"The determination of dangerousness involves a delicate balancing of society's interest in protection from harmful conduct against the individual's interest
in personal liberty and autonomy. This decision, while requiring the court to make
use of the assistance which medical testimony may provide, is ultimately a legal
one, not a medical one." State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 261, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975)
(citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) and Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d
589, 595 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). "It should be emphasized that while courts in
determining dangerousness should take full advantage of expert testimony presented by the State and by defendant, the decision is not one that can be left
wholly to the technical expertise of the psychiatrists and psychologists." State v.
Krol, 68 N.J. at 261, 344 A.2d at 302 (1975). See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648,
654 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 341, 540 P.2d 818, 821
(N.M. 1975).
252
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tion of indeterminable individual and social factors.' Absent organic impairment which specifically constricts the range of behavior, man is "relatively" free to chart his own course in the world.
We say relatively free since the free will-determinism debate still
rages. At this time, standard psychiatric diagnostic sources provide no guide to accurate and reliable predictions of dangerousness. "[T]he terms used in standard psychiatric diagnosis are
almost totally irrelevant to the determination of dangerousness." 5'
Moreover, "[t]he concept of dangerousness is too broad to be
psychiatrically defined. The capacity to engage in behavior which
can be viewed as harmful is so universal that psychiatric differentiation of it is not feasible."'55
Dangerousness to Self
West Virginia, like other states, has procedures for involuntary civil commitment of those individuals whose mental illness
creates a likelihood of serious harm to self or others. 5 The state
seeks to protect the mentally ill from themselves based on the
H"Dangerous behavior is "an interactive process of personality with social
situations (provocations, stresses, etc.)" making a prediction of future behavior
based on personality alone near impossible. Levinson & Zan York, supra note 151,
at 329. At best, psychiatrists can make an "educated guess" as to potential dangerousness. Id. "Dangerousness seems to be a result of multiple forces. It cannot be
attributed to a single factor, and it is not detectable through routine psychiatric
examination. There is no single test for it." Kozol, supra note 140, at 383.
The process of prediction, far from being a relatively simple assessment
of the consequences of certain triggering factors, is actually a rather complex feat involving a detailed understanding of the numerous possible
interactions of those factors. The multiplicity of factors involved in this
process, as well as the varying degrees to which any specific factor may
or may not interact with the other factors, or even exist at all, make the
actual prediction. Any psychiatric prediction based solely or primarily on
the existence of a given factor, such as a particular diagnosis or even past
violent behavior, is suspect in light of the literature which demonstrates
the high degree of error in relying on any one factor as the basis for a
prediction of future harm. Moreover, this same literature, supplemented
by numerous studies, indicates the difficulty in determining how various
factors interact and relate to future behavior.
S. SCHWARTZ & D. STERN, A TRL MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT C-8 (1976).
' Kozol, supra note 140, at 383.
"' Tanay, Law and the Mentally Ill, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 781, 787 (1976). Tanay
contends that "[diangerousfiess is an adjective describing a person as harmful
from a classifier's frame of reference, not a clinical state in itself." Id.
"' W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-4(a)(2), 27-1-12(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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doctrine of parens patriae. This doctrine is premised on the assumption that an individual who poses a danger to his or her own
health and well-being and who has lost the mental capacity to
make rational judgments to act in his or her own best interests
should be protected by the state even if the state's efforts are
against the individual's will. The doctrine of parens patriaeis increasingly being questioned'as a legitimate rationale for protecting
the mentally ill against their will. 5 ' The erosion of parens patriae

151
See Abromovsky & McCarthy, Civil Commitment of Non-Criminal Narcotic Addicts: Parens Patriae;A Valid Exercise of a State's Police Power; Or An
UnconscionableDisregardof Individual Liberty?, 38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 477, 499-500
(1977). The psychiatric profession is, however, still enamored with the parens
patriae doctrine. The following statement by a psychiatrist in an issue of the
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY JOURNAL is illustrative. "We are physicians. Our sole aim
should be to ensure the welfare of our patients .

. .

. Societal concerns are impor-

tant, but these should be dealt with by the judicial system." Peszke, Is Dangerousness An Issue for Physiciansin Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 825,
826 (1975). For a recent attempt to devise a new parenspatriae based commitment
statute see Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients,Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM.
J. PSYCHIAT. 1121 (1979).

This narrow view of the psychiatric role in furthering social justice should be
subjected to close scrutiny. A former President of the American Psychiatric Association has called for "critical psychiatry" which would reexamine psychiatry in the
light of the profession's duties to society. APA Head Urges Scrutiny of Psychiatry,
Review of Its Priorities,Clinical Psychiatry News (1973). The problem with the
"narrow view" is that it is used as a rationale for involuntary confinement for the
purpose of allowing the physician to "care" for patients. For example, Peszke
argues that:
to limit involuntary commitment to those who are considered dangerous
is to assert that only those who are sick and dangerous can be treated,
while those who are sick but not dangerous would be abandoned. To
commit a mentally ill individual to a hospital simply because he fulfills
the criterion of dangerousness while not committing a nondangerous
mentally ill individual who is incapable of making rational decisions and
could benefit from treatment is analogous to not hospitalizing an unconscious accident victim who is unable to ask for help but is not dangerous.
132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 825, 827 (1975). This argument is superficially attractive but
problematic on closer analysis. First, the attempt to analogize the nondangerous
mentally ill to the unconscious accident victim is simplistic. The mentally ill, for
the most part, are not unconscious. They feel, hear, see, and observe the world
around them. They are not oblivious to their environment. The consciousness of the
mentally ill may be different as a result of distortions in thinking, disorientation
as to time and space and the presence of auditory and visual hallucinations. However, it cannot be said that the mentally ill are unconscious. Rather, in one sense,
they have greater consciousness if we consider the ability of the mentally ill to know
their repressed unconscious.
The argument fails to accept the responsibility for the social implications of a
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has been hastened by judicial action.'
In Hawks v. Lazaro,151 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals declared unconstitutional an involuntary commitment
provision which allowed confinement upon a showing that the person was mentally ill and "in need of custody, care or treatment in
a hospital." The statute under consideration in Hawks gave the
state of West Virginia the power to act for the mentally ill in its
role as parens patriae and allowed a state determination of the
need for care where the person had insufficient insight or capacity
to make responsible decisions with respect to his or her own welfare.6' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however,
found that the state was unable to demonstrate a compelling state
medical decision to treat when the patient will not submit voluntarily. Unconscious
accident victims, because they are unconscious, submit without resistance to medical care. As soon as the accident victim regains consciousness he or she is free to
resist medical treatment. The conscious mentally ill patient is denied the right to
make this fundamental decision. The mentally ill are held involuntarily against
their will so that "care" can be provided. Arguably, then the argument fails of its
own weight without consideration of the individual harm in confinement and the
inadequacy of treatment modalities.
A final deficiency in the argument is that there is an assumption that an
involuntary patient will respond to "care" and treatment as if the patient had
voluntarily submitted to the treatment. Voluntariness is itself an important factor
in the cutcome of treatment. This factor has traditionally been ignored in psychiatric studies of mental patients and by psychiatrists who defend the parens patriae
medical model. See Lakovics, Voluntariness of HospitalizationAs An Important
Research Variable and Legal Implications of Its Omission from the Psychiatric
Research Literature, MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE
195-203 (F. Ayd. ed. 1974); Benedetti, Crucial Problems in the Psychotherapy of
Schizophrenia, 35 Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 67 (1975); Hardford, et al., Effects of
Legal Pressure on Prognosis for Treatment of Drug Dependence, 133 Am. J.
PSYCHIAT. 1399 (1976).

On the voluntary mental patient, see generally Appelbaum, The Voluntary
Patient-A Psychiatrist's Perspective, 45 J. KAN. B.A. 37 (1976); Farney,
"Voluntary" Psychiatric Patient, 45 J. KAN. B.A. 37 (1976); Gilboy & Schmidt,
"Voluntary" Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429 (1971); Olin
& Olin, Informed Consent in Voluntary Mental Hospital Admissions, 132 Am. J.
PSYCHIAT. 938 (1975); Payne, Voluntary Admission to a Mental Hospital-Effect
Upon the Patient's Rights, 9 BEVERLY HILLS B. A. 20 (1975).
"I The historical evolution of parenspatriae in the civil commitment field has
been charted by Justice Neely in Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).

See also, Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1207:12 (1974).
'~'
'~

202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
Id. at 123.
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interest "for hospitalizing a person in his own best interests."''
The individual's need for hospitalization because of an inability or
failure to care for himself or herself due to mental illness was found
to be inadequate to permit state intervention to protect the individual. The court expressly rejected an invitation to give a broad
reading to the application of parens patriae by the state.' 2
In repudiating the parens patriae doctrine which, the state
argued, would permit confinement of the mentally ill in need of
care and treatment, the West Virginia Court noted that:
it is possible for many nonviolent people, even those who suffer
from a mental disease or retardation to such an extent that they
are unable to earn a living, to live outside of an institution, and
when these people prefer to do so, regardless of the wisdom of
their decision, or the strength of their reasoning powers, the
constitution guarantees them the right to follow their own de3

sires.

The Hawk's decision is anomalous. Its comprehensive and systematic debunking of the parens patriae notion is followed by a
definition of harm firmly rooted in parens patriae. The expres's
purpose of the court in overturning the statutory standard for involuntary civil commitment was to substitute less subjective criteria which would satisfy constitutional due process requirements.' 4 Objectivity of the judicially required standard was to be
premised on the requirement that an individual be not only mentally ill but "likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain
at liberty.""'
While the objectivity of the "injurious" requirement is open
to debate, the court in defining what constitutes harm to self has
resurrected parens patriae and reopened the door to subjectivity
and possible constitutional challenges. The court requires only a
i"
Id.
The erosion of the parens patriaedoctrine in West Virginia reflects a similar
trend in the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967).
I"Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d at 123. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975).
"I The court was aware that "[tihe lack of a specific standard always creates
66

opportunities for abuse
165Id.

...

"

202 S.E.2d at 123.
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showing that the individual is a "passive" danger to self.'66 To
meet a "passive" danger test, the state is required to show only
that the individual is mentally ill and "that by sheer inactivity he
will permit himself to die either of starvation or lack of care."'6 "
The court adds, cryptically, that involuntary commitment is also
permitted where the mental illness "is likely to produce some form
of injury other than direct physical injury, if the type of injury were
definitely ascertainable, and if the State had a treatment program
which it could be demonstrated offered a reasonable likelihood of
ameliorating the illness or condition."'68 The court, in this passage,
is clearly moving away from the objective requirement of specific
physical harm to self where a non-physical injury (which the court
does not describe) can be ascertained and successfully treated.
Thus, where a need for treatment can be shown, and the treatment
is available, the court's concept of "passive danger" would permit
involuntary mental hospitalization.
The court's description of permissible involuntary commitment upon a showing of harm to self is totally inconsistent with
its rejection of parenspatriaeand the concept of custodial commitments. The court specifically rejected any state interest in involuntary commitment based on the best interests of the individual.
Yet, the court would allow a showing of passive harm to self where
the individual is "so mentally retarded or mentally ill that by sheer
inactivity he will permit himself to die either of starvation or lack
of care. . ,,,Il
It is indeed hard to distinguish the court's concept
of passive danger from the "need of care" provision which it found
unconstitutional. The court, unfortunately, fell prey to the lure of
parens patriae in the definition of harm to self that it sought to
avoid in the need of care or treatment provision.
The blurring of the concepts of harm to self and need for care
and treatment occasioned by the court's analysis is now reflected
in the statutory criteria for harm to self. The statute defines a
person "likely to cause serious harm" as one who has: "(1) substantial tendency to physically harm himself which is manifested by
le Id.
167Id.

,' Id. at 124.
" The present statutory'delineation of harm does not adopt this suggestion by
the court. Both the harm to self and others is statutorily prescribed as physical
harm. See W. VA. CODE § 27-1-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.)
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threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other

conduct, either active or passive, which demonstrates that he is
dangerous to himself ....
The statutory definition of harm to self contains limiting criteria which would, if read alone, partially satisfy the West Virginia
Court's concern for objectivity. The necessary harm to'self requires: (1) a physical harm; (2) a serious harm; 7 1 (3) a substantial
likelihood of the occurrence of the harm; and (4) a harm manifested by threats or attempts at suicide or threats or attempts of
bodily injury. If the statutory provision was so limited, some objectivity could be achieved. However, the statutory provision, in an
attempt to track the judicial definition from Hawks, can be read
to permit a finding of serious harm to self on the basis of "passive"
7 2 The statute itself
conduct which demonstrates dangerousness.Y
does not define what constitutes "passive" conduct.
The following line of questioning may be an effective means
of undermining the parens patriae rationale for commitment:
Defense Counsel: Doctor, is it your understanding that
all mental patients are automatically rendered incapable
decisions as to their personal safety
of making rational
3
and welfare?'

7

Defense Counsel: Then the mere presence of mental illness does not in and of itself lead to the conclusion that
the patient is dangerous to self?'7
,70W. VA. CODE § 27-1-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

,7,See Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
11, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1236-38 (1974).
172Id.
" "A patient's competency to make decisions must be determined on an individualized and periodic basis, taking into consideration the nature of his mental
illness, the degree of thought impairment, and the persistence of the symptoms of
impairment." McGough & Carmichael, The Right to Treatment and The Right to
Refuse Treatment, 47 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIAT. 307, 317 (1977).
"I While there is little evidence to suggest that the mere presence of mental
illness supports a psychiatric prediction that the patient is likely to be dangerous,
this fact does not prevent psychiatrists from basing their testimony on such mistaken notions. For example, in one civil commitment hearing observed by the
author, one psychiatrist testified that the patient was a chronic schizophrenic. In
response to the prosecutor's question as to what schizophrenia was, the psychiatrist
repled "it is a mental illness in which one is likely to be violent toward others or
harm themself." The second psychiatrist used a similar theory for her testimony
that the patient was dangerous. In her testimony she noted that the patient was a
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Defense Counsel: Doctor, are you aware of the psychiatric literature which indicates that many forms of mental
illness have a highly specific impact on their victims,
leaving reasoning and decisionmaking ability otherwise
largely unimpaired?'
Defense Counsel: Has the patient's mental illness in
this case totally impaired his or her decisionmaking
ability?
Defense Counsel: Doctor, isn't it possible that the patient is capable at times of relatively rational
decisionmaking?
If the answer to the last question is yes, defense counsel can
argue that the assumptions underlying and supporting parens
patriae are no longer present. Parens patriae is premised on the
theory that the decisionmaking ability of the patient has been
impaired as a result of the mental illness and that the state is
acting for the patient until such time as rational decisionmaking
can be restored. Only when parens patriae commitments are restricted "to those mentally ill persons who are incapable of evaluating the desirability of psychiatric care" is there the necessary
relationship between statutory means and ends to satisfy constitutional due process"7 8 and equal protection.' In the last analysis,
parens patriae should be limited to "[p]ersons whose refusal to
accept treatment results from a delusional system associated with
their mental illness and individuals whose disorder renders them
."I In such cases,
unable to relate or respond to others ...
parens patriaeis used to justify commitment of only those individuals whose "mental disorder has destroyed the power to make
choices or has prevented a decision based on relevant factors.' 75
A second approach to questioning the psychiatrist on parens
patriae commitments is suggested by this question:
Defense Counsel:

Doctor, regardless of the presence of

schizophrenic and that "an individual suffering fom this form of mental illness is
likely to be dangerous to self or others."
"I See Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1214 n.80 (1974).
II6Id. at 1215.
27 Id.
at 1215-16.
'

Id. at 1219.

179Id.
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mental illness, don't you think one could make a rational
decision to forego hospitalization in a mental institution?
An argument to support this line of questioning is found in Hawks
where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, appalled by
the conditions in the state's mental institutions, expressed concern
over the state's failure to adequately fund and staff mental hospitals and the ineffectiveness of mental institutions as a means of
solving the problems of mental illness.
Whenever the state asserts its role as parens patriae, it is
appropriate to argue to the MHC that West Virginia's highest
court recognizes that confinement in "the State of West Virginia
offers to those unfortunates who are incarcerated in mental institutions Dickensian squalor of unconscionable magnitudes."'' 0 The
court in Hawks outlined various factors which indicated that West
Virginia is neglecting the mentally ill. The court found that state
expenditures per patient ranked West Virginia forty-ninth among
the states.'8 ' The level of professional care, as administered by
physicians and staff, was inordinately low. West Virginia ranked
forty-seventh in physician hours per week and forty-ninth in the
nation of professional staff to employees.182 The court labeled the
financial support "parsimonious.""'
In Hawks, the West Virginia Court recognized that
"institutionalization is frequently the worst treatment which can
be provided a person suffering from mental problems" and that
hospitalization under the conditions of West Virginia mental hospitals "may inflict positive harm on the patients."' 84 In many cases
11 Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 120 (W. Va. 1974).
18 Id.
rn Id. at 120-21.
" Id. at 121.
1, Id. On the adverse harmful impact of hospitalization in a mental institu-

tion, see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-90 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Ennis,
Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CrM. L. Bu.. 101, 105-06 (1971); Rosenhan,
On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 379, 394-98 (1973) (reprinted

from 179 Sci. 250 (1973)); Talbot, Miller & White, Some Antitherapeutic Side
Effects of Hospitalizationand Psychotherapy, 27 PSYCHIAT. &PSYCHOTHERAPY 170
(1964). See generally, E. GoFs AN, ASYLUMS (1961); D.VAIL, DEHUMANIZATON AND
THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER

(1966).

Given the high spontaneous remission rate for some symptoms of mental ill-

ness, the need for hospitalization should be subjected to close scrutiny. For exam-

ple, the spontaneous remission rate for schizophrenia is from 20% to 40%. Note,
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 87 HARv. L. REv.
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it may be appropriate to ask whether, in fact, there isn't a greater
likelihood of harm to the patient from being hospitalized than in
remaining in the community?
The most extreme form of harm to self is suicide. Both the
legal and psychiatric professions abhor suicide, and testimony of
an individual who is potentially suicidal or has attempted suicide
is especially difficult to overcome. There are, however, a number
of ways to attack psychiatric testimony as to suicidal behavior.
Even in the face of clear and convincing evidence that the client
is bent on self-destruction, an argument can be made against commitment."" The statute speaks of harm to self. In some cases, the
actual harm from suicide may be less than the agony from continued life. One author has pointed out that "it is hardly difficult to
imagine circumstances where suicide, if not a positive good, would
readily be recognizable as the lesser of evils."'' 6 The following questions are suggestive of a defense of the suicidal patient:
Defense Counsel: Are you familiar with the psychiatric
literature which suggests that suicide may be just as
likely linked to a planned, organized effort to reduce intolerable stress than obsessional aspects of depression
and schizophrenia?187
Defense Counsel: Doctor, is it possible that the patient
poses a serious likelihood of harm to self only in the sense
that she or he is willing to risk dying to call attention to
his or her life situation?
The point here is that the patient rationally takes a risk to obtain
sufficient attention so as to communicate the desire to live.
1190, 1220 n.100 (citing S.

RACHMAN,

THE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 108-09 (1971)).

For a defense of the use of involuntary civil commitment as a benefit to patients by psychiatrists see Peele, Chodoff & Taub, Involuntary Hospitalizationand
Treatability:Observationsfrom the Districtof ColumbiaExperience, 23 CATH.U.L.
REV. 744 (1974).
'"For a succient review of the philosophical debate presented by this argument, see materials collected in W. BisHnm & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHics
1126-55 (1972).
InGreenberg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent Suicide, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 227 (1974).
I"See Id. at 234-36 and psychiatric studies cited therein. Greenberg summarizes that: "[t]o plan and carry through a suicide attempt may require more ability
to think coherently and to act in a realistic, organized fashion than a patient with
delusions or obsessions possesses." Id. at 235.
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Defense Counsel: Are you familiar with the studies
which suggest that attempted suicides are more likely to
suggest an effort to live than to die?'
Defense Counsel: What treatment for suicide is available within the hospital?
Defense counsel can raise the issue of whether involuntary
commitment is likely to alleviate the suicidial tendencies. One
commentator has noted that authorities on suicide question the
effectiveness of hospitalization and find that it "rarely results in
any increase of self responsibility on the part of the patient. He
does not thereby gain any additional insight into the problems and
conflicts which led him to a suicide-prone posture.""'8 Moreover,
recent literature on the suicide-prone patient does not stress the
use of hospitalization. "Rather, emphasis is laid on person-toperson contact and continued sympathetic support for the individual." 90
Defense Counsel: Doctor, do you have any evidence to
show that hospitalization prevents suicides, in general?' 9'
Defense Counsel: Doctor, does the psychiatric profession know how to prevent suicide?
In fact, very little is known about suicide prevention.' 2 "Most
individuals who commit suicide are not mentally ill, and most of
the mentally ill do not commit suicide."'9 3
While the psychiatric testimony will undoubtedly make it
appear that any suicide attempt or threat is related to the mental
illness, an equally plausible argument can be made that the suibidal behavior is rational based on all the circumstances. If the
psychiatrist has not investigated the circumstances surrounding
the behavior, a rival hypothesis can be offered to undermine the
"clear and convincing" nature of the psychiatric judgment.
In a variety of cases, the patient will not have actually atId. at 237-39 and psychiatric studies cited therein.
,' Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California:1969 Style, 10
SANTA CLARA LAW. 74, 94 (1969), cited in A. BROoKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MENTAL
HEALTH SYsTEMS 708 (1974).
- A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MENTAL HEALH SYSTEMS 707 (1974).
-' See Greenberg, supra note 186, at 257-59.
12 Id. at 256.
"1

See supra note 184, at 1227.
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tempted suicide but will have threatened suicide or confessed to
the psychiatrist of suicidal thoughts or attempts. Such predictions
are frequently made in the case of depressed patients. The psychiatrist who admits on cross-examination that suicidal thoughts alone
support a diagnosis of mental illness should be questioned as follows:
Defense Counsel: Doctor, could you tell the court the
manner in which you determined that the patient is suicidal and the basis for your judgment?
Defense Counsel: Is it your contention that the reporting of a suicidal thought can be taken as conclusory evidence of mental illness?
Defense Counsel: Then, your diagnosis of mental illness
was not based on the suicidal thoughts?
Defense Counsel: Doctor, are you familiar with those
studies which conclude that very few of the patients who
are severely depressed or who express suicidial thoughts
or threats actually commit suicide? '
Defense Counsel: Doctor, statistically wouldn't you be
on better grounds to predict that the patient is not dangerous to self?
Defense Counsel: Doctor, with what degree of certainty
can you predict that this patient will commit suicide
within the year?
Defense Counsel: How have you derived that measure
of accuracy?
INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION - Is THERE
ALTERNATIVE?

A LESS

RESTRICTiVE

Involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill is increasingly
being considered a drastic measure of last resort in caring for the
mentally ill.' A number of factors have coalesced to focus national
",

See Rosen, Detectionof SuicidalPatients:An Example of Some Limitations

in the Predictionof Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSUL. PSYCH. 397,401-02 (1954). The
psychiatrist can be asked if he is aware that "[o]nly about 1% of all surviving
attempters kill themselves within a year of the attempt." Greenberg, supra note
186, at 239, and psychiatric studies cited at 239 n.39. Over a longer time period,
five to fifteen years, no more than 5% to 15% of attempters kill themselves. Id.
M,But see, Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 28
Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIAT. 817 (1977). Slovenko laments the deinstitutionalization of mental patients and paints a rather bleak picture of their life in
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attention on state mental hospitals. One factor is a movement,
which began in the mid 1950's, to provide mental health services
at the community level in contrast to large, isolated state mental
hospitals.'" The community mental health approach places a high
value on treating the patient in the community and on a voluntary,
out-patient basis. Community involvement in the problems of the
mentally ill and decreased stigma of being treated for mental problems have resulted in greater scrutiny of decisions to commit individuals involuntarily to state mental hospitals under the parens
patriae doctrine.
The trend in institutional psychiatry away from hospitalization and toward treatment on an out-patient basis, in a comthe community. Such patients "end up abandoned, without even basic services, in
ghettos or back alleys." Id. at 825. "In the hospital, the patients may have had
nightmares, but in the so-called community they are living a nightmare." Id. See
also, Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNaE L.
REV. 1 (1977).
"I gee WIESENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE ACTION FOR COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
CENTER PLANNING: AN EVALUATION (1969); Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care
for the Mentally Ill, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 93 (1967); Greenblatt & Glazier, The
Phasing Out of Mental Hospitals in the United States, 132 Am. J. PSYCHAT. 1135
(1975); Ochberg & Brown, Mental Health and the Law: Partners in Advancing
Human Rights, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 491 (1974); Schwartz, Community Mental
Health in 1972: An Assessment, in 2 PROGRESS INCOMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 3-34
(H. Barten & L. Bellak eds. 1972); Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practicein Arizona, 13 Axuz. L. REv.
1, 181-90 (1971).
The mid 1950's witnessed two developments which have changed the nature
of our perspective on mental illness.
The first development was the introduction of rauwolfia and the phenothiazines, the first of the so-called tranquilizers. The therapeutic effects of
these drugs contributed to improved treatment and management of many
acute psychotic patients, facilitated reduction in the duration of hospital
stay, and increased the percentage of patients discharged from hospitals
for both chronic and acute illnesses.
The second development involved new psychosocial and behavioral
methods of treatment in the mental hospital and revised attitudes toward
the social treatment of patients ....
including the 'open door' policy,
avoidance of seclusion and restraint, development of large group techniques such as therapeutic communities, upgrading of the education of
nonprofessionals, conscious effort at early discharge, efforts to break
down administrative and other barriers between the hospital and its community, involvement of the family, and a series of developments known
at that time as 'social psychiatry.'
Klerman, Mental Illness, the Medical Model, and Psychiatry, 2 J. MED. & PHIL.
220, 223 (1977).
See also R. BALDESSARINI, CHEMOTHERAPY INPSYCHIATRY 1-11 (1977).
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munity or foster sheltered care home, or special nursing home care
facilities, has been promoted by the courts'97 and, more recently,
state legislatures 9 ' under the rubric of "least restrictive alterna-

tive." '
The need for "less restrictive alternatives" has been recognized, statutorily mandated, and recently reconfirmed in West
Virginia."' The West Virginia Code specifically requires the MHC
to make a finding as to whether there is a less restrictive alternative to commitment which is appropriate for the individual."0 ' A
recent statutory amendment prohibits involuntary hospitalization
if the person can be treated in the community. "No person who can
be treated as an out-patient at a community mental health center
shall be admitted involuntarily into a state hospital." '
The West Virginia statute does not, however, offer suggestions
as to alternatives to hospitalization except placement with a
"responsible person who will agree to take care of the individual
* ""'This can hardly be considered a viable alternative. Individuals subject to involuntary commitment are generally those
who have no immediate family or friends, or if they do, these
', See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C.
1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
M'See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. Rxv. 1107, 1138-40 (1972)
(an early but seminal work on the "least restrictive alternative").
"I See generally, Chambers, supra note 198; Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1100 (1977). For a recent, critical view of the "least restrictive alternative"
concept see Tanay, Law and the Mentally Ill, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 781, 800-03 (1976).
One court has recently found that the "least restrictive alternative" applies not only
to the type of confinement but to the type of treatment. Rennie v. Klein, 452 F.
Supp. 1131, 1146-47 (D.N.J. 1978).
2 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recognized the least
restrictive alternative concept in the incarceration of juvenile status offenders.
(Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977). "[fln view of the fact that
there are numerous alternatives to incarceration for status offenders we hold that
the state must exhaust every reasonable alternative to incarceration before committing a status offender to a secure, prison-like facility." Id. at 329) and in confinement of the mentally ill. Markey v. Wachtel, No. 144-79 (filed Dec. 11, 1979), (W. Va. 1979).
S.E.2d 202W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See also W. VA. CODE § 275-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
'a W. VA. CODE § 27-2A-1(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
' W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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significant others have given up in their efforts to care for the
individual. Commitment proceedings are most often initiated
when responsible persons have concluded that they can no longer
take care of the individual.
An important question raised here is whether a MHC can
order an individual committed to a local community mental health
center which does not have in-patient facilities and which is not
equipped to physically confine and restrain patients. The statute
speaks throughout of commitment and admission to a mental
health facility."0 ' The statute defines a mental health facility as
"any in-patient, residential or out-patient facility for the care and
treatment of the mentally ill, mentally retarded or addicted which
is operated, or licensed to operate, by the department of health and
shall include state hospitals . . . [and] a veterans administration
205
hospital."
It is not uncommon for mental health professionals to take the
position that commitment for treatment at community mental
health centers is desirable where the patient is capable of treatment on an out-patient basis. An essential question is whether the
MHC has statutory authority to order treatment by a local community mental health center. The threshold legal question is
whether community mental health centers are "mental health facilities" within the meaning of the West Virginia Code.
A further anomaly in the argument for commitment to community health centers is that patients who are mentally ill and
likely to cause serious injury to self or others would be treated as
out-patients rather than confined. Arguably, a mental patient who
is sufficiently stable to be treated as an out-patient is not sufficiently dangerous to self or others to satisfy the clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence of dangerousness which is required by the
statute. If the patient is sufficiently dangerous to justify civil commitment under the statute, then an out-patient facility may incur
civil liability for harm which occurs to the individual or others as
a result of its failure to secure the individual's confinement in a
2
manner reasonably likely to prevent the harm. 1
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-3a, -4(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
W. VA. CODE § 27-1-9 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
20 See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551
P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). See also, Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or
His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 1025 (1974); Griffith &
2

M
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The statutory requirement that the "least restrictive alternative" be employed in the care and treatment of the mentally ill
offers considerable opportunities for defense counsel representing
both hospitalized and non-hospitalized clients. Defense counsel
cannot, however, effectively utilize the "less restrictive alternative" requirement unless there is a thorough investigation of potential alternatives prior to the commitment hearing. As one legal
commentator noted: "Prior to the hearing the attorney must explore the treatment and the custodial resources, in addition to the
state hospital, that are available. He must understand the various
services offered in the community and the techniques for making
use of a potentially useful resource.""2 7
While the investigative function may, as a result of inaction
or inattention by the mental health professionals, fall to defense
counsel,"0 8 the burden of proof that involuntary commitment is
necessary and that no less drastic means of treatment are available
falls to the state. The West Virginia statute specifically places the
burden of proof that no "less restrictive alternative" is available
"on the persons seeking the commitment of the individual.""2 9 As
a practical matter, prosecutors satisfy the burden of proof by conclusory statements of psychiatrists that no alternatives to hospitalization are available. 21 Arguably, a mere conclusion as to the absence of alternatives does not satisfy the burden placed upon the
state. At minimum, the state should be required to adduce testimony as to: "(1) [w]hat alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternaGriffith, Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness, and the Right to Refuse Treat-

ment: Problematic Concepts for Psychiatristand Lawyer, 14 CAIF. W..L. REv. 241

(1978); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard

Society, 90 HARV. L. REv. 358 (1976).
a? Cohen, supra note 8, at 452-53.
On the search for alternatives and the institutional means for securing the
right to "less restrictive" approaches to treatment, see Chambers, supra note 198,
at 1168-77.
20 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-40)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
210In one commitment hearing the author attended the testimony on least
restrictive alternative was as follows:
Prosecutor: "What disposition would you recommend?"
Psychiatrist: "Indefinite commitment to Weston."
Prosecutor: "Are there other possibilities?"
Psychiatrist: "Not within the family or the State of West Virginia."
Defense Counsel in closing argument questioned in passing whether alternatives to
hospitalization had actually been sought.
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tives were not deemed suitable." ' The failure of defense counsel
to personally explore alternatives to hospitalization and to require
those seeking commitment to comply with the statutory burden of
actual proof as to "less restrictive alternatives" seriously preju12
dices the interests of the client.

Case Report: Least Restrictive Alternative and
Passive Danger to Self
One of the most serious deficiencies in our present treatment
of the mentally ill is the confinement of those who pose no serious
threat to others but who are unable to look after their own needs.
Such confinements are based on the absence of community inpatient facilities in West Virginia for the care of the mentally ill.
These confinements are legally supported on the basis of the patient's "passive dange to self."
The civil commitment hearing herein reported2 1 1 follows the

pattern outlined above. It is a perfect example of how psychiatrists
are willing to confine those whom they have no way to treat and
how defense lawyers fail to push the mental health system to provide better facilities by blocking institutional confinement where
a less restrictive alternative is feasible but simply unavailable.
This case involved the petition for recommitment of a fiftyseven year old man commited in June of 1959 to Weston State
Hospital, Weston, West Virginia. The first psychiatrist testified
that the patient had been examined a number of times and, for the
purpose of the August 22, 1977 hearing, was examined on August
8 of that year. The psychiatrist, in a narrative fashion, stated that
the patient had been admitted in 1959 with lesions and a variety
2
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See also Lake
v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966), (where the court indicated that the
state should "bear the burden of exploration of possible alternatives" to
commitment). Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 Cim. L. BULL.'101, 11314 (1971).
2"2 Arguably the "least restrictive alternative" requirement can be applied to

decisions within the institution as well as to those decisions made at the time of
the initial determination to involuntarily commit. See Covington v. Harris, 419
F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental
Patients:Committing the Legislature, 62 CALFn. L. REv. 957, 960-61 (1974). A recent
study of a Connecticut state hospital suggests that the least restrictive alternative
mandate is not being met. See note 233, infra.
"I See Appendix, introductory footnote.
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of medical problems. The psychiatrist's examination of the record
indicated that the patient had never been married and had lived
with his father until admitted to Weston. Prior to his commitment,
he worked in the coal mines "until he became sick." The psychiatrist noted that during the course of his confinement the patient
had been given every form of psychiatric treatment except prefrontal lobotomy. At the August 8, 1977 examination, the psychiatrist found the patient "yelling, untidy, cursing God, hallucinating, auditorily and visually." At present:
the patient's affect varies from flat to inappropriate. He is not
a real problem now. The patient is completely out of touch with
reality. He can give you very little about his life. He is disoriented as to time and place. Memory is quite poor. We have
here the effects of long hospitalization. In addition, there have
been organic changes superimposed on the original schizophrenic illness.
Prosecutor: Is what you have outlined a mental illness?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
Prosecutor: What disposition would you recommend?
2
Psychiatrist: Indefinite commitment to Weston. 1
Prosecutor: Are there other possibilites?
Psychiatrist: Not within the family or the State of West Virginia.
Cross Examination:
Defense Counsel: Did you examine the patient weekly?
Psychiatrist: No. I frequently see the patient around the institution but have not actually examined him weekly.
Defense Counsel: Doctor, what do you observe as to the patient's dangerousness?
Psychiatrist: The patient yells, curses God, and obviously hallucinates about God. This can antagonize people and they could
hurt him. The patient cannot take care of himself.
Defense Counsel: Has the patient ever attacked another
patient?
Psychiatrist: No. There is a history of a psuedo-suicide attempt. The record indicates one vague story of a psuedo-suicide
attempt in 1958 or 1959.
Defense Counsel then read from the patient's file and noted
"I The psychiatrist's recommendation of an indefinite commitment exceeded
statutory limitations on involuntary commitments. Orders for involuntary commitment in West Virginia are limited to a duration of two years. W. VA. CoDE § 27-54(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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that at the time of admission to the institution in 1959 the patient
spoke well and "to the point." The patient's record indicated that
the "patient is oriented in all three spheres." The defense attorney
then proceeded to read from the patient's record an entry of July
28, 1977 which indicated that the patient "is now disoriented in all
three spheres."
Defense Counsel: Why has the patient regressed?
Psychiatrist: The illness itself can do it. Being hospitalized
can make one have less need for orientation. He has regressed
since his hospitalization.
Defense Counsel: The real reason he is defined as dangerous
is because he can't take care of himself, is that right?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
MHC: This patient is out of touch with reality. Everything he
is saying now is a result of hallucinations, is that right doctor?
Psychiatrist: Yes.
A second psychiatrist testified that she had examined the patient on August 16, 1977. At the time of examination:
the patient had not bathed. He was very disheveled, an older
man. I would diagnose him as paranoid and delusional. He did
know it was 1977 and that he was in Weston. He knew that the
President was Jimmy Carter. I had trouble interacting with
him. He had trouble answering questions, he was hallucinating.
The patient is a paranois schizophrenic with regression due to
hospitalization.
Prosecutor: Is the patient dangerous to himself or others?
Psychiatrist: He is a passive danger to himself. He can feed
himself, but cannot take care of other needs. He has episodes
of withdrawal and yelling. I have not observed him as being
violent. He could manage outside the hospital."5

Cross Examination
Defense Counsel: Has the patient ever attempted suicide?
Psychiatrist: He did not display any suicidial tendencies.
MHC: What is the cause of his being unable to care for
himself?
Psychiatrist: His mental illness.
"I One

study has suggested that 75% of the patients with a diagnosis of schizo-

phrenia studied could be discharged from the hospital. Mendel, Brief Hospitalization Techniques, 6 CURRENT PSYCHIAT. THERAPIES 310 (1966). See also, Davis,
Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry: L Schizophrenia, 132 AM. J.
PSYCHIAT. 1237 (1975).
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MHC: Can the regression be reversed?
Psychiatrist: I doubt it. I can't explain the regression except
for lack of stimuli.
The defense attorney expressed concern that the hospital had
created the problem and that alternatives to hospitalization
should be sought. The MHC held that the patient was mentally
ill and a "passive danger to self" and ordered commitment, not to
exceed two years.
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
THE MENTALLY ILL

Legal representation of the mentally ill involves two problems:
providing legal counsel for individuals subject to involuntary confinement and providing legal representation of the mental patient
already confined.
Legal representation of the indigent in civil commitment hearings in West Virginia is now supplied by appointing private practitioners compensated by the state." 8 Personal observation of West
Virginia civil commitment hearings, discussions with MHCs and
appointed attorneys, and comparisons of the role of defense counsel in West Virginia to that described in the legal literature, 1 ' all
lead to the conclusion that West Virginia fails to provide effective
legal representation to the mentally ill at the time of commitment
and during hospitalization.
The West Virginia statute requires the appointment of
"competent" counsel" 8 who can protect the interests of the client.
"Competent" counsel, for purposes of the statute, is not simply
competence in general lawyering skills. Competence must refer to
the background, training, and expertise which are necessary for the
effective representation of the mental health patient. Bruce Ennis,
a leading and zealous guardian of mental patients rights, has
argued that "[ilnexperienced attorneys cannot adequately represent mental patients. 21 9
The present system of legal representation at civil commitment hearings is unsound. The system does not promote strong
"I W. VA. CODE §§ 27-5-4(g)(2), -4(h)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
21 See note 8, supra.
211See W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(g)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979). See also note 101, supra.
2I Ennis, Civil Liberties & Mental Illness, 7 CRIm.

L. BuLL. 101; 126 (1971).
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and zealous representation. Attorneys are appointed on an ad hoc
basis using any system that the MHC and/or circuit court may
devise. There is no systematic effort to encourage or to require the
appointed attorneys to perform any specific functions other than
their appearance at the hearing."' Even the representation at the
hearing is inadequate. In none of the observed cases reported in
this article or in the Appendix did defense counsel question the
credentials or expertise of the psychiatrists who testified as expert
witnesses. In the cases observed by the author, one of the psychiatrists Was a doctor with many years of experience in institutional
and community psychiatry. A second psychiatrist, however, was
doing a rotation in psychiatry at the West Virginia University
Medical Center. Defense counsel in each case proceeded on the
basis that both witnesses were equally qualified to present expert
testimony. Moreover, defense counsel did not inquire as to whether
the psychiatric resident was a physician.? 1
This article has attempted to demonstrate that defense counsel can, with adequate knowledge and training, cross-examine the
psychiatrist as to both the existence of mental illness and the
-likelihood of dangerousness. The overwhelming opinion in legal
and psychiatric circles is that psychiatrists are unqualified to predict dangerousness and have been shown in numerous studies to
have little reliability or validity in their predictions.2 2 Yet, assigned attorneys in the observed cases did not attempt to bring in
this information when cross-examining the "expert" psychiatrist.
The performance of defense counsel in the observed cases went
ancriticized by the MHC notwithstanding that, for the most part,
2 In Monongalia County, the Mental Health Commission requires that ap-

pointed counsel consult with the patient on the day immediately prior to the hearing. Personal communication from Ward D. Stone, Jr., Mental Health Commissioner, Monongalia County.
21, The West Virginia Code requires testimony of one physician or psychologist
to support a finding of mental illness and likelihood of serious harm to self or others
for commitment. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(f) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The code further
requires that the "physician" be licensed to practice medicine in West Virginia or
be a Federal government medical officer, W. VA. CODE § 27-1-5 (1976 Replacement
Vol.) and a "psychologist" be licensed to engage in the practice of psychology. W.

VA. CODE

§ 27-1-10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

See notes 145 to 150, supra.
In none of the observed cases did defense counsel prepare or file any legal
memorandum for the hearing. In those cases in which the Mental Health Commis2

sion entered an order of commitment, no appeal was taken.
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defense counsel's efforts were perfunctory.12 In those cases where
the MHC ordered the release of the client, the results were necessitated by the view of the psychiatrist that even though mentally ill,
the patient was not a danger to self or others. 24 The failure of
defense counsel to play a more active role could, in the future,
result in legal challenges to commitment proceedings and judicial
2
supervision of the appointment process. 2
Recognition of the ineffectual role of defense counsel for mental patients is only the first step in insuring adequate protection
for the legal rights of individuals subject to civil commitment.2 2 6
2'

Cases 2 and 3 in Appendix.

"I Ineffective assistance of counsel can be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. In Sloan v. Wachtel, 233 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1977), the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's denial of a habeas corpus hearing, which
would have allowed petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of an
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel during the course of an involuntary
commitment proceeding, was erroneous.
The West Virginia mental health code further provides that it "shall not be
construed to in any way limit or precondition the right to seek release . . . by
habeas corpus." W. VA. CODE § 27-5-5 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
In 1976 a circuit court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin overturned 827 of 838 civil
commitments of the Milwaukee County Court on grounds that court-appointed
attorneys had consistently failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. Memmel
v. Mundy, No. 447-417 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., Aug. 18, 1976) (reported in 1
MENTAL DisAaiury L. Rpr. 183 (1976) [hereinafter M.D.L.R.]). The court found
that attorneys representing the mentally ill routinely waived the right to jury trial,
the right to file written motions, and the right to appeal, and failed to object to
procedural and evidentiary errors of the prosecution. 1 M.D.L.R. 183.
A lawyer who does nothing, or who assists the prosecution is obviously
not the effective assistance of counsel that is envisoned by the 6th and
14th amendments to the Constitution. These petitioners would undoubtedly have been better off without any counsel whatever, rather than to
be represented by counsel who became a part of the prosecution effort to
detain or commit them.
1 M.D.L.R. at 184 (quoting from the circuit court's opinion).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the trial court decision which ordered
release or rehearing for all those within the class receiving ineffective assistance of
counsel and the emergency appointment of the Legal Aid Society to represent all
indigent patients in involuntary commitment proceedings. 1 M.D.L.R. 328 (1977).
Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for challenge to civil
commitment, see Note, Ineffective Representationas a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate Review, 13 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 3 n.6
(1977).
2'1The movement to secure the legal rights of mental patients and secure
adequate procedural safeguards against unnecessary institutionalization increasingly is being viewed in the broader context of "mental health advocacy." See
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The duties of defense counsel should be specifically set forth in the
mental health code and the state should move immediately to
transfer the responsibility for legal representation to an existing or
new legal services organization. West Virginia has taken the first
small step in this direction by making it a duty of counsel representing mental patients to "conduct a timely interview, make investigation and secure appropriate witnesses, and

. . .

be present

at the hearing and protect the interest of the individual.", This
statutory definition of the duties of counsel is inadequate, however,
to compensate for the absence of effective and adequate training.
Private practitioners appointed sporadically to represent mental patients have little professional or financial interest in developing an expertise in the mental health field. It is little surprise that
private practioners content themselves with the procedural and
legal aspects of commitment proceedings and leave questions concerning mental illness and dangerousness to the psychiatrists."8
Non-adversariness as to these crucial determinations deprives the
patient of real advocacy. 9 The lawyer, to fully represent the patient, must proceed as an advocate. °
The development of expertise in mental health law will occur
only when the state adopts a system of representation where attorneys devote all or a substantial part of their work to mental health
cases. This can be accomplished by the formation of a new stategenerally, MENTAL HEALTH

ADVOCACY:

AN EMERGING FORCE

IN CONSUMERS' RtoHrs

(L. Kopolow & H. Bloom eds. 1977); Wald & Friedman, The Politics of Mental
HealthAdvocacy in the United States, in LAW AND PSYCHIATRY I:PROCEEDINGS OF
Weisstub ed. 1979).
1979). For a model statute which
defines the duties of attorneys, see Andalman & Chambers, supra note 8, at 89-90.
2" Andalman and Chambers argue that statutory guidelines are necessary
THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 55-70 (D.
2" W. VA. CODE-§ 27-5-4(b)(1) (Cum. Supp.

"[blecause of this tendency of lawyers to adopt constricted roles, and because in

the area of civil commitment, attorneys have essentially no tradition to rely upon,
no experience, no training, and no adequate source to consult for guidance ..
Id.at 84-85.
m "The non-adversary guardian ad litem necessarily does not afford realization of constitutional and statutory guarantees in regard to the assistance of counsel." Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568, 576 (1974). See Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097-99 (E.D. Wis. 1972).

m See Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 125-26 (W. Va. 1974); Quesnell v.
State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568, 576 (1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972). But see the warning as to overzealousness in
Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings: Emerging
Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 816, 831 (1974).
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wide mental health advocacy program"' or the use of existing legal
services organizations. 3 2 Another and, perhaps, final solution
would be to simply remove the power to appoint counsel on a caseby-case basis from the MHC and require the circuit court to appoint a mental health advocate for the county to represent all cases
arising in the county. The appointment of a mental health advocate whose duties are clearly defined by statutory provision could
improve the existing system.
Legal representation at the time of the initial commitment is
only one means of protecting the mentally ill from over-zealous use
of institutionalization.m Patients will, of course, have specific legal
231For a suggested system to provide'effective assistance of counsel based on a
state-wide agency, with full and part-time staff attorneys fashioned on the model
of the New York Mental Health Information Service, see Andalman & Chambers,
supra, note 8.
For an extensive bibliography on the New York Mental Health Information
Service, see id. at 64-72. See also, Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816 (1974); Broderick,
Justice in the Books or Justicein Action-An InstitutionalApproach to Involuntary
Hospitalizationfor Mental Illness, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 547, 620-32 (1971); Meyer,
Lawyer in a Mental Hospital: The New York Experiment, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 14
(1969); Kumasaka, The Lawyer's Role in Involuntary Commitment: New York's
Experience, 56 MENTAL HYGIENE 21 (1972); Gupta, New York's Mental Health
InformationService: An Experiment in Due Process,25 RUTGERS L. REv. 404 (1971).
2 One alternative to fee payments to private practitioners is for the state to
contract with a local legal aid agency to provide the services. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 8, at 83. This approach would be especially attractive in a state
like West Virginia which has a relatively small number of commitment proceedings.
m One recently publicized case of overzealousness in institutional psychiatry
is O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Donaldson was committed in 1957
and was not finally released until 1971. Donaldson's fifteen-year confinement included no psychiatric treatment (he had refused medication on religious grounds)
and was continued even though psychiatrists at the institution did not believe him
to be dangerous to himself or others and had good reason to know that he would be
adequately cared for by others upon his release. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The case raises an
important question about the appropriateness of institutionalization of numbers of
mentally ill individuals even though they are not considered to be dangerous. Until
the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Hawks v. Lazaro,
202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974), and a statutory enactment requiring dangerousness
in addition to mental illness, West Virginia's mental institutions, as those throughout the country, were used for custodial care of the mentally ill. All of the cases
reported in the Appendix involved long-term patients who were being afforded a
new judicial hearing pursuant to the 1974 Statute.
A recent study in Connecticut undertaken jointly by the Yale University De-
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problems but more often will consult legal counsel with a variety
of complaints which deal with institutional life such as the denial
of grounds privileges, inaccessibility of medical and psychiatric
professionals,2m adverse effects of drug medications,25 the desire to
partment of Psychiatry and the Yale Law School reviewed the appropriateness of
the 107 involuntary patients at the Connecticut Valley Hospital. Crane, Zonana &
Wizner, Implications of the Donaldson Decision: A Model for Periodic Review of
Committed Patients, 28 Hosp. & CoMMUNrrY PSYCHIAT. 827 (1977). The review,
conducted by three panels -ach composed of a law student, a psychiatric resident,
and a hospital social worker, resulted in a change in the status of 57 cases, or 53%
of the patients reviewed. In 50 of the cases, discharge was recommended. Id. at 830.
This proportion is quite significant, considering the hospital's expectation that the project would identify few patients who did not belong in
the hospital. It suggests that even in a hospital that has discouraged
involuntary commitments and made legal services available to patients,
there remains a large area of disagreement about the appropriateness of
existing commitments.

Id.
Despite the merely advisory role of the panels and the severe and chronic
nature of many of the cases reviewed, the project enabled the hospital to
conclude that a significant sampling of committed patients no longer
could be justifiably confined on an involuntary basis.
Id. at 832. Of interest is the fact that the review panels found no patients with
circumstances similar to Donaldson's; that is, not dangerous, minimally impaired,
desirous of leaving the hospital, and capable of living in the community.
The bias of the review panels was toward discharge, whereas hospital
review, when it occurs, tends to be biased toward the retention of patients. The longer a patient is confined, the more likely it is for periodic
reviews to become perfunctory if they occur at all. Thus external review
encourages, if not compels, the hospital to assume a more active role in
the review process and discharge planning.
Id. at 832-33. In summary, the panels found that approximately half the patients
reviewed should no longer be maintained on an involuntary status. To date, the
hospital has concurred in approximately half of these cases. Id. at 833.
m The right to treatment is prescribed by statute in West Virginia. W. VA.
CODE § 27-5-9(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute requires an individualized treatment program based on "appropriate examination and diagnosis." Id. § 27-59(c)(4). The treatment is to be specifically directed to the needs of the individual
and is to be performed by trained personnel in a "skillful, safe and humane manner." Id. § 27-5-9(b). The treatment program and its administration must respect
the patient's "dignity and personal integrity." Id. Specific time limits are provided
within which the treatment program must be formulated as well as periodically
reviewed. The statutory language is clear:
The chief medical officer shall cause to be developed within the clinical
rec rd of each patient a written treatment plan based on initial medical
and psychiatric examination not later than seven days after he is admitted for treatment. The treatment plan shall be updated periodically,
consistent with reevaluation of the patient. Failure to accord the patient
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the requisite periodic examinations or treatment plan and reevaluations
shall entitle the patient to release.
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979). As part of the treatment program the
patient is to receive a psychiatric reevaluation at least once every three months and
a physical examination by a physician once every six months. Id. § 27-5-9(c)(2).
The statutory requirement for a treatment plan is generally viewed as "the
basis for a rational and humane therapeutic approach. It implies the consideration
of the patient's needs, an examination of alternative approaches to meeting them,
and it insures a certain degree of planning for each patient." Mechanic, Judicial
Action and Social Change, in THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR MENTAL PATIENTS 47,
64 (S. Golann & W. Fremouw eds. 1976).
There are two levels on which treatment can be analyzed: individual and
institutional. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), the court
was concerned with whether the institutions as a whole were providing sufficient
treatment to satisfy constitutional standards. The West Virginia statute provides
little in the way of guidelines on the institutional level except that treatment is to
be provided by "trained personnel" and will consist of periodic physical and psychiatric examinations which shall be used to develop and carry out an individualized
treatment plan. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(c)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Implementation of the statutory right to treatment depends not only upon
effective treatment on a case-by-case basis but institutional resources sufficient to
provide quality care and treatment. The current debate is whether treatment required by statute can be effectively implemented by court imposed minimum standards. There are questions raised as to whether court imposed minimum standards
such as those in Wyatt v. Stickney "can be reasonably interpreted and monitored,
what their long-term efforts on mental health policies and practices are likely to
be, and their bearing on the untreatable patient and the patient who wishes to
refuse treatment." Mechanic, supra at 59.
Obviously, court-imposed minimum standards alone are insufficient to
guarantee adequate treatment of a diverse patient population. The West Virginia
statute attacks this problem by requiring a specific treatment plan for the individual based on examination and diagnosis with periodic review and change in the plan
where necessary. Thus, the West Virginia statute provides a framework in which
treatment may be demanded.
The structural framework for treatment outlined in the statute and the individualized treatment plan are, in and of themselves, still insufficient to insure adequate treatment. One author has noted that the treatment plan, while an essential
prerequisite to adequate treatment in an institutionalized setting, "can become a
farcical ritual that has little to do with the daily conditions affecting the patient
and, indeed,. . . may reallocate whatever staff time is available away from contact
with patients. It is quite conceivable that professionals come to spend all of their
time formulating and reviewing paper plans, while non-professional staff continue
to run the institution and to have almost exclusive contact with patients." Mechanic, supra at 64-65.
While the present state of psychiatry would not permit conclusive or consensual proof as to the "right treatment" called for by the right to treatment, the
demand can be enforced to the extent that it calls for the hospitalized patient to
receive "some form of therapy that a respectable sector of the psychiatric profession
regards as appropriate-and receives enough of that therapy to make his confinement more than a mockery." Bazelon, Foreword, A Symposium-The Right to
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Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 676, 677 (1969). For a detailed discussion of the evaluation
of treatment, see Cameron, Nonmedical Judgment of Medical Matters, 57 GEO. L.J.
716 (1969).
It is now commonly accepted that mental patients have a right to treatment.
The literature exploring this new right is voluminous. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 275-92 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1973); THE MENTALLY
ILL AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT (G. Morris ed. 1970); THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
(D. Burris ed. 1969); THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT FOR MENTAL PATIENTS (S. Golann &
W. Fremouw eds. 1976). See also Bailey & Pyfer, Deprivationof Liberty and the
Right to Treatment, 7 CLEAR. REV. 519 (1974); Barnett, Treatment Rights of
Mentally Ill NursingHome Residents, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 578 (1978); Bassiouni, The
Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment: Medical Due Process, 15 DE PAUL
L. REV. 291 (1966); Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 742 (1969); Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA.
L. REv. 623 (1971); Birnbaum, Some Comments on "The Right to Treatment," 13
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT. 34 (1965); Drake Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt
v. Stickney, 10 AM. CraM. L. REv. 587 (1972); Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and
Wyatt: An Administrative-Law Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient'sRight to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REv. 297 (1975); Jacob, The Right of
the Mental Patient to His Psychosis, 39 MOD. L. REV. 17 (1976); Katz, The Right
to Treatment-An EnchantingLegal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969); Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 28 (1960); Leaf, Wyatt v. Stickney: Assessing the Impact in Alabama,
28 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT. 351 (1977); LeVine & Bornstein, Is the Sociopath
Treatable? The Contributionof Psychiatry to a Legal Dilemma, 1972 WASH. U.L.
Q. 693; Mahan, et al., A Mechanism for Enforcing the Right to Treatment: The
Human Rights Committee, 1975 LAW & PSYCHIAT. 131; Miller, The "Right to Treatment:" Can the Courts Rehabilitateand Cure?, 46 PUB. INTEREST 96 (1977); Morris,
Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 957,979-90 (1974); Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive Treatment,
6 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1972); Robitscher, Courts, State Hospitals and the Right to
Treatment, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 298 (1972); Robitscher, The Right to Psychiatric
Treatment: A Social-Legal Approach to the Plight of the State Hospital Patient,
18 VILL. L. REV. 11 (1972); Schwitzgebel, Implementing a Right to Effective
Treatment, 1975 LAW & PSYCHIAT. RaV. 117; Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective
Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. RaV. 936 (1974); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment
for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective
Criteria,8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 513 (1973); Stone, Overview: The Right to Treatment - Comments on the Law and Its Impact, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 1125 (1975);
Stone, The Right to Treatment and the Medical Establishment, 2 BULL. AcAD.
PSYCHIAT. & LAW 159 (1974); Tancredi & Clark, Psychiatry and the Legal Rights of
Patients, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 328 (1972); Twerski, Treating the Untreatable- A
Critique of the ProposedPennsylvaniaRight to Treatment Law, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 220
(1970); A Symposium - The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969).
See also Note, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a ConstitutionalRight
to Treatment?, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624 (1973); Note, The Right to Treatment for
Mentally Ill Juveniles in California,27 HASTINGS L.J. 865 (1976); Note, "Without
More:" A ConstitutionalRight to Treatment?, 22 LoY. L. REv. 373 (1976); Note,
Guaranteeing Treatment for the Committed Mental Patient: The Troubled Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 MD. L. REv. 42 (1972); Note, Postcommitment:
An Analysis and Reevaluation of the Right of Treatment, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 287
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refuse treatment

0

and the failure to allow home visits or release

(1975); Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisonersand Mental Patients,45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616 (1972);
Note, The Rights of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration:The Developing Law,
25 U. FLA. L. REV. 494 (1973); Note, Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1966); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53
VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967); Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 157; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patientsto Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1282 (1973); Comment, Relief for the Civilly Committed: A ConstitutionalRight to Treatment, 63
Ky. L.J. 469 (1975); Comment, Toward a Right to Treatmentfor Civilly Committed
Mental Patients, 44 U. Mo.-K.C.L. REV. 23 (1975).
m See Armstrong, The Use of PsychotropicDrugs in State Hospitals:A Legal
or Medical Decision?, 29 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT. 118 (1978); Note, Mental
Health-The Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under "Emergency Restraint Statutes," 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 509 (1976).
211 Prior to the 1978 amendments to the Mentally Ill
Persons Act, West Virginia
had not by statute or judicial decision declared a patient's right to refuse treatment.
The only right to refuse treatment arose from constitutional requirements established by the federal courts. The cases generally prohibited certain forms of treatment, e.g., lobotomy, psychosurgery and other "unusual, hazardous or intrusive
surgical procedures" affecting a patient's mental condition. See, e.g., Wyatt v.
Hardin, (M.D. Ala. 1975) (unreported order reported in F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G.
Dix & R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS 556 (2d. ed. 1976) where the court
held that the use of "aversive conditioning" and electro-convulsive shock treatment
(ECT) required the patient's "informed consent." Other cases have established the
right to refuse treatment on the basis of the free exercise of religion protected by
the First Amendment. See Winter v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971). Another constitutional basis for a right to refuse treatment can
be found in the constitutional right to privacy. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131,
1144-45 (D.N.J. 1977). It seems clear from a reading of the cases that the courts
have not assured all patients under all conditions a right to refuse treatment. Courts
have generaly established the right to refuse certain extraordinary treatments and
less intrusive therapies such as the use of psychotropic drugs where there are religious objections. Rennie v. Klein, supra.
Some state statutes specifically prohibit certain forms of treatment. Though
the West Virginia statute has no prohibited forms of treatment, it does provide that
any treatment must be provided in a "safe and humane manner with full respect
for his [the patient's] dignity and personal integrity." W. VA. CODE § 27-5-9(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1979). There is indeed a substantial question as to whether lobotomies, ECT, and "aversive conditioning" meet'this standard. Additionally, the Code
requires the patient's written consent, which is revocable at any time and invalid
after six months. Id. § 27-4-4(b) (Chim. Supp. 1979).
See also Roth, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Right to Treatment and
the Right to Refuse Treatment, in PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS
AND DEBATE (R. Bonnie ed. 1977); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental
Patients'Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461 (1977); Comment, The
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to a family member or community facility. There should be some
institutional or administrative mechanism to secure patient rights
and investigate specific patient complaints without legal intervention.n7 Only when the institution fails to attend to patient complaints should attorneys be necessary. Of course in some instances,
the bureaucratic decisions which lead to institutional constraints
on the patient's life may ultimately require the intervention of an
attorney.
In a patient advocacy program established at Bryce Hospital
in Alabama, the advocates were able to help patients:
receive remuneration for labor, obtain clothes more appropriate
to the season, receive more extended grounds privileges, secure
less restrictive placements, and receive attention for medical
problems. They have also been involved in broader issues, such
as assisting in the development of hospital policies on searches,
and procedures for dealing with resident abuse. The program
has become a clearinghouse for information on patients' rights
questions .

. ..

The internal mechanism should be designed broadly to guarantee patient legal rights and to encourage improvement in patient
care. A variety of institutional structures could be devised to
achieve this goal. One approach is a patient advocacy programns
Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and the Involuntarily
Committed, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 774 (1974).

On the right to refuse treatment, see generally, Cocozza & Melick, The Right
to Refuse Treatment: A Broad View, 5 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIAT. & L. 3 (1977).
13 Broderick, One-Legged Ombudsman in a Mental Hospital: An Over-theShoulder Glance at an Experimental Project, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 517 (1973);
Broderick, Justice in the Books or Justice in Action-An InstitutionalApproach to
Involuntary Hospitalization for Mental Illness, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 547, 618-50
(1971).

21 Tauber & Houston, The Advocacy Program,Implementing the Wyatt Standards at Bryce Hospital, 28 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIAT. 360, 361 (1977).
29 In Michigan, a patient's "rights advisers" program mandated by state statute was implemented in 23 institutions during the summer of 1975. During the first
17 months of the program in which patient complaints were administratively monitored, some 2258 complaints were received from an inpatient population of 31,000
and an outpatient population of 33,000.
The bulk of the complaints in the first year fell into six categories...
right to services suited to one's condition; right to a safe, sanitary and
humane living environment; right to protection from abuse; right to communicate and visit with persons of one's choice; right to have personal
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that can be directed by an independent party who is given responsibility to investigate patient complaints. 0 The patient advocate
will need sufficient staff to investigate complaints, formulate
specific recommendations for institutional action, and provide
property and access to one's own funds; and right to freedom of movement.
Coye, Michigan's System for ProtectingPatients' Rights, 28 HosP. & COMMUNrY
PSYCHIAT. 375, 377 (1977). A complete report is contained in REPORT ON VIOLATIONS
OF RIGHTS INTHE FIRST YEAR OF MICHIGAN'S INSTiTUTIONAL RECIPIENT RIGHTS SYSTEM,
OFFICE OF RECIPIENT RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH (1977).
See also Ferleger, A Patients' Rights Organization:Advocacy and Collective
Action By and For Inmates of Mental Institutions, 8 CLEAR. REv. 587, 587n.1
(1975); Tauber & Houston, supra note 238.
Dr. Louis Kopolow, the coordinator of patient's rights and advocacy programs
in the Division of Mental Health Service Programs of the National Institute of
Mental Health has argued that:
[A] comprehensive advocacy program would consist of a tripartite system of patients' representatives, lawyers, and an ombudsman, with psychiatrists and other mental health professionals participating in the activities of each component. The primary element in the program is the
patient's repesentative, who will be concerned with screening patients for
the appropriateness of commitment, of guardianship, of forced medication and other form of treatment, of transfer or release from large institutions, and other matters. The patient's repesentative will also devote his
or her efforts to preserving the right to noninstitutionalization whenever
possible and to arranging for transfer of patients to other mental health
personnel in the community.
Kopolow, Meeting the Patients' Rights Challenge Through Mental Health
Advocacy, 28 Hosp. & ComMuNrry PSYCHIAT. 383, 383 (1977). See generally, Dickey
& Remington, Legal Assistance for InstitutionalizedPersons-An Overlooked
Need, 1976 S. ILL. U.L.J. 175.
Dr. Kopolow envisions the role of the ombudsman as one who "could address
problems throughout the entire mental health system. His role would not be to
resolve individual complaints, but rather to use his broad investigatory ability,
independence, and objectivity to make recommendations to correct the system's
malfunctioning." Kopolow, supra, at 383-84. On the role of the ombudsman, see
Broderick, supra note 8.
2I One of the chief advantages of the patient advocate program is the ability
of the staff members to respond to the day-to-day issues that are common to patient
complaints. The advocate, as a part of the hospital administration, has advantages
which are not present in outside legal counsel. The advocate has access to patients,
and their records, and to the staff.
The relationship of the patients' rights advocate to the director of the mental
institution and its staff, however, must be defined. Advocates appointed by institutional administrators are likely to have conflicting loyalties in representing individual patients. An additional problem exists in that advocates who receive no special
training often come from background which produce biases similar to those of staff
members which created the initial problem.
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follow-up to insure that legitimate patient concerns are attended
to. While there is little justification for an attorney serving as an
internal patient advocate, the advocate should have access to
2
attorneys for legal consultation. '
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is a fundamental axiom of the legal profession that lawyers
will effectively and competently represent those whom they take,
or those whom may be assigned, as clients. The Code of Professional Responsibility maintains this duty as one applicable to
every attorney for the protection of every client. Yet, one should
deduce from this article that lawyers are not effectively and competently representing individuals whose liberty is at stake due to
mental illness.
Lawyers do not represent the mentally ill in the traditional
sense of representation. A lawyer accompanying the client/patient
to the hearing does not suffice for representation and effective
advocacy. Competent and effective representation occurs only
when the lawyer has the knowledge, expertise, and willingness to
question psychiatric diagnoses of mental illness and psychiatric
predictions of dangerousness.
This article is not to be taken as a suggestion that lawyers who
represent the mentally ill should become amateur psychiatrists.
Rather, we should understand enough about psychiatry to expose
the opportunity for error in psychiatric diagnoses. At minimum,
lawyers can show that psychiatric judgments are based on social,
moral, philosophical and legal theories - theories on which the
psychiatrist has no more claim to expertise than do lawyers or
laymen. Lawyers abdicate their professional responsibility to the
241 One advocacy program that involved approximately 2000 complaints con-

suited with attorney's in about 60% of the cases. Tauber & Houston, supra, note
238, at 361.
It will be useful for hospital patient advocates and attorneys to establish contact with the various private, state and federal organizations and agencies which
are entering the mental health field. For attorneys, one of the most important new
groups is the Mental Health Law Project (MHLP) organized in 1972 with the
purpose of defining and securing through litigation the rights of mental patients.
The project is sponsored by the American Orthopsychiatric Association and the
American Civil Liberties Union. The MHLP has been instrumental in cases challenging commitment criteria for involuntary commitment and cases seeking a right
to accept and refuse treatment and treatment by least restrictive alternative.
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241

mentally ill when they allow the courts to defer to psychiatric
testimony concerning dangerousness. Psychiatrists cannot predict
dangerousness and a lawyer who allows such predictions to result
in the confinement of his or her client without strenuous crossexamination is negligent in the advocacy required of all lawyers in
representing those whose liberty is at stake.
Lawyers can and should defer to the expertise of professionals
who have clinical experience with the diagnosis and treatment of
mental illness. We must, however, insure that our deference is to
real expertise-expertise founded on experience and a recognition
that knowledge of human behavior and human mental states has
limits. Lawyers, by their tenacious advocacy for the mentally ill,
can insure appropriate respect by psychiatrists for the limits of
their professional knowledge.
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APPENDIX*

Case 1
The first psychiatrist testified that the patient was examined
on three occasions in the week preceding the hearing and the day
prior to the hearing. The psychiatrist further testified that the
patient was a chronic schizophrenic. In response to the prosecutor's question, "What is schizophrenia," the psychiatrist replied
that it is a mental illness in which one is likely to be violent to
others or to himself. The psychiatrist noted that there was no other
form of treatment for the patient other than institutionalization.
Defense Counsel: Doctor, how do you know that the patient
is dangerous?
Psychiatrist: The patient tried to strike the doctor examining
her at the time she was being admitted. She has also tried to
strike her parents.
Defense counsel objected to the psychiatrist's testimony as
hearsay. The MHC allowed the testimony since the alleged hearsay evidence consisted of the admitting doctor's statements which
were contained in the medical record.
Defense Counsel: Doctor, have you ever witnessed any acts of
violence by the patient?
Psychiatrist: Yes, I have seen her pinch and strike nurses,
aides, and other patients. She could have caused serious harm
to others if she had not been placed in isolation.
Defense Counsel: Are there any alternatives to commitment
to Weston State Hospital?
Psychiatrist: The psychiatric unit at the University Medical
Center won't take patients as far out of control as this patient.
Nursing homes won't take her because they couldn't handle her.
* The transcripts are taken from actual civil commitment hearings held in
Fairmont and Weston, West Virginia, during the summer of 1977. The cases are
reproduced from notes taken by the author at the hearings and to the extent possible, represent verbatim accounts of the hearings. The mental hygiene commissioner
and prosecuting and defense attorneys in each of the hearings authorized the author
to observe the hearings. For other transcript materials of involuntary commitment
proceedings which reflect the ritualistic role of the attorney, see Wexler & Scoville,
Special Project - The Administration of PsychiatricJustice:Theory and Practice
in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. Rxv. 1, 38-43 (1971). For a more thorough effort by defense
counsel, although still deficient, see the transcript of People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App.
3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974), reprintedin F. MiLLER, et al., THE MENTAL HEALT
PRocEss 348-56 (1976).
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Redirect Examination by Prosecution:
Prosecutor: Do you recommend commitment for six months or
two years?
Psychiatrist: Probably, one year.
The second psychiatrist testified that the patient had been
examined and was a schizophrenic. The psychiatrist then testified
that "an individual suffering from this form of mental illness is
likely to be dangerous to self or others."
Defense Counsel: Do you have any specific instances of her
dangerousness?
Psychiatrist: I have the reports of others. As for myself, I can
say that the patient displayed hyperactivity and violent outbursts.
Defense Counsel: Is there any other alternative to the state
hospital?
Psychiatrist: There is no other alternative. The patient needs
physical restraint. She is hyperactive. She would be too much
for nursing homes. She will not take her medication.
Defense Counsel: Isn't there a program at the University Medical Center which would take her?
Psychiatrist: No. The program takes only voluntary patients
and does not use restraints. The patient is too hyperactive to
be managed on an open ward.
Redirect Examination:
Prosecutor: Is medication required for continued treatment?
Psychiatrist: Yes. She has a history of not taking medication.
MHC: How long has the patient been confined?
MHC: Would her parents be able to take care of her, they are
in their eighties, aren't they?
Psychiatrist: No.
The third witness was a staff member of a community mental
health facility. He testified that the patient was a client of the
community mental health center and that he became involved
after an emergency call from the family. They told him she was
very withdrawn and quiet and that they brought her in because she
had destroyed her apartment and was running around nude. The
staff member said that when one of the doctors tried to give her
medication the patient attacked him.
Defense Counsel: You said she attacked the doctor?
Mental Health Worker: Yes.
Defense Counsel: Did she actually hit the doctor?
Mental Health Worker: No, she drew back to hit him.
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The patient's mother, who was present, stood up and asked
permission to ask a question. This was denied by the prosecutor.
MHC: Who is family?
Mental Health Worker: Her brother or brother-in-law.
The prosecutor called the father as a witness.
Prosecutor: Could you tell us why you got concerned about
your daughter?
Father: She wasn't taking care of her apartment. She was
throwing things out back.
Prosecutor: Is that all?
Father: She was running around the apartment without
clothes, with the blinds up.
Prosecutor: Was your daughter violent?
Father: She hasn't been in the last couple of weeks. She was
violent last year, before she went into the mental hospital.

Cross Examination:
Defense
Father:
Defense
Father:
Defense
Father:

Counsel: Did you see her in a violent state?
No, but her mother did.
Counsel: Did she keep her apartment clean?
At times, she did.
Counsel: Could she return home?
Not unless she's improved a lot.

The patient's mother interrupted the testimony of the mental
health worker and her husband. Defense counsel called the patient's mother as a witness. The patient's mother testified that
during her daughter's last commitment, she and her husband had
received a call from the hospital to pick up their daughter. "The
people at the hospital said she was capable of working. We got her
a new typewriter. The social workers were supposed to help her get
a job. We never heard from them. They made her live by herself.
They wouldn't let her live with us."
MHC: Do you think your daughter is mentally ill?
Mother: Well, she can talk to you, when she wants to. Give
her a chance and she'll do something.
MHC to Defense Counsel: Have you advised your client that
she has a right to testify?
Defense Counsel: Yes, she voluntarily chooses not to testify.,
An individual subject to involuntary commitment has a statutory right not
to appear as a witness at the commitment hearing. The West Virginia statute
specifically provides that "Itihe individual shall not be compelled to be a witness
against himself." W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(g)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute also
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Defense Counsel, in closing, argued that the prosecution had
not proved it's case "beyond a reasonable doubt."2 The defense
provides, however, that: "If the designated physician or psychologist reports to the
circuit court or mental hygiene commissioner that the individual has refused to
submit to an examination, the circuit court or mental hygiene commissioner shall
order him to submit to such examination." W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(f)(2) (Cum.Supp.
1979). This provision clearly fails to recognize a privilege against self-incrimination
during a psychiatric interview. Thus, West Virginia does not extend the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to a crucial phase of the involuntary commitment process: the psychiatric interview which is the basis for commitment. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has refused to extend the
privilege against self-incrimination to the prehearing psychiatric interview, Hawks
v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (1974), and by statute, provides that statements
made to a physician or psychologist may be admitted as evidence without a
Miranda-type warning to the individual. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(i)(2) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
The constitutionality of allowing a privilege against self-incrimination at a
formal hearing and denying it at a critical prehearing stage is questionable. Some
courts considering the issue have concluded that a Miranda-type warning is constitutionally required. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
2 Defense counsel has mistated the burden of proof which the state must meet.
The findings of the MHC "must be based upon clear, cogent and convincing proof."
W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
In the absence of a statutory provision setting forth the burden of proof, the
courts split, some adopting the preponderance of evidence test, see State v. Krol,
68 N.J. 236, 257, 344 A.2d 289, 300 (1975) (Commitment following not guilty by
reason of insanity) (decision to follow preponderance of evidence standard over a
dissent which strongly favored beyond a reasonable doubt.); others, the reasonable
doubt standard. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 935-37 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Suzuki
v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473, aff'd
on other grounds, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957,
aff'd on othergrounds, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1975); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306,
535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975) (commitment under a mentally disordered
sex offender statute).
Other courts have followed the West Virginia approach and adopted the clear
and convincing evidence test. See Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 516-17 (D.
Neb. 1975); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392-94 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325
F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 342, 540 P.2d 818,
821 (1975).
The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the preponderance of evidence test
does not meet constitutional due process standards and that due process requirements do not mandate proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Addington v. Texas, 99
S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
At least one court prior to Addington found little distinction between the clear
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noted the inconsistency in the testimony as to the patient's dangerousness to others. Finally, the defense argued there are less restrictive alternatives for treatment and care of the patient. The prosecution closed by summarizing the testimony adduced at the hearing and asked for an order of commitment. The MHC ordered six
months commitment.
Vase 2
This case involved a petition for recommitment of a sixty-nine
year old woman of Polish origin. The patient could not speak English.' She had been hospitalized in May, 1963 because of
"immature actions." The first psychiatrist:
found the patient neatly dressed, and cooperative through an
interpreter. The patient did not know when she was born. She
was disoriented as to date and location. She answered questions
appropriately, with one exception when she inappropriately
mentioned the death of her son. She could recognize familiar
objects: a watch, a key, and her leg. She said she would prefer
to stay at Weston. It is my impression that she is mentally
retarded.4 She is able to take care of her personal hygiene.
and convincing evidence standard of proof and the criminal reasonable doubt standard. In Washington, the clear, cogent, and convincing standard for the state's
burden of proof "exacts the duty that every element essential to proving committable mental illness be demonstrated to a degree essentially corresponding to that
necessary for commitment in criminal proceedings." In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253,
256, 517 P.2d 588, 590 (1973).
For an empirical analysis of the impact of the burden of proof on determinations of dangerousness, see Wexler & Scoville, supra Appendix note *, at 100-17.
See generally Combs, Burden"of Proof and Vagueness in Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 47 (1973); Share, The Standardof Proofin Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1977 DeT. C.L. REv. 209 (1977); Note,
Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1190, 1301 (1974); Comment, The Standard of Proof in Civil Commitment
Proceedings In Massachusetts:Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 1 W. NEw ENG. 71, 80-88 (1978).
The patient had been interviewed by a Polish interpreter prior to the hearing
and was accompanied by the interpreter at the hearing. The proceedings were not
interpreted for the patient, in fact there was no communication between the interpreter and the patient during the entire proceeding.
Mental retardation is treated like mental illness in West Virginia for purposes
of involuntary civil commitment. See W. VA. CODE § 27-5-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Mental retardation is statutorily defined as a "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning which manifests itself in a person during his developmental period and
which is characterized by his inadequacy in adaptive behavior." W. VA. CODE § 271-3 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
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Prosecutor: Is she dangerous to herself?.
Psychiatrist: In a very supervised setting, she can function
outside the hospital. She could care for herself, in a less restrictive environment.
Prosecutor: Any suicide attempts?
Psychiatrist: No.
Prosecutor: Summarize the diagnosis.
Psychiatrist: She is mentally retarded. She has deficiencies.
Cross Examination:
Defense Counsel: Is the patient dangerous to herself or others?
Psychiatrist: She is not actively dangerous to herself or others,
perhaps dangerous in a passive sense. Because of the language
barrier she can't communicate her needs. She has been able to
function here. She recognizes people, etc.
Defense Counsel read from the patient's record for the period
from 1963 to the present and noted that the Weston staff had
repeatedly recommended that the patient be placed in a nursing
home beginning as early as 1963 when she was initially confined.
MHC: She
committed?
Psychiatrist:
to manage.

functioned outside the institution until
She was living with her sister and became hard

The testimony of the second psychiatrist indicated that the
patient was examined August 15, 1977 and found to be a:
sixty-nine year old white single female who is obviously severly
retarded. I think there is a strong possibility the fall was just a
fall, she was born with her difficulties. [The patient's file made
reference to a fall at the age of three.] The family managed to
take care of her until she reached fifty-five. Since her admission, May, 1963, she has been taken home on at least nineteen
visits ranging from two days to two weeks, the last of which was
in February. There were no problems with her home visits.
Prosecutor: Is she dangerous to self or others?
Psychiatrist: She is not dangerous to self or others.
Prosecutor: Can she function in a different environment?
Psychiatrist: Yes, if we could subsidize the family so they
could look after her. Places to take care of her are hard to find.
Cross Examination:
For a discussion of the issues in the civil commitment of the mentally retarded
see Ellis, Issues in Mental Retardation, 1975 LAw & PsYcH. Rlv. 9. See generally
PRESIDENT'S COMMI'ITEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN

AND THE LAW (1976).
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Defense Counsel: When did Weston start to try to place her?
Psychiatrist: It has been some time.
Defense Counsel: Since 1974?
Psychiatrist: It could have been since 1974.
Defense Counsel: Can the patient manage herself?
Psychiatrist: She could function in a personal care home.
The MHC, off the record, questioned the patient's sister, who
was present at the hearing, and then proceeded to swear her as a
witness. The sister testified that the patient was on Social Security
which had been raised from $117 to $144 and that, in addition, the
patient received a $100 a month from workmen's compensation as
a result of her father's death in a coal mine. Weston was paid $3.00
to $3.50 a day for her care. The patient had a savings account of a
few thousand dollars.
MHC: Why was your sister committed?
Sister: We had trouble while she was living with mother. It
began at menopause.
MHC: Does your sister visit?
Sister: She visits in Morgantown. On long visits she gets
moody. Sometimes she hides when guests come.
Defense Counsel: I ask that the patient be released. I have no
real argument.
Prosecutor: No argument.
MHC: I find that the patient is mentally retarded but not
dangerous to self or others. The order will be stayed 60 days to
find a suitable placement.
Case 3
The first psychiatrist testified that the patient was examined
on August 16, 1977, and was seen from time to time on the hospital
unit. The patient was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic on
admission in 1963. The psychiatrist basically defined a schizophrenic as one who has "grandiose ideas." The psychiatrist further
noted that the patient's schizophrenia "is in a state of remission.
The symptoms are pretty well in control." The psychiatrist "found
the patient to be a friendly, active man. He has a hypertension
muscular disease for which we are treating him. He still believes
this is a prison and not a hospital. The patient has the leftover
effects of schizophrenia."
Prosecutor: Is he mentally ill?
Psychiatrist: Yes, in a sense. We don't speak of a cancer patient being cured, it is just in remission.
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Prosecutor:

Psychiatrist:

Is he dangerous to self or others?

No.

Prosecutor: Could he get along in a less restrictive
environment?
Psychiatrist: Yes. He is a good candidate for a personal care
home or to live with one of his kids.
Prosecutor: Is he on medication?
Psychiatrist: Yes, for his heart condition.
Cross Examination:
Defense Counsel: Does he take his medication voluntarily?
Psychiatrist: Yes, he is a good patient.
Defense Counsel: No further questions.
The second psychiatrist testified that the patient was exam-

ined on August 16. "It was the only time that I saw him. I reviewed
his records."
Prosecutor: What were your medical findings?
Psychiatrist: On examination, he was neatly dressed, clean,
gave a history of being in the hospital since 1963. He gave as a
reason his problem with a garbage collection business. He gave
a delusional explanation of the event.5 He is oriented'as to person, place, time. He denied hallucinations and suicidal or homicidal urges. Except for the delusional system as to how he got
here he has done well.
Prosecutor: Doctor, what is your diagnosis?
Psychiatrist: Schizophrenic, paranoid type, in good control
and what seems like a delusional system.
Prosecutor: Is he dangerous to self or others?
Psychiatrist: No. He could be managed in a nursing home.
Defense Counsel: No questions.
MHC: What is an isolated delusional system?
Psychiatrist: It isn't pervasive, in that it doesn't effect most
of his behavior.
MHC: It would be an easy job to order release, but what happens from there? The evidence here is ambiguous. The patient
doesn't need a nursing home. I don't know whether there has
been any dialogue between the hospital and the patient's family. It's been a long time since he was home.
MHC: [Talks with the patient off the record.] What do you
want to do?
Patient: It doesn't really matter. I could get a room in Kingwood with my Social Security.
MHC to Social Worker: Does the patient ever leave Weston?
Social Worker: No.
See text note 92, supra.
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The defense lawyer held a conference with family members.
The defense attorney had not interviewed the patient or the family
prior to the hearing. Following the conference defense counsel
called the patient's wife to testify. She indicated that she had been
married to the patient since 1937.
Defense Counsel: If the patient is released will you take care
of him?
Wife: Yes, I took care of him for 10 years and am ready to if
he is ready to come back home.
[Defense calls the patient's son who testifies that: He can stay
with us. I have room for him. My wife's father was at Weston
for three or four months, so we can handle it.]
MHC to Son: Why hasn't your father visited you during the
past fourteen years?
Son: He didn't ask to come out on short visits. He wanted to
be released.
Defense calls the patient as a witness. The patient refused to
take the oath saying, "I'll leave that up to the court." The MHC
allowed the patient to testify without taking an oath.
Defense Counsel: Are you ready to go home?
Patient: Yes, as ready as I ever was.
Defense Counsel: Are you ready to resume your place in
society?
Patient: Yes, to be a preacher.
Defense Counsel: Will you try to get along with people?
Patient: Yes, I always did.
Defense Counsel: Do you need time to pack up?
Patient: My toothbrush and razor. Ha.
[MHC expressed reluctance to release the patient.]
MHC: Doctor, ifI release the patient today, how soon can the
community mental health center follow up?
Psychiatrist: Within ten days to two weeks.
The MHC requested that the time be reduced to no more than
one week. The patient took his wife's arm, grinned at her and
walked out.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss2/3

94

